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 Abstract 
 
The influence of emotion on memory and the role of encoding and 
retrieval effects were examined in a series of 10 experiments. Retrieval effects 
were examined in the first 3 experiments by investigating the success of 
different memory retrieval strategies. Positive emotional enhancement of 
recognition was found in traditional two-alternative forced-choice recognition 
and a task which encouraged a nonanalytic retrieval strategy. No emotional 
enhancement of memory was found in a task which encouraged an analytic 
retrieval strategy or when a Remember / Know / Guess judgement followed 
recognition. The paradigm was adapted to a within-participants design but 
emotional enhancements of recognition were no longer found. The next 7 
experiments explored encoding effects with a paradigm investigating visual 
specificity of memory. Participants identified whether pictures were Same / 
Similar / New (SSN) in comparison to those shown at study. The findings from 
the SSN and Remember / Know / New paradigm were compared,  with 
negative emotional enhancement of memory found in both. Negative and 
positive emotional enhancement of memory for specific visual details was 
found, with a central-peripheral trade-off in memory with negative emotion 
when objects were presented on congruent neutral backgrounds. Eye 
movements were recorded at encoding to examine attentional effects. 
Attentional narrowing was found on scenes with a negative object but no 
attentional effects were found with positive emotion. In the last 3 experiments 
associative memory, implicit memory, distinctiveness of emotional stimuli and 
warnings of emotion were measured and manipulated but could not account for 
 the memory effects. Surprisingly, the emotional memory effects remained even 
when stimuli were blocked into emotional groups radically altering the 
distribution of visual attention. The implications of the results for choice of 
experimental stimuli, task instructions in experimental paradigms and the 
memory processes of encoding and retrieval are discussed. 
 
 Acknowledgements 
 
Completing the research in this PhD and writing this thesis has been the 
most challenging and rewarding experience of my academic life. There are 
several people whom I wish to thank for their help and support throughout the 
three years in which I completed my PhD. Firstly, thank you to Dr Peter 
Chapman who supervised my work throughout this lengthy process and whose 
guidance and support helped me successfully develop a disjointed collection of 
ideas into a cohesive programme of research. 
Thank you to the School of Psychology, University of Nottingham for 
providing the resources which enabled me to conduct this research. Thank you 
to Dr Richard Tunney and Dr David Clarke for providing feedback on the first 
two years of my PhD work and asking challenging questions in my progression 
vivas which helped prepare me for the final viva voce. Thank you to members 
of the Cognition and Language Research Group for providing support on the 
technicalities of eye-tracking and listened supportively to several presentations 
on my work in progress.  
Thank you to Dr Dana Samson and Dr Dinkar Sharma for examining 
my PhD, making the viva voce an enjoyable experience and for providing me 
with insightful and constructive comments on how to successfully publish and 
continue the research in this thesis. 
Finally, thank you to my family for supporting me and enduring the 
stress and challenges of life with a PhD student. Thank you to Otto for his 
bounding enthusiasm for the simple joys in life which was renewed afresh each 
morning and was often the kick-start needed on mornings when my confidence 
 and motivation was waning. Most importantly, thank you to Fenja who kept the 
rest of my world turning even when that of my PhD had stalled, and without 
whose love, support, humour and endless patience I would not have had the 
courage to embark upon a PhD nor the fortitude to complete it.  
 1 
Contents 
 Page 
List of FiguresÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 3 
List of TablesÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 7 
Chapter 1 Ð IntroductionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 11 
Chapter 2 - Influence of emotion on processes at the time of retrieving a 
memoryÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 43 
     Experiment 1ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 48 
     Experiment 2ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 65 
Chapter 3 - Methodologies to investigate the influence of emotion on 
memoryÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 82 
      Experiment 3ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 82 
      Experiment 4ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 100 
Chapter 4 - The influence of emotion on specific visual details of 
memoryÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 132 
      Experiment 5ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 133 
      Experiment 6ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 143 
      Experiment 7ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 157 
Chapter 5 - Which alternatives to attention focusing could explain 
emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity?............................... 182 
      Experiment 8ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 192 
      Experiment 9ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 209 
      Experiment 10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 222 
 2 
      Meta-analysis: Experiments 6-10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 236 
Chapter 6 Ð DiscussionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 261 
ReferencesÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 283 
Appendix 2.1. IAPS Numbers for pictures stimuliÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 302 
Appendix 2.2. ANOVAAnalyses for Experiment 1E: RKG ResponseÉÉ 303 
Appendix 3.1. Visual properties of photographs from Experiment 3ÉÉ... 306 
Appendix 4.1. Chapter 4. Analysis of Same, Similar, New responses to 
Same, Similar, New itemsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 308 
Appendix 5.1. Chapter 5. Analysis of Same, Similar, New responses to 
Same, Similar, New itemsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 318 
Appendix 5.2. Analysis of variance in ratings for encoding task of 
Experiments 9 and 10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 320 
 
 
 3 
List of Figures 
 Page 
Chapter 2  
Figure 2.1. Experiments 1 and 2: Performance by repetitions and emotion 
for each task (preference, recognition, recognitionÐanalytical, recognitionÐ
nonanalytical, recognitionÐRKG)ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 54 
Chapter 3  
Figure 3.1. Experimental procedureÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 90 
Figure 3.2. Recognition performance across task and emotion blockÉÉÉ 92 
Figure 3.3. Possible relationship between Same, Similar, New and 
Remember, Know, New responses to Same itemsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 107 
Figure 3.4. Responses to Same items in the Same/Similar/New and 
Remember/ Know/New taskÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 128 
Figure 3.5: Relationship between Same/Similar/New and 
Remember/Know/New responses to Same itemsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 130 
Chapter 4  
Figure 4.1. Examples of pairs of negative, neutral and positive objects used 
in Experiment 5ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 135 
Figure 4.2. Mean average specific and general recognition to negative, 
neutral and positive objectsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 140 
Figure 4.3. Examples of stimuliÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 147 
Figure 4.4. Mean average specific and general recognition to neutral 
backgrounds presented with negative, neutral or positive objects and 
 
 
 4 
negative, neutral or positive objects presented with neutral backgroundsÉ.. 153 
Figure 4.5. Mean average specific and general recognition to neutral 
backgrounds presented with negative, neutral or positive objects and 
negative, neutral or positive objects presented with neutral backgroundsÉ.. 166 
Figure 4.6 Average total gaze duration on background and object scene 
components across scenes containing a negative, neutral or positive object.. 172 
Chapter 5  
Figure 5.1. Specific and General Recognition to Negative, Neutral or 
Positive objects presented with Neutral Backgrounds and Neutral 
Backgrounds presented with Negative, Neutral or Positive objectsÉÉÉ... 198 
Figure 5.2. Average total gaze duration on object and background scene 
components of scenes with a negative, neutral or positive objectÉÉÉÉ.. 204 
Figure 5.3. Specific and general recognition to negative, neutral or positive 
objects presented with neutral backgrounds and neutral backgrounds 
presented with negative, neutral or positive objectsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 214 
Figure 5.4. Average gaze duration on object and background scene 
components for scenes with a negative, neutral or positive objectÉÉÉÉ. 218 
Figure 5.5. Specific and General Recognition to Negative, Neutral or 
Positive objects presented with Neutral Backgrounds and Neutral 
Backgrounds presented with Negative, Neutral or Positive objectsÉÉÉ... 228 
Figure 5.6. Average gaze duration on object and background scene 
components of scenes with a negative, neutral or positive objectÉÉÉÉ.. 232 
Figure 5.7. Specific and general recognition of objects as function of  
 5 
emotion averaged across Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 241 
Figure 5.8. Specific and general recognition of backgrounds as function of 
emotion of object with which they were initially presented averaged across 
Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 241 
Figure 5.9. Specific and General Recognition to objects by emotion for 
Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.ÉÉ. 245 
Figure 5.10. Specific and General Recognition to backgrounds by emotion 
of object initially presented with for Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10ÉÉÉÉ.. 246 
Figure 5.11. Experiments 7- 10: Average number of fixations on different 
components of sceneÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 250 
Figure 5.12. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Aggregated values for average number of 
fixations on different components of scenes according to emotional valence 
of objectÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 250 
Figure 5.13. Proportion of number of fixations on the object in comparison 
to scene as a wholeÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 252 
Figure 5.14. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Average total gaze duration on different 
components of sceneÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 254 
Figure 5.15. Proportion of total gaze duration on the object in comparison 
to scene as a wholeÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 255 
Figure 5.16. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Average fixation duration on different 
components of sceneÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 257 
Chapter 6  
Figure 6.1. Summary of findings from Chapter 2ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 261 
 6 
Figure 6.2. Summary of findings from Chapter 3ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 262 
Figure 6.3. Summary of findings from Chapters 4 & 5: Negative emotion... 265 
Figure 6.4. Summary of findings from Chapters 4 & 5: Positive emotionÉ. 265 
Figure 6.5. Average ratings of emotional arousal and valence (scale -5 to 
+5) given for negative, neutral and positive objects used in Experiment 5É 273 
 
 7 
List of Tables 
 Page 
Chapter 2  
Table 2.1. Experiments 1 and 2: Results of ANOVA analysis across 
conditionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 57 
Table 2.2. Experiment 2: Results of separate ANOVA analysis on 
Remember/Know/Guess responsesÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 71 
Table 2.3. Experiment 2: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a 
Remember / Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a 
two alternative forced-choice test (by number of training presentations)É... 72 
Table 2.4. Experiment 2: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a 
Remember / Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a 
two alternative forced-choice test (by emotion block)ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 72 
Table 2.5. Experiment 2: Separate ANOVA analysis on Recollection and 
FamiliarityÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 74 
Chapter 3  
Table 3.1. Low-level visual properties of photographic stimuli in Negative, 
Neutral and Positive Emotion BlocksÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 88 
Table 3.2. Proportion of each emotion block given RKG responses by 
accuracyÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 94 
Table 3.3. Average proportion of Remember, Know or Guess responses 
given after correct recognition of item by emotionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 94 
Table 3.4. Average confidence ratings by accuracy and emotion blockÉÉ. 96 
 8 
Table 3.5. Criteria for giving responses to same items in the Same, Similar, 
New task and Remember, Know, New taskÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 106 
Table 3.6. Mean average proportion (SE) of Same, Similar, New items 
given Same/Similar/New responses for Negative and Neutral itemsÉÉÉ. 118 
Table 3.7. Same/Similar/New task: Same items. Repeated measures 
ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratingsÉÉÉÉ.. 119 
Table 3.8. Same/Similar/New task: Similar items. Repeated measures 
ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratingsÉÉÉÉ.. 120 
Table 3.9. Same/Similar/New task: New items. Repeated measures 
ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratingsÉÉÉÉ.. 121 
Table 3.10. Mean average proportion of Targets (same items) and 
Distractors (similar + new items) given Remember/Know/New responses 
for Negative and Neutral itemsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 123 
Table 3.11. Remember/Know/New task: Same items. Repeated measures 
ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratingsÉÉÉÉ.. 125 
Table 3.12. Remember/Know/New task: Distractors (Similar and New 
items). Repeated measures ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on 
confidence ratingsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ... 126 
Chapter 4  
Table 4.1. Experiment 5: Proportion of same/similar/new items given 
ÔsameÕ/ÔsimilarÕ/ÔnewÕ responses for negative, neutral and positive objects.. 141 
Table 4.2. Mean responses for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) & emotion (negative, neutral or positive).. 152 
 9 
Table 4.3. Mean responses for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) & emotion (negative, neutral or positive)..  165 
Table 4.4. Mean average number of fixations, gaze duration and fixation 
duration made on object or background scene components for scenes with a 
neutral background and a negative, neutral or positive objectÉÉÉÉÉÉ 169 
Chapter 5  
Table 5.1. Mean proportion of responses for objects and backgrounds as a 
function of item type (same, similar or new) & emotion (negative, neutral 
or positive)ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 196 
Table 5.2. Eye measurements on object or background scene components 
for scenes with a neutral background and negative, neutral or positive 
objectÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 202 
Table 5.3. Mean responses for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) & emotion (negative, neutral or positive).. 212 
Table 5.4. Eye measurements on object or background scene components 
for stimuli of negative, neutral or positive emotionsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 215 
Table 5.5. Mean responses for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) & emotion (negative, neutral or positive).. 225 
Table 5.6. Eye measurements on object or background scene components 
for stimuli of negative, neutral or positive emotionsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.. 230 
Table 5.7. Average ratings on approach/avoidance task for scenes with a 
negative, neutral or positive objectÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 237 
Table 5.8. ANOVA analyses and planned comparisons on approach /  
 10 
avoidance task ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 237 
Table 5.9. Results of paired samples t-tests to compare recognition across 
emotions for specific and general recognitionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 243 
 
  11 
Chapter 1 Ð Introduction 
General introduction to thesis 
 In this thesis I will examine the influence of emotion on memory by 
examining factors at the time of encoding and retrieving memories of 
emotional and non-emotional stimuli that have been presented in a controlled 
laboratory setting. To set this research into the context of existing theory and 
research findings I will provide an overview of the relevant scientific literature 
in three sections. Firstly, I will review the psychology of emotion by 
considering what emotions are, how they can be defined and the influence that 
has been demonstrated of emotion on different aspects of cognition. Secondly, 
I will consider the different methodologies which can be used to investigate 
emotionsÕ effects on memory, how emotions and memory can be measured and 
manipulated and how different methods of research may impact on research 
findings of emotionsÕ influence on memory. Lastly, I will review the specific 
literature investigating emotionsÕ effects on memory, the different stages of the 
memory process that can be affected by emotion and the different types of 
memory which can be affected by emotion. 
  
Section 1. The psychology (cognition) of emotion 
Section 1.1. What are emotions? 
 Emotions are pervasive and fundamental experiences of human 
life which motivate us to pursue short and long term goals in our life. Emotions 
can have diverse effects on our behaviour which can be constructive or 
destructive; the fear of a dangerous situation could initiate a flight response 
which could save your life whereas, the grief of a person recently bereaved of a 
  12 
loved one could block their ability to function in everyday life. Historically, 
cognition and emotion have frequently been considered, and studied, as 
separate entities. However, modern research suggests that rather than being 
separate, cognition and emotion are intertwined and interdependent at both 
psychological and neural levels (see Fox, 2008 for a review).  
There are different broad frameworks which have been used to study 
emotion and which emphasise different components of emotion and describe 
different levels of involvement of cognitive processes. In this thesis research 
will be discussed which takes a variety of perspectives on emotion, and may 
often draw from a variety of these theories to aid in the interpretation of 
research findings. Four broad approaches to investigating emotion are briefly 
described below: 
i) emotions are biologically given: emotional systems have evolved to co-
ordinate various body processes (including motor systems, energy, 
physiological reactions & cognitive processes) to solve immediate and 
urgent problems (e.g. Ekman, 1992). E.g. if threat is detected the 
emotion of fear would facilitate an appropriate flight reaction. 
ii) emotions are socially constructed: emotions are culturally learned 
behaviours to help define the cultureÕs values and assist members of the 
society in negotiating social roles. E.g. In North European & American 
societies where individualism is highly valued, anger is often seen as an 
acceptable way of asserting oneÕs will, whereas in Asian societies 
where collectivism is highly valued, it may be seen as unacceptable as 
it indicates social disharmony (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). 
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iii) emotions are the result of perception of bodily changes: emotions occur 
as a result of a change in the environment (e.g. seeing a bear in the 
woods) leading to a variety of physiological changes (e.g. activation of 
brainÕs autonomic system and biochemical and hormonal changes in 
specific parts of the brain). The perception of these changes causes the 
emotional experience (Damasio, 1999; James, 1884; Lange, 1885). 
iv) emotions are the result of cognitive appraisals: the way we evaluate or 
appraise the significance of events around us determines the type of 
emotion that is experienced. It is not the situation itself that produces an 
emotion, but how the situation is appraised in reference to current goals 
that produces an emotion (Arnold, 1960). 
 
These four approaches to the study of emotion are not mutually exclusive or in 
competition with one another. The approach taken will depend on the 
experimental paradigm being used. It is, however, important to be aware of 
these different approaches because findings in one area may not necessarily 
generalize to another area and this may be due to the different definitions of 
emotion.  
 
Section 1.1.1. How can emotions be defined? 
The scientific examination of the psychology of emotion requires a 
systematic approach to be taken to a range of experiences which are inherently 
difficult to standardise and define. There is no general agreement in emotion 
science on how emotion should be defined and many theorists agree that each 
emotion consists of a number of different components, including subjective 
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report, physiological response and cognitive appraisal (Fox, 2008). 
Nevertheless, in contemporary psychological research where emotions are 
often induced by the presentation of emotional and non-emotional stimuli to 
research participants, emotions have most often been defined along the 
dimensions of emotional arousal and emotional valence. It has been argued that 
the dimensional view of emotion is parsimonious in that the two primary 
dimensions of arousal and valence can define the entire spectrum of emotional 
behaviour, rather than assuming discrete and independent specific emotional 
states (e.g. fear, anger, joy) (see Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992). 
These bipolar factors of pleasantness and intensity have been found to account 
for most of the variability in judgements of the affective nature of text passages 
and map onto behavioural dimensions of direction (approach or avoidance) and 
vigour (i.e. mobilization) (see Bradley et al., 1992). 
There are also researchers who examine the different influences of 
defined specific emotions, such as anger, fear, happiness, contentment, rather 
than by just defining emotion along two linear dimensions of arousal and 
valence. It has been argued that for a more complete understanding of the 
effects of emotion it is essential to take into account the differing motivations 
and problem-solving strategies associated with discrete emotions (Levine & 
Pizarro, 2006).  
   
Section 1.1.2. Moods vs. emotions 
 In everyday language we more often discuss the moods we are 
experiencing than our emotions. There is no accepted agreement on the 
distinction between emotions and moods, but in general an emotion is a 
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reaction to a particular situation or object that can be quite intense and leads to 
temporary changes in function and arousal whereas, a mood is a less intense 
experience which lasts for a longer period of time and is often more general. 
One view that is widely accepted is that moods are continually present and 
provide the emotional backdrop to our everyday life, and emotions are the 
disruptions superimposed onto this background (Davidson, 1994). It is 
sometimes unclear in psychological research whether a mood state or emotion 
is being investigated as a mixture of these may be activated in many studies 
(e.g. Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). 
 
Section 1.1.3. Everyday emotions and clinical disorders of emotion 
 Up to this point the theories of emotion discussed have been of levels of 
everyday experiences of emotions, rather than the extreme levels which may 
occur in clinical disorders of emotion, such as clinical depression or anxiety. 
This is because there is a divide in the literature between theories considering 
normal emotions, and those considering emotional disorders. There has been an 
attempt to integrate the literature and provide a framework that incorporates 
theoretical explanations of everyday ÔnormalÕ emotions and the extreme levels 
of emotion experienced by people with clinical disorders by Power & 
Dalgleish (1997). However, in this thesis the emphasis is on investigating 
cognitive processes which are affected by emotion and therefore we will only 
consider theories of normal emotion in our interpretation and exploration of 
findings, rather than also trying to integrate theories of emotional disorders. 
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Section 1.2. What effects do emotions have on different aspects of 
cognition? 
 Emotions have been shown to affect early stages of cognition, such as 
perception and attention, as well as late stages of cognition, such as 
information-processing and memory. Research and theoretical findings 
concerning emotionsÕ influence on attention and memory will be considered in 
detail in Section 3 of this introduction as these areas are directly relevant to this 
thesis. A brief overview of the influence of emotion on the cognitive processes 
of perception and information processing will be given here to provide some 
context to the investigations of emotionsÕ influence on memory.  
Section 1.2.2. An early stage of cognition: Perception 
 In the earliest stage of cognition, that of perceiving stimuli in the 
environment, one of the challenges is in deciding which information should be 
perceived and processed as it is not possible to process all of the information 
with which we are surrounded. As described above, one proposed function of 
emotion is to prioritise and demarcate the important information which should 
be perceived and processed, at the expense of irrelevant information.  
 Emotion has been shown to enhance early perceptual processing from 
neuroimaging studies (for a review see Vuilleumier, 2005) and behavioural 
consequences of this modulation of early visual processing have also been 
demonstrated. Presentation of a negative emotional cue (a fearful face) has 
been shown to increase the level of sensitivity to contrast in a simple visual 
stimulus (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006). Further research has shown that 
emotion can both improve and impair early vision, by inducing a trade-off in 
visual processing and that this may benefit perceptual dimensions which are 
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relevant for survival at the expense of those that are less relevant (Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2009). 
Perception and attention are closely linked, although the exact nature of 
this relationship has been a matter of considerable debate. It has been argued 
that emotional information can only be identified after the allocation of spatial 
attention (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007), but it has also been argued that 
emotional information can be identified before the allocation of spatial 
attention (Kern, Libkuman, & Otani, 2005). 
Section 1.2.3. Emotional information processing 
In addition to influencing initial perception, emotion has been shown to 
have an influence on the processing of information. Positive and negative 
emotions have been shown to differentially affect a personÕs style of evaluating 
arguments; positive emotions tend to promote heuristic, creative and flexible 
modes of information processing, while negative emotions tend to promote a 
more analytic, data-driven mode of information processing (Levine & Pizarro, 
2006). Bodenhausen, Kramer & Susser (1994) found that individuals who had 
been induced to feel happy rendered more stereotypic judgements than did 
those in a neutral mood, but that when motivation was sufficient they were able 
to overcome this influence of stereotypes on their judgements. 
This change in information processing style brought about by emotion 
has been shown to affect the judgements that people make in attributing the 
cause of a personÕs behaviour. Forgas (1998) found that negative moods 
decreased the Fundamental Attribution Error, where people attribute the cause 
of a personÕs behaviour to dispositional personal factors within the personÕs 
control, even when there is strong evidence that the personÕs behaviour was 
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due to external influences. In contrast, positive moods were found to increase 
this fundamental attribution error. 
 
Section 2. Which methodologies can be used to research emotionsÕ 
effects on memory? 
There are several methodological approaches which can be taken to the 
study of emotion and memory, and each has their own influence on the 
experimental design and potential findings. These are discussed below. 
Section 2.1. How can emotions be measured? 
 There are several components of emotion and a wide variety of ways in 
which these can be measured. Emotions can be measured by examining 
subjective feelings of emotion, as well as physiological, behavioural and neural 
responses to emotion (Coan & Allen, 2007). Examples of the different 
measurements which could be taken when studying emotion include: 
i) Behavioural responses to emotion: Facial expressions are a critical way 
in which humans express their emotion and can be measured using 
human-observer-based coding systems, facial electromyography or 
using automated computer vision to analyse facial images (Cohn & 
Kanade, 2007). In extensive studies Ekman (e.g. 1992) has examined 
facial expressions in different cultures and concluded that they are 
universal, rather than culturally specific manifestations of emotion. 
ii) Physiological responses to emotion: A set of photographs that was 
developed to study emotion (International Affective Picture System, 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) and rated along two dimensions of 
valence and arousal was validated by measuring physiological 
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responses. These included skin conductance response to measure 
sweating, and reflexive eyeblinks which increase with unpleasant 
material (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). 
iii) Neural responses to emotion: Various neuroimaging techniques 
(including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
electroencephalography (EEG)) have been used to measure blood flow 
and electrical activity of the brain, respectively, to examine how these 
change with the experience of emotion (Norris, Coan, & Johnstone, 
2007). 
iv) Subjective feelings of emotion: subjective reports of emotion have also 
been assessed by using diary-based studies and self-report time 
sampling of experiences in situ (Brandstatter, 2007). One advantage of 
this method is that naturally occurring emotions can be studied. 
v) Questionnaire-based measures of emotion: There are standardised 
questionnaires which can be used to measure a variety of emotional 
states. These can measure levels of emotion to assess for a clinical 
disorder such as depression with the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). They can also be used to 
measure a range of positive and negative emotions and are particularly 
used in research examining mood; one example is the Multiple Affect 
Adjective Checklist which assesses several discrete emotions using 
ratings on 132 adjectives (see Gray & Watson, 2007 for a review). 
 
One of the primary considerations when deciding which methodologies 
to use to research the effects of emotion is to decide whether to study the effect 
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of naturally occurring emotions or whether to experimentally manipulate 
emotions in the controlled setting of a laboratory. The measures above could be 
used to measure both types of emotion but they may interfere to a greater or 
lesser extent with the feelings of the participant dependent on whether the 
emotion was naturally occurring or induced. For example; a questionnaire-
based measure may provide an accurate measure of a personÕs general feeling 
of depression in their life, but in a laboratory experiment where the emotions 
induced may be short lived a questionnaire based measure may not be so 
appropriate. 
 
Section 2.1.1. Study of naturally occurring emotions  
 The influence of naturally occurring emotions on cognition can be 
studied by investigation of a public event which was experienced as part of 
everyday life by a large number of people. One example of this type of 
research was conducted by Kensinger & Schacter (2006) who examined 
memory for the final game in the 2004 American League playoff series. By 
comparing the experiences of people who were fans of the winning team with 
fans of the losing team, Kensinger & Schacter (2006) were able to explore the 
influence of positive and negative emotions on memory for the same event. 
There are limitations in the use of this type of paradigm which include the 
inability to control the parts of the event to which people originally paid 
attention. This is one of the reasons why a great deal of research in this area is 
conducted within a laboratory setting. 
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Section 2.1.2. Experimentally manipulated emotions  
 There are a variety of ways in which the emotions of a participant can 
be manipulated in a laboratory setting. In psychological experiments the aim is 
normally to induce emotions of a similar intensity and valence with each 
participant. In order to do this emotions are often induced by presenting the 
participant with stimuli which have been designed to induce specific emotions. 
Although it is not possible, or assumed, that the emotions experienced by each 
participant will be the same, the aim is to produce similar emotional 
experiences for each participant. This may be done by presenting participants 
with an article to read which may induce a happy, neutral or sad mood (e.g. 
Handley & Lassiter, 2002), presenting participants with a film clip (e.g. 
Hemenover & Schimmack, 2007) or by playing clips of emotionally evocative 
music to participants (e.g. Witvliet & Vrana, 2007). After mood-inductions 
such as these the mood manipulation is generally checked using a standardised 
questionnaire. 
In contrast to using standardised stimuli to induce mood, another 
method which can be used to induce emotions is to ask participants to recall 
events from their own life which make them feel a certain way (e.g. Berntsen, 
2002). One of the difficulties of this method of inducing emotions is that the 
researcher has no control over the events which participants may recall and it is 
possible that some participants may have experienced more traumatic or 
euphoric events than other participants and therefore the emotions produced 
may differ both qualitatively and quantitatively between participants. 
With the methods described above the aim is often to induce a 
relatively long lasting mood. This can influence the design of the experiment 
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because mood inductions generally require experimental designs with between 
group comparisons of the influence of emotion. Emotions tend to be 
manipulated in a different way in experiments which are designed to examine 
the effect of different emotions on cognitive processes in the same participant. 
In this type of experiment participants may be presented with a series of 
pictures or words, each of which are designed to invoke an emotion of a certain 
valence or intensity. A database of photographs and words was developed by 
Lang and colleagues (Lang et al., 2001) to be used in the study of emotion. 
This database consists of hundreds of stimuli which have been rated in a series 
of studies by participants for levels of emotional valence and arousal. The 
stimuli from this International Affective Picture System have been used in a 
large number of studies to examine the influence of emotion on cognition (see 
Libkuman, Otami, Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007). 
The advantage of stimuli such as these are that complex experiments 
can be designed which need a large number of stimuli to be presented to 
participants. In experiments with a large number of stimuli the emotional 
experience of each individual participant may not be measured, instead ratings 
are provided by a different group of participants, ideally sampled from the 
same population as the participants conducting the experiment. This is to avoid 
the contamination of experimental manipulations which may occur if 
participants are required to complete the experimental task in addition to rating 
the stimuli for emotion. 
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Section 2.2. How can memory be researched? 
 The study of memory can also be divided into that of naturally 
occurring memories, and experimentally produced memories, in the same way 
as for the study of emotion, as described above. The way in which the study of 
memory and emotion can differ between autobiographical and laboratory 
controlled memories will be discussed below.  
Section 2.2.1. Study of autobiographical memories  
 Three ways in which emotional autobiographical memories have been 
studied are in the examination of eyewitness memory, flashbulb memory and 
memory for traumatic experiences. The research has often focused on whether 
emotion enhances or diminishes the strength of memory for an event and 
whether special mechanisms are required to account for the effects of emotion 
on memory (Schooler & Eich, 2000). The accuracy of eyewitness testimony is 
very often impaired and different aspects of the event may be remembered 
better than others. Memory for central details may be improved but at the cost 
of an impairment in memory the peripheral details, as has been demonstrated in 
studies which have found a weapon focusing effect, whereby memory is 
impaired in the presence of a gun or knife (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). 
Flashbulb memories were first described by Brown & Kulik (1977) and refer to 
vivid memories for hearing about salient news stories, such as the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy, or more recently the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York. These flashbulb memories were 
characterized as being incredibly accurate and involving unique memory 
processes, although later research has refuted both the level of accuracy of such 
memories (e.g. McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988) and its unique mechanism 
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(e.g. Conway et al., 1994). Memory for traumatic events has been shown to be 
accurate, although not flawless, for a variety of experiences, including 
kidnapping and concentration camp experiences and the study of these 
memories has at times been wrought with heated debate (Schooler & Eich, 
2000). One of these debates has been whether traumatic memories can be 
completely forgotten and then accurately recovered.   
 The study of emotional disorders has often included an examination of 
autographical memories and how their characteristics may differ between 
people with and without a certain disorder. For example Williams et al. (2007) 
found that the specificity of autobiographical memories can have an important 
impact on clinical depression, and that when this specificity of memories is 
modified it can reduce depression. 
Section 2.2.2. Experimentally produced memories 
 Memories of events that happen in a controlled laboratory setting or 
memories of various stimuli that are presented to participants within an 
experiment can be measured in different ways. There are normally three 
distinct phases in experimental memory research: an encoding or study phase 
in which materials are presented to the participant, a retention interval and a 
retrieval or test phase in which the participant attempts to respond to a 
question, for which the answer involves the use of the initially studied 
information (Lockhart, 2000). Experimental manipulations at each of these 
stages of memory research can be used to provide insight into the cognitive 
processes involved in memory. In this thesis the influence of emotion on 
memory will be considered by experimental manipulations at the times of 
encoding and retrieving a memory. The impact of manipulations at these stages 
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of the memory process are briefly described below. There can also be 
manipulations during the retention interval but these are not discussed here.  
The encoding stage in memory research can be manipulated by altering 
the mental state of the participant at the time they are encoding material, e.g. 
by inducing a particular mood state as described above. Altering the demands 
of the task performed whilst encoding the material can also affect the level of 
memory performance, e.g. asking participants to judge the honesty of a person 
can lead to subsequent higher recognition than asking them to judge the sex of 
the person (see Lockhart, 2000). 
With regard to the retrieval phase, in memory research up until the 
1970s most researchers considered that different methods of evaluating 
memory were just alternative methods for measuring a common underlying 
construct, but since then memory tasks have been seen as possibly involving 
different processes that potentially tap different memory subsystems (Lockhart, 
2000). One often used measurement of memory is the recognition test. In this 
participants are presented with exactly the same material in the test phase as in 
the study phase. Items may be presented singly in a free-choice recognition test 
(yes, no response required) or in a forced-choice recognition test one 
previously studied item is presented along with other new (distractor) items. 
The choice of distractors is important in recognition tests as the degree of 
similarity between old and new items is one factor which will affect the 
difficulty of the test.  
In recognition tests it is important to take account of the possibility of 
guessing and achieving chance success, although in forced recognition tests 
participants are more likely to make an unbiased judgement between 
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alternatives (Lockhart, 2000). The consideration of bias is particularly 
important when investigating the influence of emotion on memory as emotions 
of different types have been found to have different effects on recognition bias. 
Phaf & Rotteveel (2005) found that induced positive affect led to a more liberal 
recognition criterion for test words, and that negative affect led to more 
cautious tendencies without any effect on accuracy of recognition memory. 
Levine & Bluck (2004) found similar results with memory for a real world 
event in that participants who were happy about the event having occurred had 
a lower threshold for judging events as having occurred than participants who 
had a negative reaction to the original event. Bless et al. (1996) found that 
participants who had a happy mood induced were more likely to ÔrecogniseÕ 
information that was consistent with their general knowledge about eating in a 
restaurant, whereas people with a sad mood induced tended to be more 
conservative and accurate in their judgements. Bless et al. (1996) also found 
that happy participants outperformed sad ones when performing a secondary 
task whilst listening to a story on which their memory was later tested, and 
took this to suggest that happy moods do not decrease cognitive capacity or 
processing motivation in general, because if this were the case an impaired 
secondary-task performance would be expected. In contrast, Forgas (1998) 
found that positive mood reduced and negative mood improved memory 
performance. Although different information processing strategies have been 
shown with positive and negative moods these are not always related to the 
objective accuracy of accounts and it appears that people may believe they 
remember happy events more clearly than they do (Levine & Bluck, 2004). 
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These findings may differ in the degree to which they are due to an influence 
of emotion at the time of encoding or retrieval.  
Other types of memory test include cued recall where participants are 
presented with a cue and required to recall an item associated with that cue; 
serial recall in which participants are instructed to recall items in the order in 
which they were presented and free recall in which participants are asked to 
recall items in any order. 
 All the tests above have been described as measuring explicit memory 
where there is a conscious effort to fulfill the instructions to remember. This is 
in contrast to implicit memory tasks where memory is revealed in responses to 
the task even though the participant may not be aware that a form of 
remembering has occurred. Tasks of implicit remembering can include word-
fragment completion and the level of preference for an item, preference has 
been taken as a measure of memory in techniques such as the mere exposure 
paradigm. This paradigm will be used in Chapter 2 of this thesis to examine the 
influence of factors at the time of retrieving a memory. We will also be 
examining how the Remember/Know paradigm impacts on findings of an 
emotional influence on memory. 
Section 2.2.3 Interactions between experimental design and findings 
 There can be an interaction between the factors of experimental design, 
which have been described above, and the experimental findings, particularly 
in the influence of emotion on memory. The type of measurement of memory 
which is used can affect the findings uncovered. One example of this relates to 
investigations of recollection. Recollection was found to be enhanced by 
negative emotion when measurements were based on a paradigm which 
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required participants to distinguish between which items they ÔRememberÕ and 
which items were ÔKnownÕ (Ochsner, 2000). In contrast, recollection has been 
found to be impaired by negative emotion when measurements were based on a 
paradigm which required participants to identify in which half of the study 
phase an item had initially appeared (Aupee, 2007). 
 
Section 3. Emotion and memory 
Section 3.1 What influence can emotion have on memory? 
Feelings of emotion accompany many events experienced in life and 
can influence the memories of these events. Memories of traumatic and 
upsetting events may appear to be vivid and clear but on closer inspection there 
may only be some aspects of the event for which the accuracy of memory is 
enhanced, whilst other aspects of the event may be completely forgotten 
(Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990). Emotion clearly has an effect on memory, 
but there is no agreement in the literature on whether its effects are enhancing 
(e.g. Ochsner, 2000) or detrimental (e.g. Aupee, 2007). We need to be able to 
define and predict in which conditions memory is enhanced and in which 
conditions it is impaired by emotion, in order to understand the mechanisms by 
which memory is influenced. Memory is not a single unified process and the 
effects of emotion on memory have been examined for different processes 
(encoding, consolidation or retrieval) and using different assessments (e.g. 
recognition, free recall) (see Fox, 2008 for a recent review). Before we can 
hope to understand the overall effect of emotion on memory we first need to 
understand the effects it has on any one of the processes.  
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Section 3.2. Which processes underlying memory may be affected by 
emotion? 
The processes by which emotions may have their enhancing effect on 
memory are not clear. Early research demonstrated the effect that mood has on 
encoding and retrieval of memory (e.g. Bower, 1981) and a recent review 
confirmed that people process, encode and retrieve information differently 
depending on their mood (Levine & Bluck, 2004). The main focus in this thesis 
will be on the encoding and retrieval stages and these will be reviewed below, 
although there will be brief consideration of emotionÕs influence on 
consolidation. 
Section 3.2.1. Encoding  
Two theories of how emotion may influence the encoding process of 
memory are going to be discussed here. One theory is that emotion alters the 
allocation and distribution of attention to an event or stimulus (e.g. 
Christianson, 1992) and another theory is that emotional materials are 
relatively rare or unusual and that this enhanced distinctiveness of emotional 
stimuli may lead to the enhancement of memory (e.g. Schmidt, 2002). 
Section 3.2.1.1 Attention  
 Emotion may influence attentional processes at the time of encoding 
information into memory by emotional stimuli garnering more attentional 
processing capacity or by a spatial narrowing of the distribution of visual 
attention onto emotional stimuli. 
i) Additional attentional processing capacity 
The need for additional attentional resources to enable the more successful 
encoding of emotional items and lead to their enhancement in memory has 
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been found when memory is assessed by recognition (e.g. Clark-Foos & 
Marsh, 2008; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007) and by free 
recall (Kern et al., 2005). Talmi et al (2007) compared memory for emotional 
and neutral pictures that were encoded whilst participants concurrently 
completed a divided attention task of auditory discrimination or whilst 
participants could give their full attention to encoding the pictures. They found 
the use of additional attention at encoding could completely account for an 
emotional enhancement in memory of positive pictures. In contrast, the 
enhancing effects of negative emotion on memory were found to be 
independent of attention. Similarly, Clark-Foos & Marsh (2008) found that 
dividing attention at encoding and during the memory test, by participants 
performing a random number generation task, did not effect the negative 
emotional enhancement of word recognition relative to neutral words. Again 
similar results were found by Kern et al (2005) that dividing attention at the 
time of encoding worsened neutral, but not negative, memories.  
The patterns of findings across these studies are very similar but 
differing interpretations of what they reveal about the role of attention in 
emotionÕs effects on memory have been given by the authors. Kern et al (2005) 
interpreted their results within the two-path theory proposed by Christianson, 
Loftus, Hoffman, & Loftus (1991) and argued that pre-attentive processing can 
account for the emotional advantage of negative stimuli. They rejected the 
second path of Christianson et alÕs (1991) theory of post-stimulus elaboration 
as an account of their findings, as there was no opportunity for this elaboration 
to occur due to the blocking of rehearsal between the encoding of stimuli and 
testing of memory. Talmi et al (2007) suggested that negative emotion has an 
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effect on memory that is separate from attentional processes, with the effects of 
emotion on memory direct and independent from the effects on attention. In 
contrast, Clark-Foos & Marsh (2008) argued that the involvement of attention 
in the emotional enhancement of memory is dependent upon circumstances. 
They suggested that there may be a conscious route by which emotion 
enhances memory through the allocation of additional attention at encoding to 
negative emotional stimuli, but when this route is constrained there may be a 
more automatic route through which the emotional enhancement occurs. Clark-
Foos & Marsh (2008) emphasised that the laws which will be found to govern 
the relationship between emotion and memory will greatly depend on the 
context of the findings and therefore may differ with different stimuli and 
tasks. 
 Studies such as those described above have demonstrated that 
emotional stimuli can be processed with a reduced amount of attention at the 
time of encoding and therefore in circumstances where attentional capacity is 
reduced, e.g. during the completion of a concurrent task, emotional stimuli 
receive more complete processing than neutral stimuli and this may lead to 
more accurate memory for the emotional than neutral stimuli. This suggests 
that attention may be deployed in a different way for emotional and neutral 
stimuli, and this deployment may result in better memory for emotional than 
neutral stimuli.  
ii) Attention narrowing 
Another way in which the deployment of attention may differ between 
emotional and neutral stimuli could be in the spatial distribution of attention 
across a visual stimulus. Research investigating memory for central and 
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peripheral elements of emotional and non-emotional scenes has suggested that 
attention narrowing may occur with negative stimuli (Kensinger et al, 2007b). 
There are suggestions that whilst negative emotion leads to a narrowing of 
attention, positive emotion leads to a broadening of attention (Fredrickson, 
2001). It has been argued that a positive mood may lead to a shift in 
information processing style by relaxing inhibitory control, leading to a 
reduced tendency to narrowly focus attention (Freitas, Katz, Azizian, & 
Squires, 2008; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). The degree to which attention 
is broadened with positive emotion has been found to depend on the level of 
approach motivation. Low approach motivated positive affect has been 
associated with a greater breadth of attention than high approach motivated 
positive affect (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008).  
Attention narrowing at the time of first witnessing an event has been 
invoked to account for the phenomenon of weapon focus in memory, where 
there is an impairment of memory for an event in which there was a weapon 
present (Loftus et al., 1987). Groeger (1997) argued that attention narrowing 
may not be due to narrowing in the distribution of attention across an event, but 
a narrowing in the span of attention on different parts of an event. It may be 
that with attention narrowing less information can be attended to but that what 
is attended to is well remembered (Groeger, 1997).  
 Other researchers have investigated memory with alternative definitions 
of central and peripheral elements of a scene and have found indications of the 
involvement of attention. Cook, Hicks, & Marsh (2007) found that increased 
attention toward valenced material led to a reduction in the binding of its 
contextual details into memory (another possible aspect of peripheral 
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information). Touryan, Marian, & Shimamura (2007) found that the memory 
for objects embedded in the periphery of a scene was better for negative than 
neutral objects, but that associative memory for these items and their peripheral 
information was worse for scenes with a negative than neutral object.  
Research by Easterbrook (1959) is often cited as providing support for the 
proposal that this attentional narrowing is a defensive motivational reaction to 
emotional arousal (e.g. Christianson et al., 1991; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & 
Schacter, 2006). It is this motivational reaction which is thought to lead to a 
focus on central rather than peripheral elements of a scene. Easterbrook (1959) 
investigated animal learning and found that an animal which was aroused by 
means of food deprivation became less sensitive to information at the periphery 
of an event. 
iii) Pre-attentive processes 
Studies measuring eye movements have shown that visual attention is 
drawn preattentively to emotional, over neutral, pictorial stimuli, suggesting 
that emotional content is likely to engage attention in early processing stages 
(Nummenmaa, Hyona, & Calvo, 2006). This may lead to a difference in the 
amount of information encoded from emotional and neutral stimuli. The 
possibility of pre-attentive processing of emotional stimuli (as argued by Kern 
et al, 2005) has been directly investigated and it was found that although 
affective processing of emotional and non-emotional pictures can occur 
without overt attention, some resources for covert attention are required (Calvo 
& Nummenmaa, 2007). The ability to process the gist of scenes in peripheral 
vision is thought to lead to the selective attentional orienting seen with 
emotional stimuli but direct fixations on the stimuli are required to enable 
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processing of the specific content of both emotional and neutral scenes (Calvo, 
Nummenmaa, & Hyona, 2008). This suggests that processing of emotional 
stimuli does not occur pre-attentively and that covert attention is required to 
encode emotional stimuli in a way that leads to their enhancement in memory 
over neutral stimuli. Both positive and negative pictures have been shown to 
capture attention more quickly than neutral stimuli (Calvo & Lang, 2004; 
Lobue & DeLoache, 2008; Nummenmaa et al., 2006).  This capturing of 
attention has been found to be due to the emotion conveyed rather than 
schematic properties of the images  as evidenced by preferential detection of 
fear-conditioned neutral faces compared with neutral and happy faces (Milders, 
Sahraie, Logan, & Donnellon, 2006). 
 
Section 3.2.1.2. Distinctiveness of emotional events 
Emotional stimuli may be remembered better because they are more 
rare or unusual and are therefore distinctive and stand out relative to 
background neutral events.  Distinctiveness has been shown to enhance 
memory regardless of emotionality (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) and therefore 
this characteristic of emotional stimuli may contribute to its enhancement in 
memory (for a review see Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007). 
Emotional items can be more distinct in both an absolute and relative sense 
because they possess unique features which are not shared with other typical 
items that are stored in long-term memory and because they are distinctive 
relative to other neutral items presented within an experimental context (cf. 
Schmidt, 1991).  
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In studies using the Remember-Know paradigm the advantage for 
Remember responses both with emotional words and pictures has been taken as 
evidence that emotional stimuli are encoded more distinctively than neutral 
stimuli leading to subsequently different experiences during recollection 
(Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000). Dewhurst & Parry (2000) found an 
enhancing effect of emotion on recollection only when a mixed list of 
emotional and random-neutral words was presented, but not when pure lists of 
emotional words and random-neutral words were presented. This suggested 
that the relative distinctiveness of emotional stimuli may be responsible for the 
enhancing effect of emotion.  
Section 3.2.2. Consolidation 
 There is evidence from pharmacological studies that emotion can 
influence the processes of consolidating memories. The administration of a 
powerful stimulant with arousing properties (e.g. amphetamine) before and 
after learning a list of words was found to lead to improvement in memory for 
those words (Soetens, Casaer, D'Hooge, & Hueting, 1995). Emotionally-
arousing events and stimuli are more likely to be consolidated into long-term 
memory and the mechanisms underlying this process are probably linked to 
actions which are modulated by the amygdala with involvement of the 
hippocampus (Fox, 2008). 
Section 3.2.3. Retrieval 
 There are a number of studies which have found that emotion can 
influence the retrieval process of memory. 
In a review of research into autobiographical memory it was concluded 
that the overgenerality in memory, often seen in depression, results from a 
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failure to retrieve episodic memories, rather than a failure in the initial 
encoding of these memories (Williams et al., 2007). Mathews, Richards & 
Eysenck (1989) found that when clinically anxious people, in comparison to 
controls, listened to and wrote down homophones the former were more likely 
to write down the threatening meaning, rather than neutral meaning, of the 
homophone. The interpretive bias that operates with these anxiety-prone 
individuals in making them preferentially aware of the more threatening 
meaning of such events (Mathews et al., 1989) may be a function of a different 
retrieval strategy to that used by non-anxious individuals. 
Different patterns of emotional enhancement have been found when 
different tasks are used to measure memory and this may indicate that different 
tasks encourage participants to retrieve memories in different ways. Better 
memory for positive than negative trait information was found when 
information was encoded with reference to the self, but not with reference to 
another person, when memory was measured by free-recall but not when it was 
measured by recognition (D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden 2005). 
DÕArgembeau et al. (2005) suggested retrieval processes may explain some 
part of their findings as the provision of cues at the time of retrieval in the 
recognition task seemed to eradicate the emotional differences found with free 
recall.  
Neuropsychological studies using fMRI have shown greater and 
differential activity with successful recognition of emotional, compared to 
neutral items, both at the time of encoding, and at the time of retrieval (Dolcos, 
LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004, 2005). These findings have also been shown to hold 
when examining the retrieval of neutral stimuli encoded in an emotional 
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context, in contrast to emotional stimuli themselves. Smith, Henson, Rugg, & 
Dolan (2005) conducted an fMRI study and found that distinct neural circuits 
are engaged during the retrieval of memories which were formed in association 
with emotional contexts, in comparison to those formed in association with 
neutral contexts. Smith, Dolan & Rugg (2004) examined recognition memory 
for neutral objects that were associated with positive, negative or neutral 
contexts at encoding. They found additional ERP effects at early and late 
stages of retrieval for objects that were studied in emotional contexts. Larger 
and more sustained ERP effects have also been shown in the recognition of 
words that were studied in the context of negative sentences, rather than neutral 
sentences (Maratos & Rugg, 2001). 
It appears that there does seem to be an effect of emotion on the way 
memories are retrieved. Further investigation is needed to find out how these 
processes of retrieval may differ. Retrieval effects in memory have been 
suggested by research into mere exposure (Whittlesea & Price, 2001) and this 
will be explored in chapter 2. 
 
Section 3.2.7. Do different types of emotion exert influence through different 
mechanisms onto different memory processes? 
In studies of emotion and memory, emotion has been most commonly 
defined along the two dimensions of arousal and valence. Some studies have 
found that the better memory for emotionally arousing stimuli is independent 
of emotional valence (Bradley et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the importance of 
focusing on discrete emotions has been recognised (Levine & Pizarro, 2004) 
and several studies have found that particular emotions can have different 
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effects on cognitive processes, even when they evoke similar levels of arousal 
(Levine & Pizarro, 2006). Positive and negative emotions that are similar in 
intensity of arousal have been shown to have very different effects on how 
information is processed and remembered (Bless et al., 1996; Bodenhausen et 
al., 1994; Forgas, 1998; Levine & Bluck, 2004). In studies of autobiographical 
memory there is also no clear picture of the relationship between emotional 
intensity and valence (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004).  
Buodo, Sarlo, & Palomba  (2002) examined attentional resources 
available whilst participants viewed pleasant and unpleasant highly arousing 
images. They found that participants took longer to respond to a tone whilst 
viewing sexual images (positive valence) and images of blood/injury (negative 
valence) than other images, but there was no difference in reaction time when 
viewing images of sport/adventure (positive valence) and threat (negative 
valence) (Buodo et al., 2002).  
 
Section 3.3. Types of memory affected by emotion  
Section 3.3.1. Recollection and familiarity 
In addition to examining overall levels of memory accuracy it is also 
possible to consider the way in which emotional material is better remembered, 
and the form of the memory which contains the remembered material. Studies 
using the Remember-Know paradigm have found that emotional enhancement 
of memory can be found in recollection, but not in familiarity (Dolcos et al., 
2005; Ochsner, 2000).  
Ochsner (2000) used a remember / know paradigm to investigate the 
processes of recollection and familiarity that may underlie recognition and 
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found that recollection was significantly boosted for negative or highly 
arousing photographs, and boosted to a lesser degree for positive stimuli. There 
was no effect of emotion on familiarity. Ochsner (2000) suggested that this 
increased recollection of negative over positive photos may be due to the 
increased relevance of negative photos to chronically important goals (i.e. 
staying away from danger) in contrast to the positive stimuli which may have 
been less relevant to personal goals. Alternatively, it may have been that the 
emotion from positive stimuli enhanced the processing of all (studied and 
nonstudied) items and therefore any increased processing fluency as a result of 
previous exposure to an item was negligible by comparison (Ochsner, 2000).  
The effects of emotion on recollection have been confirmed in several 
studies using a Remember-Know paradigm. Enhanced recollection has been 
found for pleasant and unpleasant pictures compared to neutral pictures when 
tested after one year, with no effect on familiarity (Dolcos et al., 2005). A 
similar pattern of results has been found with words, with positive or negative 
words subsequently better recognised than emotionally neutral words, and 
differences in recollection of the stimuli, as opposed to familiarity, as measured 
by number of Remember or Know responses (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). An 
examination of negative emotional valence and arousal found that both factors 
led to increased numbers of remember responses for negative compared to 
neutral words (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). 
However, inconsistent results have been found when using a different 
methodology to study recollection. Aupee (2007) examined recollection using 
the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) (Jacoby, 1991). The Process 
Dissociation Procedure was developed by Jacoby (1991) to measure 
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recollection and familiarity within a task. Recollection is measured as the 
difference in responding when people are specifically directed to not use 
responses from a particular study episode (an exclusion condition) compared to 
when they are directed to use responses from that study episode (an inclusion 
condition). For example people may be instructed to respond ÔyesÕ to some 
items which they have seen and heard in an earlier encoding task, and to some 
other items only if they were heard in the earlier encoding task but not if they 
were also seen. Aupee (2007) used a variant of PDP which required 
participants to complete two recognition tests where in one test they must 
identify pictures presented in the first half of the training phase, and not those 
presented later, or ÔnewÕ pictures. In the second test they must discriminate 
between pictures presented in the second half of the training phase and other 
pictures. Aupee (2007) found evidence that in this case, recollection of 
negative and positive pictures was lower than for neutral pictures. Aupee 
(2007) suggested that this lack of emotional enhancement, in contrast to that 
found in many earlier studies, may be due to the information upon which 
recollection must be based when using the PDP method. Estimates of 
recollection derived from PDP are greatly determined by the ability to recollect 
a very targeted piece of information, such as when the stimulus was presented 
(Aupee, 2007). This is in contrast to studies using estimates of recollection 
based on a Remember-Know judgement where it may be that ÔrememberÕ 
judgements were based on a memory of the emotional reactions and associated 
thought at the time of encoding, rather than recollection of specific perceptual 
details of the stimulus (Aupee, 2007). 
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Section 4. Summary 
 In this chapter I have examined a range of issues including the 
psychology of emotion, suitable methodologies for examining the influence of 
emotion on memory and the different cognitive processes through which 
emotion might exert its effects on memory. The aim of this literature review 
was to place the research of this thesis within the context of the wider relevant 
literature which is not considered within the experimental chapters. In this 
thesis the later chapters will focus on aspects of encoding a memory, however, 
this thesis begins by examining retrieval effects in memory using a mere 
exposure paradigm. The mere exposure phenomenon was first investigated by 
Zajonc (1968) who found that when stimuli are presented very briefly, repeated 
exposure may lead to an increased preference for the stimuli with an 
accompanying absence of any explicit recognition. In chapter 2 this paradigm 
is used as a way of briefly presenting participants with stimuli to assess 
different strategies of retrieving a memory (as investigated by Whittlesea & 
Price, 2001) and of examining the influence this may have on the emotional 
enhancement of memory. In chapter 3, the implications of using different 
methodologies to examine the relationship between memory and emotion are 
examined by comparing memory assessed with a Remember/Know/Guess 
paradigm and other measures of recognition. We also examine how findings 
from the Remember/Know/New paradigm compare to a newer paradigm for 
investigating recognition memory in which memory for the specific visual 
details of stimuli is assessed (Kensinger et al., 2006). In chapter 4, we begin to 
consider effects at the time of encoding a memory and use the visual specificity 
paradigm to examine the relationship between attentional factors and the 
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emotional influence on memory. In the last experimental chapter (chapter 5), 
we consider how encoding factors other than attention may be involved in the 
emotional enhancement of memory for specific visual details. 
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Chapter 2. Influence of emotion on processes at the time of retrieving a 
memory 
A limited amount of published research has directly investigated the 
influence of factors at the time of retrieval on the emotional enhancement of  
memory (Fox, 2008). The research that there is has mainly been conducted 
using neuroimaging rather than behavioural methods, with the aim of 
examining neural activity at the times of encoding and later retrieving 
memories. Greater and differential neural activity has been found for 
successfully recognised emotional items, compared to neutral items, both at the 
time of encoding and at the time of retrieval with studies using fMRI (Dolcos 
et al., 2004, 2005). Differential activity at retrieval has also been found using 
the more time sensitive method of measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) 
(Maratos & Rugg, 2001; Smith et al., 2004).  
   Findings from neuroimaging research indicate that there may be 
processes at the time of retrieving memories which are different for emotional 
than non-emotional memories. There are some findings from behavioural 
studies which also indicate this possibility. The study of recognition memory 
and emotion has often been broken down into an examination of different 
subjective experiences of memory through the use of the Remember-Know 
procedure, where participants differentiate between recognition based on 
specific memories for the episodic context (Remember responses) and 
recognition accompanied only by a sense of familiarity (Know responses) (e.g. 
Dolcos et al., 2005; Ochsner, 2000). An emotional enhancement of recollection 
appears to be a robust findings with effects demonstrable immediately after 
study (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000), after 2 weeks (Ochsner, 2000) and after one 
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year (Dolcos et al., 2005). There are different interpretations of the results 
obtained from this Remember-Know procedure, in one of these it is argued that 
recollection and familiarity are two separate and distinct memory retrieval 
processes (Yonelinas, 2001). If this specific interpretation is used this may 
indicate that the finding of emotional enhancement in recollection, but not 
familiarity (e.g. Dolcos et al., 2005; Ochsner, 2000) could result from different 
retrieval processes being used to search for memories of emotional and non-
emotional content. Effects at the time of retrieval may be in addition to 
explanations based on the more distinctive encoding of emotional stimuli 
which it has been argued leads to different subjective experiences of memory 
for emotional and neutral stimuli (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). 
   Research into memory for briefly presented non-emotional stimuli has 
found evidence for retrieval effects. The mere exposure paradigm is one 
methodology which has been used to highlight retrieval effects in memory 
(Whittlesea & Price, 2001). In the first two experiments of this thesis we will 
use a paradigm from Whittlesea & Price (2001) to examine how retrieval 
strategies may differ between emotional and neutral stimuli. The mere 
exposure effect is the preference for previously exposed stimuli in the absence 
of recognition for those same stimuli. The mere exposure effect has been 
explained with reference to an implicit or explicit awareness of a memory (e.g. 
Seamon et al., 1995). However, Whittlesea & Price (2001) proposed an 
alternative explanation, namely that tasks of preference and recognition in 
traditional mere exposure experiments encourage the use of different 
processing styles at the time of retrieval. They argue that these different 
processing styles can account for the instances where recognition succeeds and 
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where it fails in these tasks.  Whittlesea & Price (2001) argued that recognition 
of a stimulus results from the experience of increased fluency of processing 
which occurs when a stimulus is encountered again after initial exposure. They 
argued that for successful recognition to occur the strategy at retrieval must 
enable the experience of this enhanced fluency of processing. In a series of 
experiments Whittlesea & Price (2001) demonstrated that different levels of 
recognition performance depended on retrieval processing style, which was 
manipulated by task instructions. Successful recognition was shown with 
nonanalytic strategies at retrieval and failed recognition with analytic strategies 
at retrieval. By varying the number of times stimuli were presented they also 
demonstrated that level of recognition was sensitive to the amount of pre-
exposure. Nonanalytic strategies of processing at retrieval were induced by 
giving participants instructions which gave them no motive to analyse stimuli 
for distinctive features, instead they would be motivated to process items 
nonanalytically by considering their overall image. Analytic strategies of 
processing were induced by giving participants instructions which gave them a 
motive to analyse the stimuli for the details of distinctive features. Although 
the Whittlesea & Price experiments were primarily designed to understand the 
mere exposure effect, they also provide a powerful theoretically motivated 
paradigm for exploring retrieval strategy effects in recognition memory. It is on 
this basis that the experiments in Chapter 2 and 3 use this paradigm to explore 
the retrieval of emotional stimuli. 
    The exposure durations in the mere exposure paradigm described in 
Whittlesea & Price (2001) are much shorter than has been used in previous 
research investigating memory and emotion. However, these durations should 
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be suitable for investigating memory for emotional and neutral stimuli because 
even at rapid presentation rates of stimuli the ability to discriminate emotional 
from neutral pictures has been demonstrated by measuring physiological 
responses such as skin conductance (Smith, Low, Bradley, & Lang, 2006). 
There has been previous research with emotional stimuli and the mere 
exposure paradigm but the focus of this was limited to preference of stimuli 
rather than subsequent recognition (e.g. Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; 
Robinson & Elias, 2005; Witvliet & Vrana, 2007) and did not seek to 
systematically manipulate retrieval style.  
   There may be several routes by which the emotion of a stimulus 
influences its subsequent retrieval. Emotion has been shown to affect the 
fluency of processing experienced when encountering both visual and auditory 
stimuli (see Ferre, 2003). A specific example is the more accurate recognition 
of affective than neutral words which has been demonstrated even with words 
that are only presented extremely briefly to participants (Kitayama, 1990). This 
may be due to increased fluency of processing experienced when viewing the 
emotional words. For an emotional enhancement of memory to occur it may be 
necessary to experience this enhanced fluency of processing which is 
associated with affective stimuli. Whittlesea & Price (2001) argued that 
fluency of processing is enhanced with nonanalytic processing at retrieval. We 
might thus predict that analytic processing at retrieval would prevent the 
experience of enhanced processing fluency and therefore block or reduce any 
emotional enhancement of memory. 
    Nonanalytic processing may be more efficient than analytic processing 
with emotional stimuli by harnessing the enhanced memory for gist that has 
  47 
been found with emotional events. Emotion has been shown to enhance 
memory for the gist of an event at the expense of memory for details of the 
event (Adolphs, Tranel, & Buchanan, 2005; though cf. Kensinger et al., 2006). 
The experimental findings of studies which failed to find an emotional 
enhancement of memory may be explained by considering how the task 
affected processing style at retrieval. In a task where participants were asked to 
recall targeted perceptual aspects of experimental stimuli (i.e. in which half of 
an experimental list stimulus pictures were presented) the recall of emotional 
stimuli was worse than of neutral stimuli (Aupee, 2007). This may be because 
the task induced participants to use an analytic processing style at retrieval and 
may suggest that in some cases analytic processing may not just block any 
emotional enhancements of memory but actually reverse them. 
   This study tests the hypothesis that different strategies in the retrieval of 
emotional stimuli contribute to the emotional enhancement of memory. If 
people spontaneously use a nonanalytic processing strategy when attempting to 
recognise emotional material then we would expect to see an advantage for 
emotional material, over neutral, in traditional recognition tasks.  However, we 
would expect any emotional enhancement effects to disappear in an analytic 
processing strategy task as this would prevent participants from using the 
successful strategy that we propose normally gives an advantage with 
emotional material. There is one additional issue of retrieval style in 
recognition tests that we wish to explore. In some recent research participants 
were asked to perform a recognition task and then subsequently make a 
Remember / Know / Guess (RKG) judgement (e.g. Dahl, Johansson, & 
Allwood, 2006; Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Dougal & Rotello, 2007). It is 
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possible that having to distinguish between Remembered and Known items in 
this way may encourage participants to use a different strategy than in a 
traditional recognition task and that this change may be to a more analytic 
strategy. Thus, an additional hypothesis we will test is that making subsequent 
RKG judgements after first identifying which picture was recognised may 
encourage an analytic strategy of retrieval and reduce emotional enhancement 
in recognition. 
 
Section 1. Experiments 1A and 1B: Preference and Recognition 
Section 1.1. Introduction 
We have adapted the procedure used by Whittlesea & Price (2001) to 
allow comparison of performance across positive, negative and neutral blocks 
of stimuli. All other aspects of the design are a replication of Whittlesea & 
Price (2001). We first assessed whether it was possible to obtain the mere 
exposure effect with a stimuli set drawn from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) (Lang et al., 2001). We also wanted to see if there was 
an emotional enhancement effect in these tasks with stimuli presented for the 
very short durations used by Whittlesea & Price (2001). We predicted there 
would be an emotional enhancement with greater recognition memory for 
negative and positive than neutral photographs.  
Section 1.2. Method 
Design 
In these experiments the influence of emotion (positive, negative and 
neutral) on judgements of preference and recognition was examined. 
Participants were shown negative, neutral and positive stimuli in a within-
  49 
participant blocked stimuli design and completed in either the preference or 
recognition judgement task. Memory performance was tested using a two-
alternative forced choice design.  
Participants 
12 University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 1A 
(Mean age 20.58 years (SD 2.97yrs); 7 female), and 12 in Experiment 1B 
(Mean age 20.00 years (SD 1.41yrs); 5 female). All participants received an 
inconvenience allowance of £2 and were native English speakers. Exclusion 
criteria were that participants who had a phobia of animals should not take part, 
as several of the photographs were of animals. None of the participants in 
experiments 1A Ð 2E participated in more than one of the experiments. 
Materials 
One hundred and eighty photos from the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang et al., 2001) were selected as stimuli. Erotic photos or those of 
extreme mutilation were excluded for ethical reasons. Normative ratings of 
arousal and valence (from Lang et al., 2001) were used to create three groups 
of 60 photos of negative, neutral or positive valence and to match positive and 
negative photos on arousal (See Appendix 2.1 for IAPS photo numbers). 
Within each group of stimuli (positive, negative or neutral) there were pairs 
which were matched for arousal (within one point on the Likert type 1-9 scale 
of arousal ratings from Lang et al., 2001). These arousal-matched pairs were 
used for the two Ðalternative-forced-choice recognition test. Half of the pairs 
comprised stimulus set A and the remainder comprised stimulus set B. Photos 
were selected to maximise heterogeneity of content within each valence group 
and across the pairs that were matched for valence and arousal. The proportion 
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of photographs of people, animals and inanimate objects / scenes were similar 
across valence groups and stimulus sets A and B. Mean ratings for valence and 
arousal were: positive valence 7.16 (SD 0.54), arousal 5.12 (SD 0.81); neutral 
valence 5.01 (SD 0.56), arousal 4.66 (SD 0.87); negative valence 3.02 (SD 
0.53), arousal 5.15 (SD 0.75). Within each valence group stimulus sets A and B 
had similar means and standard deviations for valence and arousal. Within each 
valence group of stimuli one third were presented once, one third three times, 
and one third five times. This was part of the original experimental design of 
Whittlesea & Price (2001) and allowed for a demonstration of increasing levels 
of recognition across repetitions. Presentations of photographs were 
approximately 7.6 cm square (246 by 246 pixels maximum), with some 
variability to allow for presentation of photos without distortion of their 
original proportions. Photos were presented on a Compusys PC with a 17Ó 
monitor with a 75 Hz refresh rate and screen resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. 
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime (version 1.1). Ethical approval 
for this study was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the School of 
Psychology, University of Nottingham.  
Procedure 
To allow informed consent participants were told they would be shown 
some photographs which would vary in pleasantness. Participants were told 
they would be shown three series of rapidly presented photographs and after 
each series they would complete a task relating to those pictures. All 
subsequent instructions appeared on computer.  
Study Phase:  
  51 
Participants were initially shown a practice study phase Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation (RSVP) of 10 photographs to familiarise them with the 
presentation rate. All example photos were of neutral valence and were single 
objects against a plain background, in contrast to the complex scenes used for 
experimental stimuli. Of the 10 practice photographs, 9 appeared for 40 msec 
and the last photo appeared for 160 msec. This was to aid participantsÕ memory 
of this image which was used in the later practice task. Participants were then 
shown the study phase for the first valence block (i.e. positive, negative or 
neutral photos). Photographs were presented in an RSVP with 40msec 
exposure per picture and no interstimulus interval.  
In each study block participants were shown 30 different photographs. 
Participants were shown photographs from one set of A or B, with the 
unexposed set used to create matched pairs during the test phase. The use of 
sets A and B for targets or distractors was counterbalanced across participants. 
From each set of 30 photographs; 10 were shown once, 10 three times and 10 
five times. This resulted in an RSVP stream of 90 photographs in three study 
blocks with 270 photographs being shown in total across the 3 study blocks. 
Each RSVP stream lasted 3.6 seconds. The order of photographs in the study 
phase was randomised for each participant, with the exception that repeated 
presentations of the same item were separated by at least 2 other photographs. 
The selection of photos to be shown 1, 3, or 5 times in the study phase block 
was randomised for each participant. A fixation cross appeared centrally for 
one second before the RSVP began. Participants were not given task 
instructions until after the first study phase and so were unaware of the exact 
nature of the task until this time.  
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Retrieval phase:  
Participants then completed two examples of the retrieval task with 
target stimuli from the practice study phase. In each test trial participants were 
shown a pair of photographs. One member of the pair (Ôthe targetÕ) was from 
the earlier RSVP, the other member of the pair (Ôthe distractorÕ) was from the 
corresponding unexposed set. The target and distractor were matched for 
valence and arousal. In Experiment 1A participants were asked which picture 
they preferred. Participants had to choose the left or the right photograph by 
pressing Ô1Õ or Ô9Õ respectively on the keyboard. The test question and response 
keys were shown under each pair of photographs. After the practice examples, 
participants completed the test phase for the first valence block. There were 30 
test trials for each valence block. Each photo was shown only once in the test 
phase. The pair of photos was shown side by side, with the location of the old 
item chosen at random. There was a new random order of test trials for each 
participant.  
After completing the test phase for the first valence block, participants 
were shown the study phase for the second valence block. This was in the same 
format as the first valence block. Participants then completed the test phase for 
the second valence block (but without any example tasks). Participants were 
then shown the study phase for the third valence block and then completed the 
test phase for the third valence block. The order of the valence blocks of 
positive, negative or neutral stimuli was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
   Experiment 1B was identical, except that the subjects were asked to 
perform a recognition judgement instead of a preference judgement. No 
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detailed instructions were given; participants were simply asked which picture 
they recognised from each pair. 
 
Section 1.3. Results  
    Firstly, we examined the probabilities of selecting the old item in the 
preference test given that the item had been exposed one, three, or five times in 
training (see Figure 2.1). CohenÕs d will be reported as the effect size for all t 
tests. In none of the conditions were the ÔoldÕ items selected significantly more 
often than chance would predict [One: t(11) = 1.71, p = 0.12, d = 0.49; Three: 
t(11) = 0.81, p = 0.44, d = 0.23; Five: t(11) = 0.61, p = 0.55, d = 0.18]. We 
performed the same steps in analysing the recognition test. Items presented 
three times were selected about 7% more often than chance would predict 
(t(11) = 2.21, p < 0.05, d = 0.64). The selection of items presented five times 
was approaching statistical significance [t(11) = 2.01, p = 0.07, d = 0.58]. Items 
presented once were not selected more often than chance would predict [t(11) < 
0.001, p = 1.00, d = 0].  
   Secondly, we conducted an ANOVA to compare the probabilities of 
selecting the old item when it had a positive, negative or neutral valence and 
when it was shown one, three or five times. For all ANOVA analyses 
MauchlyÕs test of sphericity was conducted and in those cases where the 
assumptions were not met the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p values are 
reported. These will be indicated with degrees of freedom which contain 
decimal points. CohenÕs f will be reported as the effect size for all factors and 
interactions for the ANOVAÕs. TukeyÕs Honestly Significant Difference 
pairwise comparisons were conducted for all significant main effects revealed 
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by the ANOVAÕs. These are only reported where significant. For brevity the 
ANOVA values in this chapter only are reported in tabular form (see Table 
2.1). 
For the preference task, a 3 (emotion) x 3 (repetitions) repeated 
measures ANOVA found no significant effects for the main effects of emotion 
block or repetitions, nor for the interaction between emotion block and 
repetitions. For the recognition task, a 3 (emotion) x 3 (repetitions) repeated 
measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of  emotion block, but not 
for repetitions or the interaction between emotion block*repetitions. Post hoc 
analyses revealed that significantly more ÔoldÕ photos were selected from the 
positive than neutral block (q = 4.15, p < 0.05).  
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Figure 2.1. Experiments 1 and 2: Performance by repetitions and emotion for 
each task (preference, recognition, recognitionÐanalytical, recognitionÐ
nonanalytical, recognitionÐRKG). Error bars show ± 1 S.E. of mean. 
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Table 2.1: Experiments 1 and 2: Results of ANOVA analysis across condition 
Condition Emotion block Repetitions Emotion block 
*Repetitions 
Experiment 1 Ð Photo Duration 40ms 
Preference 
 
F(2,22) = 0.91, MSe = 
2.13, p = .42, f = 
0.29 
F(2,22) = 0.96, MSe = 
1.17, p = .40, f = 0.29 
F(4,44) = 1.34, MSe = 
2.27, p = .27, f = 0.35 
Recognition Ð 
Straightforward 
F(2,22) = 4.39, MSe = 
2.59, p < .05, f = 
0.63 
F(2,22) = 1.91, MSe = 
2.41, p = .17, f = 0.42 
F(4,44) = 0.64, MSe = 
2.80, p = .64, f = 0.24 
Recognition Ð 
Analytic 
F(2,22) = 0.14, MSe = 
2.90, p = .87, f = 
0.11 
F(2,22) = 0.63, MSe = 
2.29, p = .54, f = 0.24 
F(4,44) = 0.33, MSe = 
2.05, p = .86, f = 0.17 
Recognition Ð 
Nonanalytic 
F(2,22) = 0.24, MSe = 
2.84, p = .79, f = 
0.15 
F(2,22) = 1.11, MSe = 
2.39, p = .35, f = 0.32 
F(4,44) = 0.30, MSe = 
3.16, p = .88, f = 0.17 
Recognition Ð 
RKG 
F(2,22) = 0.95, MSe = 
1.77, p = .40, f = 
0.29 
F(2,22) = 0.51, MSe = 
3.14, p = .61, f = 0.21 
F(4,44) = 1.10, MSe = 
2.35, p = .37, f = 0.32 
Experiment 2 Ð Photo Duration 80ms 
Preference 
 
F(2,22) = 0.58, MSe = 
1.77, p = .57, f = 
0.23 
F(2,22) = 1.08, MSe = 
2.23, p = .36, f = 0.31 
F(4,44) = 0.83, MSe = 
2.82, p = .51, f = 0.27 
Recognition Ð 
Straightforward 
F(2,22) = 4.39, MSe = 
2.42, p < .05, f = 
0.63 
F(2,22) = 2.03, MSe = 
3.70, p = .16, f = 0.43 
F(4,44) = 0.16, MSe = 
2.51, p = .96, f = 0.12 
Recognition Ð F(2,22) = 0.06, MSe = F(2,22) = 1.50, MSe = F(2.5,27.2) = 2.12, MSe 
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Analytic 2.31, p = .94, f = 
0.08 
3.57, p = .25, f = 0.37 = 3.50, p = .13, f = 
0.44 
Recognition Ð 
Nonanalytic 
F(2,22) = 7.48, MSe = 
1.50, p < .01, f = 
0.82 
F(2,22) = 2.26, MSe = 
1.56, p = .13, f = 0.45 
F(4,44) = 0.45, MSe = 
2.64, p = .78, f = 0.20 
Recognition Ð  
RKG 
F(2,22) = 0.16, MSe = 
1.83, p = .86, f = 
0.12 
F(2,22) = 1.28, MSe = 
2.64, p = .30, f = 0.34 
F(4,44) = 1.27, MSe = 
2.54, p = .30, f = 0.34 
 
Section 1.4. Discussion 
   In experiment 1A we found no evidence for preference of items seen 
previously. In experiment 1B there was evidence of recognition memory with 
photos presented 3 or 5 times, although this was at a low level with 
performance about 7% above chance levels. There was no emotional 
enhancement in the preference task but in the recognition task performance 
was better for positive than neutral pictures.  
 
Section 2. Experiments 1C and 1D: Analytic and Nonanalytic Recognition 
Section 2.1. Introduction 
  We predict that an emotional enhancement of memory will be seen with 
a nonanalytic recognition style, but not with analytic recognition style. We also 
predict that in line with Whittlesea and Price (2001) overall recognition will be 
greater for nonanalytic than analytic recognition style. 
 
Section 2.2 Method 
Design 
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 In these experiments the influence of emotion on judgements of 
recognition using an analytic and nonanalytic style of retrieval was examined. 
Participants 
Twelve University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 
1C (Mean age 21.50 years (SD 2.65 yrs); 5 female), and 12 in Experiment 1D 
(Mean age 19.92 years (SD 1.50 yrs); 6 female).  
Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiments 1A and 1B. In the 
Whittlesea and Price (2001) experiments hairline crosses were used in the 
analytic and nonanalytic recognition conditions to facilitate the identification 
of an altered region of the photograph. Whittlesea and Price (2001) 
demonstrated that it was the differing instructions, and not the hairlines, that 
were responsible for inducing analytic recognition. Therefore, for ease of 
comparison of results across experiments, hairline crosses were not used in this 
experiment. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1A, except for the 
different instructions given to participants during the test phase. In Experiment 
1C (analytic recognition) participants were told that, from each pair, both 
photos had been presented previously but one of the photos had been altered 
from its previous presentation. They should select the photo they thought had 
been altered (by pressing Ô1Õ or Ô9Õ), and then point and ÔclickÕ with the mouse 
cursor in the region of the photo which they thought had been altered. 
Therefore, the correct answer was the photograph which they thought was 
different from the initial presentation. Relative to the other experiments 
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reported the response given in Experiment 1C would indicate the photograph 
participants did not remember seeing before and therefore the scores were 
reversed. In Experiment 1D (nonanalytic recognition) participants were told 
that neither photo, from each pair, had been shown previously but a photo from 
the same category as each of the test photos had been shown previously (e.g. 
another bird). They should select the photo that was globally similar to the 
photo of the same category that was shown earlier (by pressing Ô1Õ or Ô9Õ). 
 
Section 2.3. Results  
    For analytic recognition, in none of the conditions were the ÔoldÕ items 
selected significantly more often than chance would predict [One: t(11) = 1.10, 
p = .29, d = -0.32; Three: t(11) = 0.84, p = .42, d = -0.24; Five: t(11) = 0.60, p 
= .56, d = 0.17]. For nonanalytic recognition, items presented five times were 
selected about 6% more often than would be predicted by chance (t(11) = 2.64, 
p < .05, d = 0.76). Items presented once or 3 times were not selected 
significantly more often than chance would predict [Once: t(11) = 0.12, p = 
.91, d = 0.03; Three: t(11) = 1.39, p = .19, d = 0.40].    
For the analytic recognition test and the nonanalytic recognition test, 
the 3 (emotion) x 3 (repetitions) repeated measures ANOVAs found no 
significant main effects of emotion block or repetitions and the interaction 
between emotion block and repetitions was not significant (See Table 2.1 for 
ANOVA results).  
 
Section 2.4. Discussion 
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    We found evidence of recognition memory in the nonanalytic 
recognition when photos were shown 5 times, as with the straightforward 
recognition task this was at a low level at about 5% greater than chance. There 
was no evidence of recognition memory with analytic recognition. This is 
consistent with our predictions that nonanalytic recognition would be greater 
than analytic recognition. In contrast to what we were expecting we found no 
evidence of an emotional enhancement of memory in analytic or nonanalytic 
recognition. However, this may have been due to the very low levels of 
recognition memory. 
 
Section 3. Experiment 1E: Recognition followed by Remember / 
Know / Guess judgement 
Section 3.1. Introduction   
  In an attempt to uncover more of the differences between memory for 
emotional and neutral material we examined recognition followed by a 
Remember / Know / Guess (RKG) judgement.  Similarly to the analysis of 
Ochsner (2000) we used the Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight 
(1998) model of recognition memory to examine recollection and familiarity. 
We added the Guess category in line with other research using the Remember-
Know paradigm with two alternative forced choice tests (Bastin & Van der 
Linden, 2003). 
 
Section 3.2. Method 
Design 
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 In this experiment we investigated the influence of emotion on 
recognition and on a subsequent Remember, Know, Guess judgement. 
Participants 
Twelve University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 
1E (Mean age 24.42 years (SD 7.92 yrs); 7 female). 
Materials 
The same materials were used as in Experiments 1A-D. 
Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1A, except for the 
different instructions given to participants during the test phase. Participants 
were asked to perform a recognition judgement, for which instructions were the 
same as Experiment 1B. After each recognition judgement participants were 
asked to indicate their level of awareness of the memory by indicating whether 
they Remember / Know / Guess that they recognise the photo. Participants then 
indicated ÔRememberÕ if their recognition was accompanied by some 
recollective experience, ÔKnowÕ if the photograph was familiar but they had no 
recollective experience, or ÔGuessÕ if the photograph was not familiar nor was 
it accompanied by some recollective experience but they guessed that they had 
seen it earlier. They indicated this by pressing ÔRÕ, ÔKÕ or ÔGÕ on the keyboard. 
Participants were also given written instructions explaining how to differentiate 
between RKG (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003). Their understanding of these 
instructions was checked and they were asked to justify their RKG judgement 
following the two example tasks. 
  
Section 3.3. Results  
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    For the recognition test, which was followed by a RKG judgement, 
none of the ÔoldÕ items were selected significantly more often than chance 
would predict [One: t(11) = 0.39, p = .70, d = 0.11; Three: t(11) = 0.52, p = 
.61, d = 0.15; Five: t(11) = 1.62, p = .13, d = 0.47]. A 3 (emotion) x 3 
(repetitions) repeated measures ANOVA found no significant main effects for 
the main effects of emotion block or repetitions and the interaction between 
emotion block and repetitions was not significant. 
    We analysed the Remember / Know / Guess responses by conducting 
an ANOVA on each of the different types of responses separately with three 
factors of Correct or Incorrect, Emotion block and Number of repetitions.  We 
analysed Recollection and Familiarity (as per Yonelinas et al., 1998) by 
emotion block and number of repetitions. However, as recognition did not 
exceed chance it is difficult to interpret these results and therefore they are not 
reported here. (Results of these analyses are given in Appendix 2.2).  
 
 
 
Section 3.4. Discussion   
    No evidence of recognition memory was found and there was no 
evidence of emotional enhancement of memory. 
  
Section 4. General Discussion 
   Overall performance was lower than that observed by Whittlesea and 
Price (2001) and there were not many emotional effects. This may be because 
the stimuli in our experiment were more difficult to encode. Nevertheless, our 
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recognition task results are consistent with Whittlesea and Price (2001) in that, 
we do have greater recognition in the nonanalytic and straightforward 
recognition conditions than in the analytic recognition condition. It appears that 
making a Remember / Know / Guess judgement may impair memory and lead 
to an analytic stance as there was no recognition in this condition. We did not 
find a preference for previously shown stimuli, which may suggest that with 
emotional stimuli a preference task changes from a nonanalytic style of 
recognition task to an analytic task. However, this was not a prediction tested 
by Whittlesea and Price (2001). In Experiment 2 we aimed to improve 
recognition above chance levels. 
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Section 5. Experiments 2A and 2B: Preference and Recognition 
Section 5.1. Introduction 
    For Experiment 2 we doubled the exposure duration of the photographs 
in the training phase that was used by Whittlesea & Price (2001) to 80msec and 
we expected that this would improve memory dramatically over the number of 
repetitions. We repeated the experiments from Experiment 1 with a new set of 
participants and an increased length of photo exposure during the training 
phase, in all other respects Experiments 1 and 2 were identical.  
    With increased photo duration we expected to see the same pattern of 
results as in Experiments 1A and 1B, but with greater levels of performance. 
 
Section 5.2. Method 
Participants 
Twelve University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 
2A (Mean age 20.58 years (SD 1.16 yrs); 4 female), and 12 in Experiment 2B 
(Mean age 21.00 years (SD 3.28 yrs); 9 female). 
Procedure 
An identical procedure was used for Experiments 2A and 2B, as for 
Experiments 1A and 1B, except that the length of photo exposure in the 
training phase was extended to 80 msec. 
 
Section 5.3. Results  
    In the preference test significantly more of the ÔoldÕ items were selected 
than would be predicted by chance for those photos that were shown three 
times (t(11) = 2.60, p < .05, d = 0.75). However, those photos shown once, or 
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five times were not significantly more likely to be selected than by chance 
[One: t(11) = 0.42, p = .69, d = 0.12; Five: t(11) = 1.61, p = .14, d = 0.46] (See 
Figure 2.1). In the recognition test photos that were shown once were not more 
likely to be selected than chance [t(11) = 1.80, p = .10, d = 0.52]. Those that 
were shown three times were approaching significance [t(11) = 2.14, p = .06, d 
= 0.62] and those that were shown 5 times were significantly more likely than 
chance to be selected (t(11) = 4.82, p < .001, d = 1.39). 
    For the preference test, the 3 (emotion) x 3 (repetitions) repeated 
measures ANOVA found no significant effects for the main effects of emotion 
block and repetitions nor for the interaction between emotion block*repetitions 
(See Table 2.1 for ANOVA results). For the recognition test, the 3 (emotion) x 
3 (repetitions) repeated measures ANOVA found a significant main effect of 
emotion block but not of repetitions and there was no significant interaction 
between emotion block* repetitions. Post hoc analyses for emotion block 
revealed that significantly more ÔoldÕ photos were selected from the positive 
than from the neutral group (q = 4.18, p < 0.05).  
 
Section 5.4 Discussion 
    We found some evidence of preference for items seen previously, but 
only when these had been shown 3 times, not when they were shown once or 5 
times. Even though there is one significant result for the preference task it 
appears that the overall trend from Experiments 1A and 2A is towards little or 
no preference for previously exposed items. Further analysis found no effect of 
emotion block or number of repetitions in the accuracy of selecting ÔoldÕ items 
in the preference task. In the recognition test we found evidence of memory for 
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items that had been seen previously when they had been shown 5 times, with a 
trend in the same direction for those shown 3 times. An emotional 
enhancement of memory was found with photos from the positive block more 
likely to be recognised than those from the neutral block. The results for the 
recognition tests were in the same direction, and of the same effect size for 
emotion, to those obtained with the shorter 40 msec photo duration. 
 
Section 6. Experiments 2C and 2D: Analytic and Nonanalytic Recognition 
Section 6.1. Introduction 
    It was expected that we would observe the same pattern of results here 
as those found in experiments 1C and 1D. 
 
Section 6.2. Method 
Participants.  
Twelve University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 
2C (Mean age 21.67 years (SD 2.46 yrs); 6 female), and 12 in Experiment 2D 
(Mean age 19.92 years (SD 1.16 yrs); 10 female). 
Procedure.  
An identical procedure was used for Experiments 2C and 2D, as for 
Experiments 1C and 1D, except that the length of photo exposure in the 
training phase was extended to 80 msec. 
 
Section 6.3. Results  
   For analytic recognition in none of the conditions were the ÔoldÕ photos 
more likely to be selected than chance [One: t(11) = 0.26, p = .80, d = 0.07; 
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Three: t(11) = 1.53, p = .16, d = -0.44; Five: t(11) = 1.61, p = .14, d = 0.46]. 
For nonanalytic recognition photos shown once were no more likely than 
chance to be selected [t(11) = 1.60, p = .14, d = 0.46]. However, photos shown 
three or five times were more likely to be selected than chance (Three: t(11) = 
3.38, p < .01, d = 0.97; Five: t(11) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 1.63). 
    For analytic recognition, the 3 (emotion) x 3 (repetitions) repeated 
measures ANOVA found no significant effects for the main effects of emotion 
block and repetitions nor for the interaction between emotion 
block*repetitions.  For nonanalytic recognition, the 3 (emotion) x 3 
(repetitions) repeated measures ANOVA found there was a significant effect of 
emotion block but not of repetitions nor of the interaction between emotion 
block*repetitions. Post hoc analyses for emotion block revealed that 
significantly more ÔoldÕ photos were selected from the positive than from the 
neutral group (q = 4.36, p < .05), and from the positive than from the negative 
group (q = 5.04, p < .01).  
 
Section 6.4. Discussion 
    For analytic recognition, results were similar to those found with the 
shorter duration. There was still no evidence of recognition, and no effect of 
emotion block or number of photo repetitions. With nonanalytic recognition 
the expected emotional enhancement of memory that we did not find at 40 
msec, appeared with a photo exposure of 80 msec. There was an emotional 
enhancement of memory for positive over neutral and negative stimuli.  
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Section 7. Experiment 2E: Recognition followed by Remember / Know / 
Guess judgement 
Section 7.1. Introduction 
 In Experiment 1E performance overall did not exceed chance and it was 
not possible to meaningfully examine the RKG responses. With the increased 
exposure duration used in Experiment 2 we expect recognition to be greater 
than chance and therefore allow analysis of the RKG responses.  
 
Section 7.2. Method 
Participants.  
Twelve University of Nottingham students participated in Experiment 
2E (Mean age 25.83 years (SD 9.44 yrs); 4 female). 
Procedure. 
  An identical procedure was used for Experiments 2E, as for 
Experiments 1E, except that the length of photo exposure in the training phase 
was extended to 80 msec. 
 
Section 7.3. Results  
    With recognition followed by a Remember / Know / Guess judgement 
participants were more likely to select the ÔoldÕ photos whether they had seen 
these one, three or five times (One: t(11) = 2.38, p < .05, d = 0.69; Three: t(11) 
= 2.79, p < .05, d = 0.81; Five: t(11) = 4.71, p < .001, d = 1.36). A 3 (emotion) 
x 3 (repetitions) repeated measures ANOVA found no significant main effects 
of emotion block and repetitions and no significant interaction between 
emotion block and repetitions.  
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    We analysed the Remember / Know / Guess responses by conducting 
an ANOVA on each of the different types of responses separately with 3 
factors of accuracy (correct or incorrect), emotion block (negative, neutral, 
positive) and number of repetitions (presented once, three or five times) (For 
ANOVA values see Table 2.2, for means see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).  
For the ÔrememberÕ responses the main effects of repetitions and 
accuracy were significant but that of emotion block was not. The interaction 
between accuracy and repetitions was significant but none of the other 
interactions were significant. Post hoc comparisons revealed that significantly 
more ÔrememberÕ responses were made for photos shown 5 times than 3 times 
(q = 6.60, p < .001), and for those shown 5 times than once (q = 5.31, p < .01). 
Further examination of the significant interaction revealed significantly more 
correct ÔrememberÕ responses were given when the photos were shown 5 times 
than one time (q = 8.32, p < .001) and 5 times than 3 times (q = 5.48, p < .01). 
When examining the interaction according to the number of repetitions, it was 
found that significantly more correct than incorrect ÔrememberÕ responses were 
given when photos were shown 5 times (q = 6.87, p < .001) and when shown 3 
times (q = 4.02, p < .05). 
  71 
Table 2.2. Experiment 2: Results of separate ANOVA analysis on 
Remember/Know/Guess responses 
 Remember Know Guess 
Emotion block F(2,22) = 0.24, 
MSe = 1.02, p = 
.79, f = 0.15 
F(2,22) = 0.49, 
MSe = 1.22, p 
= .62, f = 0.21 
F(2,22) = 0.96, 
MSe = 1.65, p 
= .40, f = 0.29 
Repetitions F(2,22) = 12.25, 
MSe = 0.67, p < 
.001, f = 1.06 
F(1.2,12.8) = 
0.87, MSe = 
2.49, p = .38, f 
= 0.28 
F(2,22) = 6.84, 
MSe = 1.13, p 
<0.01, f = 0.79 
Accuracy F(1,11) = 22.96, 
MSe = 0.99, p < 
.001, f = 1.44 
F(1,11) = 27.04, 
MSe = 1.24, p 
< .001, f = 
1.57 
F(1,11) = 2.22, 
MSe = 2.27, p 
= .17, f = 0.45 
Emotion block*Repetitions F(4,44) = 1.40, 
MSe = 0.61, p = 
.25, f = 0.36 
F(2.3,25.4) = 
1.49, MSe = 
1.54, p = .25, f 
= 0.37 
F(4,44) = 1.16, 
MSe = 0.81, p 
= .34, f = 0.32 
Emotion block*Accuracy F(1.2,13.1) = 2.65, 
MSe = 1.28, p = 
.09, f = 0.49 
F(2,22) = 0.02, 
MSe = 1.90, p 
= .98, f = 0.04 
F(2,22) = 0.27, 
MSe = 1.93, p 
= .77, f = 0.16 
Repetitions*Accuracy F(2,22) = 4.62, 
MSe = 0.97, p < 
.05, f = 0.65 
F(2,22) = 1.77, 
MSe = 1.96, p 
= .19, f = 0.40 
F(2,22) = 0.68, 
MSe = 2.85, p 
= .52, f = 0.25 
Emotion*Repetitions*Accuracy F(4,44) = 1.57, 
MSe = 0.52, p = 
.20, f = 0.38 
F(4,44) = 1.82, 
MSe = 1.45, p 
= .14, f = 0.41 
F(4,44) = 2.29, 
MSe = 2.47, p 
= .07, f = 0.46 
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Table 2.3. Experiment 2: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a Remember / 
Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a two alternative 
forced-choice test (by number of training presentations) 
Number of  Remember Know Guess Rec FdÕ 
Repetitions   Hits FAs Hits FAs Hits FAs   
One .05 .04 .19 .16 .31 .24 .01 .13 
Three .09 .03 .19 .11 .30 .28 .07 .28 
Five .17 .05 .22 .10 .23 .23 .12 .48 
 
NB: Rec = Recollection; FdÕ = Familiarity Ð both calculated according to 
Yonelinas et al (1998) 
 
Table 2.4. Experiment 2: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a Remember / 
Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a two alternative 
forced-choice test (by emotion block) 
Emotion  Remember Know Guess Rec FdÕ 
Block    Hits FAs Hits FAs Hits FAs   
Positive .11 .05 .21 .13 .26 .24 .06 .20 
Neutral .12 .02 .19 .12 .29 .27 .10 .39 
Negative .09 .05 .20 .12 .29 .24 .03 .26 
 
NB: Rec = Recollection; FdÕ = Familiarity Ð both calculated according to 
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    For the ÔknowÕ responses the main effect of accuracy was significant 
but the main effects of emotion block and repetitions, and the interactions 
between the factors, were not significant. 
    For the ÔguessÕ responses the main effect of repetitions was significant 
but the main effects of accuracy and emotion block, and the interactions 
between the factors, were not significant. Post hoc comparisons revealed that 
significantly more ÔguessÕ responses were given for photos shown 3 times than 
5 times (q =  4.98, p < .01) and for those shown once than five times (q = 3.87, 
p < .05).  
    We calculated Recollection according to Yonelinas et al (1998), 
disregarding the Guess responses. We analysed Recollection with a 3 (number 
of repetitions) x 3 (emotion block) repeated measures ANOVA (see Table 2.5 
for the ANOVA results). There was no significant main effect for the factor of 
emotion  but there was for repetitions although not for the interaction. Post hoc 
analysis revealed that there was significantly greater recollection for photos 
that had been presented 5 times than those presented once (q = 4.41, p < .05). 
We analysed Familiarity (FdÕ) across the same factors with a 3 (number of 
repetitions) x 3 (emotion block) repeated measures ANOVA. There were no 
significant main effects for the factors of emotion block and number of 
repetitions nor for the interaction.  
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Table 2.5. Experiment 2: Separate ANOVA analysis on Recollection and 
Familiarity 
 Recollection Familiarity 
Emotion block F(1.2,12.8) = 2.38, MSe = 
0.04, p = .15,f = 0.46 
F(2,22) = 0.08, MSe = 
1.67, p = .93, f = 0.08 
Repetitions F(2,22) = 4.883, MSe = 
0.03, p < .05, f = 0.67 
F(1.4,15.0) = 0.28, MSe = 
2.87, p = .76, f = 0.16 
Emotion block*Repetitions F(4,44) = 1.17, MSe = 
0.02, p = .34, f = 0.33 
F(4,44) = 1.13, MSe = 
1.30, p = .35, f = 0.32 
 
Section 7.4. Discussion 
    In contrast to the results found with a  photo exposure of 40 msec, at 80 
msec, there was evidence of recognition memory for photos that had been 
shown once, three or five times. Nevertheless, even though the floor effect 
from Experiment 1E was removed, there remained no evidence of an emotional 
enhancement of recognition memory in this task. Analysis of the Remember / 
Know / Guess responses revealed that after correct recognition of an item more 
ÔrememberÕ responses were given to items which were shown with more 
repetitions. There were no significant effects revealed for the Know 
differences, as expected from the findings of Ochsner (2000). After correct 
recognition of an item a ÔguessÕ response was more likely with items which 
were shown with fewer repetitions. No emotional enhancement was found for 
the numbers of Remember / Know / Guess responses, Recollection nor 
Familiarity. This was in contrast to the findings of Ochsner (2000) who found 
that recollection was enhanced for negative and positive stimuli. 
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Section 8. Experiment 2 - General Discussion 
    The same pattern of results was found with increased duration of photo 
exposure, as with a shorter duration, with the exception that evidence of 
recognition memory when followed by a RKG judgement was only found with 
the longer photo exposure. No preference for previously exposed stimuli was 
found. Better recognition was found for positive stimuli in a straightforward 
recognition and nonanalytic recognition task. There was recognition when 
followed by RKG judgement but no effect of emotional enhancement. No 
recognition was found with an analytic recognition task. 
 
Section 9. Chapter Discussion 
 Three key findings have emerged from these studies. Firstly, we have 
replicated Whittlesea & PriceÕs (2001) findings showing that retrieval strategy 
is important in memory for briefly presented stimuli. Secondly, we have found 
emotional differences for briefly presented stimuli, when these appear they 
tend to be an advantage for positive stimuli but these only seem to appear when 
participants are engaged in a nonanalytic style of processing. Thirdly, a 
commonly used procedure, the Remember-Know-Guess paradigm may affect 
how participants do a task in a way which affects emotion. These three issues 
will now be discussed in detail. 
     With photo exposure of 80 msec we found an emotional (positive) 
advantage in traditional recognition. In addition we found the same with 
nonanalytic processing at retrieval. This suggests that, as argued by Whittlesea 
and Price (2001), nonanalytic processing styles at retrieval are also used during 
traditional recognition tasks. This positive enhancement in memory seems to 
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depend on nonanalytic processing. The use of analytic processing at retrieval 
seems to remove or reduce this effect of increased memory for positive stimuli.    
Despite the identical presentation of stimuli we only found evidence of 
an overall emotional enhancement bias in some conditions. This would suggest 
that whether an emotional enhancement of memory will be observed depends 
on the retrieval processing strategy encouraged by the retrieval task. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the process of retrieving memories is 
different for emotional than non-emotional stimuli (e.g. Maratos & Rugg, 
2001; Smith et al., 2004).  
    We found an emotional enhancement for positive, but not negative, 
stimuli in comparison to neutral stimuli. This is in contrast to findings of some 
previous studies which have found an advantage for negative stimuli, but not 
positive (Ochsner, 2000) and in contrast to other studies which have found an 
advantage for both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; 
Dolcos et al., 2005).  Some of the differences in patterns of emotional 
enhancement of memory may be due to the different time frames involved. We 
tested recognition immediately after exposure to the photographs, Ochsner 
(2000) tested recognition after 2 weeks, and Dolcos et al. (2005) tested 
recognition after 1 year. However, Dewhurst & Parry (2000) found an 
emotional enhancement of memory after only a 10 minute delay. The length of 
time for which our stimuli were presented at encoding may explain our lack of 
an enhancement of memory for negative stimuli. Kensinger, et al (2006) found 
an enhancement of memory for negative, over neutral, stimuli at 1000 ms and 
500 ms but not at 250 ms. 
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   Presentation of stimuli in blocked lists of emotional valence in contrast 
to mixed lists of emotional valence may have influenced our findings. 
Dewhurst & Parry (2000) found that more Remember responses were given to 
emotional than neutral words when stimuli were presented in mixed lists, but 
that this enhancement disappeared when stimuli were presented in blocked lists 
of emotional or neutral words. However, we did find a better memory for 
positive emotional stimuli in some conditions with blocked lists of emotional 
stimuli. 
   Positive stimuli may have benefited from nonanalytic processing at 
retrieval more than negative stimuli due to similarity to the heuristic styles of 
information processing that are often seen with positive moods. This is in 
contrast to the analytic and data-driven modes of information processing that 
are seen with negative emotions (Levine & Pizarro, 2006). Emotional stimuli 
may engender a mood which may then affect retrieval style. Bodenhausen et al. 
(1994) found that individuals who had been induced to feel happy rendered 
more stereotypic judgements than did those in a neutral mood. Similar findings 
have been demonstrated with studies of memory. Phaf & Rotteveel (2005) 
found that induced positive affect led to a more liberal recognition bias of test 
words, whereas negative affect led to more cautious tendencies without any 
effect on accuracy of recognition memory. Levine & Bluck (2004) found 
similar results with memory for a real world event. Participants who were 
happy about the event having occurred had a lower threshold for judging that 
specific details of the event had occurred than participants who had a negative 
reaction to the original event (Levine & Bluck, 2004). Buchanan (2007) found 
that memories are also influenced by the emotion experienced during memory 
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retrieval. It is possible that participants in this study had a positive mood 
induced whilst viewing the positive block of photos which, may have led them 
to be more successful in using nonanalytic processing at retrieval for the 
positive block of photos. When participants were encouraged to use analytic 
processing at retrieval this may have inhibited their feelings of emotion when 
looking at the photos. This may explain why no emotional enhancement of 
memory was found in the analytic style at retrieval or when recognition was 
followed by a RKG judgement. 
    We found no emotional differences in the RKG task either in the 
overall recognition or subsequent RKG response. Our lack of finding an 
emotional effect in the recognition task which is subsequently followed by an 
RKG response is consistent with previous research by Dougal & Rotello 
(2007) who also found no effect of emotion on recognition accuracy. However, 
our RKG findings are not consistent with that aspect of Dougal & RotelloÕs 
findings as they did find an emotional effect on the subjective experience of 
recollection as measured by the RKG responses. It is surprising that we have 
not found any emotional differences in the RKG responses as others have 
found, however these tasks have all had longer duration times and it is likely 
that participants did more extensive encoding and paid more attention to the 
stimuli in these tasks. Our very short presentation duration may have led to the 
lack of RKG differences in this research, this is in comparison to durations of 3 
seconds (Dougal & Rotello, 2007).Research using a one-step Remember-
Know-New paradigm, instead of the two-step paradigm used here, has also 
found an emotional enhancement of accuracy of recognition memory after 2 
second exposures (e.g. Ochsner, 2000).  
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It is possible that the act of making an RKG judgement lead participants 
to engage in a more analytical style of processing at retrieval, thereby blocking 
or reducing any advantage that may be available from emotional stimuli. These 
findings are consistent with those of Dahl et al. (2006) who found no difference 
in recognition between positive and negative pictures. Although, they did find 
a valence dependent difference in the RKG responses with a greater proportion 
of ÔrememberÕ responses for negative pictures.  
It has been suggested that differences in recognition found with 
emotional stimuli are solely due to response biases, rather than reflecting true 
differences in recollection (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). However, we found no 
evidence of response bias in the RKG responses given to emotional stimuli in 
this experiment. It is possible that the use of 2AFC decreased the probability of 
participants being susceptible to response bias. Aupe (2007) found lower 
recollection of negative and positive, than neutral, pictures when measuring 
recollection of a targeted piece of information, such as when the stimulus was 
presented. This particular task may have lead participants to use an analytic 
style at retrieval and thus block or reduce any emotional enhancement. 
    Previous research (e.g. Dewhurst & Parry, 2000) found that emotional 
differences in a Remember-Know paradigm were only revealed when a mixed 
list of emotional and non-emotional stimuli were used, in contrast to the 
blocked lists of stimuli used in these experiments. However, more recent 
studies have demonstrated emotional enhancement in memory even with 
blocked lists of emotional and non-emotional stimuli (e.g. Talmi, et al., 2007). 
The use of blocked lists is unlikely to explain the difference in our findings as 
we did find evidence of emotional differences in recognition with other 
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retrieval conditions. It may be that the use of blocked lists could have 
explained a reduced effect of emotion on RKG responses, but it is unlikely that 
this could explain a complete eradication of any effect of emotion. 
There are differences in the format of the recognition test between this 
experiment and that used in other research with which our findings are 
inconsistent. Ochsner (2000) used a Yes-No recognition task, whereas we used 
a two alternative forced choice recognition task. However, Kroll, Yonelinas, 
Dobbins, & Frederick (2002) compared both these paradigms and found that  
memory accuracy did not differ across the tests and they therefore concluded 
that both tests relied on the same underlying memory processes.  
The preference task was included to allow a direct comparison with 
Whittlesea and Price (2001). We failed to find any preference for previously 
viewed stimuli. This is in contrast to Whittlesea and Price (2001). This 
difference may be due to their use of non-emotional stimuli which may have 
meant that the only possible reason why participants prefer one picture over 
another was whether or not they had seen the picture before. It is possible that 
with emotionally relevant stimuli participants may have had real preferences 
for particular pictures which may have overridden any experimental 
manipulations of fluency caused by pre-exposure to stimuli. Research with 
excerpts of music which evoke positive or negative emotions has successfully 
demonstrated an effect of repeated exposure on preference of the stimuli 
(Witvliet & Vrana, 2007), however, preference for pictures may be less 
malleable. 
    In conclusion, these results support studies showing an emotional 
enhancement of memory with positive stimuli. The idea that emotional 
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enhancement can be influenced by retrieval is important in relation to 
inconsistencies in previous studies. We found emotional enhancement using 
nonanalytic, but not analytic, processing strategies at retrieval. One particular 
concern is that making an RKG judgement may change the processing strategy 
used at retrieval and this may hide or reduce any enhancements of positive 
material.  
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Chapter 3. Methodologies to investigate the influence of emotion on 
memory 
 
 Experimental design and methodology can have an impact on the 
relationship uncovered between different cognitive processes, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2. In the experiments reported in Chapter 2 an emotional influence was 
only found when recognition was measured by certain tasks. It is important to 
establish whether these effects reflect generalisable differences in cognitive 
processing or whether they are specific to the experimental design. In this 
chapter the impact of different methodologies to assess memory and induce 
emotion are investigated.  
 
Section 1. Experiment 3: Do Remember/Know/Guess judgements change 
the process of retrieval and block the emotional enhancement seen with a 
simple test of recognition memory? 
 
Section 1.1. Introduction 
An investigation of recognition memory and emotion in Experiment 2 
found that asking participants to follow recognition with a 
Remember/Know/Guess judgement blocked the emotional enhancement of 
recognition memory that was seen when participants were not required to make 
any additional judgements. With a simple recognition judgement we found a 
significant improvement of recognition memory for positive photographs, 
when compared to neutral and negative photographs. Following a RKG 
judgement there was evidence of recognition memory, but no difference in 
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levels of memory between the positive, neutral or negative photographs. From 
Experiment 2 we proposed that making a RKG judgement induced participants 
to use an analytical, rather than nonanalytical, processing strategy at the time of 
retrieval, thereby eliminating the emotional enhancement of memory.  
In this experiment we further investigate the effect that the RKG task 
has on blocking emotional enhancement of memory by conducting a within-
participants design to increase statistical power and create an experimental 
paradigm which could be used to viably investigate this phenomenon, without 
the very large numbers of participants required in Experiments 1 and 2. We 
will compare the emotional influence on memory in a straightforward task of 
recognition, recognition followed by a RKG judgement and recognition 
followed by another judgement. Another aim of this experiment is to examine 
whether any subsequent judgement would block emotional enhancement of 
memory, or whether this is a phenomenon specific to the RKG task. 
Previous research has found that emotional enhancement of memory 
has differed depending on the judgement used to qualify a recognition task. 
Dahl et al. (2006) used IAPS photos and asked participants to encode positive 
and negative photos by viewing a matrix of 4 photographs and identifying the 
one positive / negative photo presented with 3 neutral photographs. Participants 
then viewed all of the photos from the encoding phase separately and after 
identifying a photo as having appeared in the preceding encoding phase they 
made either a Remember/Know/Guess judgement or a confidence judgement. 
When participants made a RKG judgement there was no difference in the 
recognition performance for positive or negative photos. However, when 
participants made a confidence judgement there was significantly improved 
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performance for negative, than positive, photographs. Participants were more 
confident about their judgements of negative than positive photographs, and 
gave more remember responses for negative than positive photographs.  
 The emotional enhancement in Remember responses found by Dahl et 
al. (2006) is in a similar direction to other research examining Remember/ 
Know judgements with emotional stimuli which also found an advantage for 
negative stimuli (e.g. Ochsner, 2000). This is in contrast to the findings from 
Experiment 1 and 2, where an advantage was found for positive stimuli alone. 
This may be due to methodological differences between these studies. In 
Experiments 1 and 2 we used a two-alternative forced choice recognition 
judgement, whereas Dahl et al. (2006) and Ochsner (2000) both used a one-
step RKN judgement of a single photo. Differences have been found in the 
proportion of Remember / Know responses given dependent upon whether a 
one-step Remember, Know, New judgement is made or a two-step judgement 
where first an old-new judgement is made and then a Remember / Know 
judgement  (Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002).  
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of task upon memory 
performance and the influence that emotion has upon memory using a within-
participants paradigm, in contrast to the between participants design used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. We will assess memory performance using the tasks of 
straightforward recognition and recognition followed by RKG response that 
were used in Experiments 1 and 2. In addition a condition will be included 
where the recognition task is followed by a confidence judgement, this will 
give insight into whether the effects of the additional RKG judgment are due to 
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the performance of any subsequent task, or whether there is something in 
particular about the RKG task which affects emotionÕs influence on memory. 
 We are proposing that the processing style with which information from 
memory is retrieved to make a recognition judgement will be affected by the 
knowledge that a subsequent judgement will be required. Specifically, we 
propose that a judgement such as Remember/Know/Guess has more specific 
requirements than a judgement of recognition, we argue that it would be most 
efficient to base the recognition and RKG judgement on the same information 
and so avoid the need to retrieve the same information from memory twice. 
Therefore, we argue the judgement of recognition and RKG will be made on 
the basis of the same piece of information that has been retrieved from 
memory. In this way, we argue that if the RKG judgement requires an 
analytical style of processing, this will also be used with the recognition 
judgement.  Specifically, we predict that for straightforward recognition and 
recognition followed by an RKG response there will be the same pattern of 
results as in Experiments 1 and 2; that is a positive emotional enhancement of 
recognition in the former and no emotional enhancement in the latter. When 
recognition is followed by a confidence judgement we predict that, in line with 
previous research (e.g. Dahl et al., 2006) there will be emotional enhancement 
of recognition memory, and that this will be reflected in the ratings of 
confidence given.  
 
Section 1.2. Method 
Design 
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In this experiment the effects of a factor of emotion with three levels 
(negative, neutral, positive) and a factor of retrieval task with three levels 
(recognition memory, recognition memory followed by RKG judgement, 
recognition memory followed by confidence judgement) on memory 
performance were examined. Participants were shown negative, neutral and 
positive stimuli in a within-participant blocked stimuli design. Memory 
performance was tested using a two-alternative forced choice design to 
maintain consistency with Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants took part in this experiment (24 female). All 
were native-English speaking University of Nottingham students or research 
staff (mean age = 23.9 years, SD = 6.02). Participants received an 
inconvenience allowance of £2 for their voluntary participation. Participants 
with a phobia of animals were excluded, as the experimental stimuli contained 
pictures of several animals. 
Materials 
Stimuli were 180 colour photographs selected from the IAPS database. 
The majority of stimuli were those from Experiments 1 and 2 but some 
additional photographs were selected to allow for matching on low-level visual 
properties between negative, neutral and positive groups of stimuli. The 
negative, neutral and positive groups of stimuli in this experiment were 
matched on low-level visual properties of visual complexity, luminance, RMS 
contrast, Red, Green and Blue channel saturation, see Table 3.1 (cf. 
Nummenmaa et al., 2006). These measures of low-level visual properties were 
obtained using Adobe Photoshop 7.0. There were 2 sets of stimuli used in this 
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experiment to provide a set of targets and distractors for the test phase of the 
experiment. Emotional arousal, emotional valence and low level visual 
properties were matched between these two sets (see Appendix 3.1 for means 
and SD). Stimuli were also matched for whether or not they contained an 
identifiable face within the photograph. 
 Stimuli were selected to provide distinct ratings of emotional valence 
between the positive, neutral and negative groups of stimuli with means (with 
SD in parentheses) of 7.17 (0.53), 5.01 (0.60) and 3.04 (0.55) respectively. 
Average ratings of arousal were matched between positive and negative groups 
of stimuli with means (with SD in parentheses) of 5.11 (0.80) and 5.14 (0.73) 
respectively with a lower average for the neutral group of 4.70 (0.85).  
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Table 3.1: Low-level visual properties of photographic stimuli in Negative, 
Neutral and Positive Emotion Blocks 
 Negative Neutral Positive 
 Visual Measure 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
Luminosity 
95.70 
(36.17) 
94.33 
(31.52) 
88.00 
(33.07) 
Complexity 
39.67 
(10.89) 
43.55 
(12.86) 
39.22 
(10.61) 
RMS Contrast 
1.44 
(0.58) 
1.73 
(1.99) 
1.46 
(0.73) 
Red channel  
saturation 
107.42 
(40.08) 
105.26 
(38.76) 
100.05 
(34.36) 
Green channel  
saturation 
94.85 
(35.32) 
91.35 
(32.17) 
84.52 
(35.34) 
Blue channel  
saturation 
84.75 
(33.73) 
80.54 
(40.41) 
73.90 
(40.95) 
 
Procedure 
At the start of the study participants were shown 10 example 
photographs to get them used to the speed of presentation of the photographs. 
Photographs were presented in a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Each photo was presented for 120msec, an increase from 
80msec in Experiment 2, to ensure sufficient levels of performance as there 
was no repetition of stimulus presentation as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Experimental stimuli were presented in blocks of positive, negative and neutral 
stimuli, with the memory task completed directly after presentation of stimuli. 
This was repeated so that participants performed three different memory tasks 
(see Figure 3.1). For the first task, e.g. recognition, participants would see a 
fixation cross for 1 sec and then the RSVP of stimuli would begin showing 10 
positive, 10 negative and 10 neutral photographs. The order of photographs 
within the emotional block was randomised for each participant. Participants 
were then given instructions for the task. For the recognition task participants 
were shown a pair of photographs presented side by side, one of each pair had 
been presented in the preceding RSVP and the other was an emotionally 
matched item as a distractor. The location of the target photograph (right or left 
on the screen) was randomised. Participants were told to indicate by key press 
which photograph they recognised.  Firstly, participants completed two 
examples of the task with two pairs of photographs from the example RSVP. 
The experimental photographs were then presented in the same order of blocks 
as in the RSVP  (e.g. positive, then negative, then neutral) but the order of 
photographs within the blocks was randomised. Photographs were presented 
until a response was made. The second RSVP of 30 photographs was then 
shown, with the same order of emotional blocks. All aspects of the procedure 
remained the same apart from new instructions for the second task e.g. 
recognition followed by a confidence judgement. Participants had to select the 
photograph they recognised in the same way as for the first block, they had to 
indicate how confident they were they had seen that photograph previously 
using a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident). The 
third RSVP of photographs was then shown. For the third task e.g. recognition 
  90 
followed by a RKG judgement participants were given the same instructions 
for recognition as in the straightforward recognition task. They were then given 
detailed instructions of when they should give a Remember, Know or Guess 
response in the same way as for Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental procedure 
 
The order of the three tasks and the order of the valence blocks 
(positive, negative, neutral) within the task blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. Two sets of stimuli were created and their use as study items or 
distractors at test was counterbalanced across participants. The choice of 
photographs presented for each task was counterbalanced across participants 
from three different matched selections of groups of photographs.  
 
Section 1.3. Results 
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Recognition performance in all three tasks 
First of all we analysed memory performance in the recognition part of 
each task. Overall recognition accuracy in the recognition task, recognition 
then confidence judgement task and recognition then RKG task was 
comparable with means of 0.61, 0.58 and 0.58 respectively. To ensure that 
performance exceeded chance (0.50 in a two-alternative forced choice test) we 
conducted a series of one-sample t-tests to compare performance to that 
expected by chance. Performance on all tasks was significantly greater than 
that expected by chance (Recognition: t(35) = 7.07, p < .001; Recognition then 
Confidence judgement: t(35) = 5.12, p < .001; Recognition then RKG 
judgement: t(35) = 5.60, p < .001). 
 The influence of emotion on recognition performance in the different 
tasks was compared by conducting a 3 (task) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the factors task and emotion (See Figure 3.2). For all ANOVA 
analyses MauchlyÕs test of sphericity was conducted and in those cases where 
the assumptions were not met the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted MSE and p 
values are reported, this is indicated by decimal points in the degrees of 
freedom. The main effect of emotion approached significance (F(2,70) = 2.98, 
MSE = 7.06, p = .06) but the main effect of task was not significant [F(2, 70) = 
2.02, MSE=3.82, p = 0.14]. There was no significant interaction between task 
and emotion [F(4, 140) = 1.04, MSE = 3.00, p = .39]. Planned contrasts 
comparing recognition of emotional to neutral and negative to positive stimuli 
were conducted to further explore the main factor of emotion. This revealed no 
significant difference in recognition of emotional than neutral stimuli [F(1,35) = 
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0.28, p = .60], but did reveal significantly greater recognition of positive than 
negative stimuli (F(1,35) = 5.32, p < .05). 
Further planned contrasts were conducted to examine influence of 
emotion on recognition for each task. This revealed that for the task of 
straightforward recognition there was no significant difference between 
recognition of emotional and neutral items [F(1,35) = 0.22, p = .64] nor between 
positive and negative items [F(1,35) = 1.89, p = .18]. For recognition followed 
by a confidence judgement there was greater recognition of emotional than 
neutral items which was approaching statistical significance [F(1,35) = 3.84, p = 
.06], and the greater recognition for positive than negative items was also 
approaching significance [F(1,35) = 3.61, p = .07]. For recognition followed by 
RKG judgement there was no significant difference between recognition of 
emotional and neutral items [F(1,35) = 0.35, p = .56] nor between positive and 
negative items [F(1,35) = 0.74, p = .40]. 
 
Figure 3.2. Recognition performance across task and emotion block 
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Analysis of RKG responses 
W      	
               
on the responses made (See Table 3.2). We conducted separate 2 (accuracy) x 
3 (emotion) AAs on each of the different types of responses separately 
with the factor of accuracy (correct or incorrect) and emotion block (positive, 
negative, neutral). For the Remember responses the main effect of accuracy 
was significant (F(1,35) = 38, Mﬀﬁ = 2ﬂﬃ p < .001) with more Remember 
responses given after correct than incorrect recognition. The main effect of 
emotion block was not significant [F(2,70) = 11, Mﬀﬁ = 0.91, p = .21 and nor 
was the interaction between emotion and accuracy [F(2,70) = 0.50, Mﬀﬁ = 0.39, 
p = 1.  
For the Know responses the main effect of accuracy  was significant 
(F(1,35) = 1ﬂ 1, Mﬀﬁ = 9, p < .01) with more Know responses given after 
correct than incorrect recognition. The main effect of emotion block was not 
significant [F(2,70) = 1.01, Mﬀﬁ = 2 8ﬃ p = .37 and nor was the interaction 
between emotion and accuracy [F(2,70) = 0.33, Mﬀﬁ = 2ﬂﬃ p = .7.  
F        the main effect of accuracy was not significant 
[F(1,35) = 1.53, Mﬀﬁ = 38!, p = .22, nor was the main effect of emotion block 
[F(2,70) = 1.97, Mﬀﬁ = 2.53, p = .15, nor was the interaction between accuracy 
and emotion block [F(2,70) = 0.93, Mﬀﬁ = 31ﬂ, p = .ﬂ2. 
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Table 3.2. Proportion of each emotion block given RKG responses by accuracy 
 
 Remember Know Guess 
Emotion  Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Positive .12 .04 .18 .11 .29 .26 
Neutral .11 .04 .15 .11 .33 .26 
Negative .08 .03 .17 .09 .31 .32 
 
We also analysed the pattern of RKG responses given to the different 
emotional stimuli by conducting a 3 (response type) x 3 (emotion) ANOVA 
only on RKG responses given after correct recognition (see Table 3.3 for mean 
values). Caution is needed in the interpretation of these results due to the small 
number of responses on which this analysis is based as the average number of 
correct responses for each emotion block was approximately 5 or 6. There was 
a significant main effect of response type (F(2,70) = 28.96, MSE = 117.48, p < 
.001). The main effect of emotion was not significant [F(2,70) = 0.55, MSE = 
0.57, p = .58] and nor was the interaction between emotion and response type 
[F(4,140) = 0.78, MSE = 1.35, p = .54].  
 
Table 3.3. Average proportion of Remember, Know or Guess responses given 
after correct recognition of item by emotion  
Emotion Remember Know Guess 
Positive .20 .31 .49 
Neutral .19 .26 .55 
Negative .15 .30 .55 
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Further signal detection analysis of these RKG results was not possible 
due to the two alternative forced choice recognition used which meant that the 
assumptions of signal detection analysis were not met. 
Analysis of Confidence judgements 
We analysed the confidence judgements given after recognition to 
examine the influence of emotion on these responses (See Table 3.4). We 
conducted a 3 (emotion) x 2 (accuracy) repeated measures ANOVA with the 
factors emotion (positive, negative, neutral) and accuracy (correct or incorrect). 
The main effect of emotion block was significant (F(2,70) = 5.75, MSE = 2.57, p 
< .01). The main effect of accuracy was significant (F(1,35) = 29.31, MSE = 
8.65, p < .001) with ratings of greater confidence given after correct 
recognition than incorrect recognition. The interaction between emotion and 
accuracy was also significant (F(2,70) = 3.37, MSE = 0.88, p < .05). Orthogonal  
contrasts were conducted to further examine the main effect of emotion block 
and the interaction. There was no significant difference in the confidence 
ratings given to neutral vs. emotional items [F(1,35) = 0.79, p = .38] but there 
was significantly higher confidence ratings given to positive than negative 
items (F(1,35) = 13.00, p < .001). There was no significant difference in 
confidence ratings given after correct recognition to emotional or neutral items 
[F(1,35) = 0.48, p = .49] but there was significantly greater confidence ratings 
given to positive than negative items after correct recognition (F(1,35) = 11.17, p 
< .01). Significantly lower confidence ratings were given after incorrect 
recognition to emotional than neutral items (F(1,35) = 4.54, p < .05) and greater 
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confidence ratings were given to positive than negative items (F(1,35) = 6.92, p 
< .05). 
 
Table 3.4. Average confidence ratings (1 - Not at all confident to 5 - Very 
confident) by accuracy and emotion block, mean (SE) 
Confidence rating of: Positive Neutral Negative 
Correct recognition  2.77 
(0.13) 
2.47 
(0.17) 
2.37 
(0.13) 
Incorrect recognition  2.21 
(0.14) 
2.33 
(0.14) 
1.88 
(0.12) 
 
Section 1.4. Discussion 
We found successful recognition memory in all three tasks in this 
within-participant paradigm, with recognition greater than chance in all 
conditions. There was an overall positive emotional enhancement of 
recognition memory but this was not modulated by the task which participants 
performed at retrieval. Although planned contrasts did reveal that this 
emotional enhancement was driven by findings in the recognition followed by 
confidence task. The findings of emotional enhancement in recognition when 
followed by confidence judgement and lack of emotional enhancement in 
recognition when followed by RKG response were consistent with our 
predictions. However, the lack of emotional enhancement in straightforward 
recognition was not consistent with our predictions. 
There was no influence of emotion on the Remember, Know or Guess 
responses given, in contrast to higher ratings of confidence given to positive 
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stimuli, which corresponded with more successful recognition of positive 
stimuli in this task. These findings were consistent with our  predictions. 
In this experiment we found increased accuracy of recognition for 
positive stimuli in recognition when followed by a confidence judgement. The 
confidence ratings for positive stimuli were higher than for negative stimuli, 
regardless of accuracy of prior recognition. These findings are not consistent 
with earlier research (Dahl et al., 2006) which found increased accuracy and 
confidence for negative stimuli. The different findings in this experiment may 
be due to the different stimulus sets used; in particular if the erotic stimuli were 
used as part of the positive stimulus set in the Dahl et al. (2006) experiment 
this may have led to social desirability in participants and reduced their 
willingness to say that they were confident they had seen the erotic stimuli in 
that experiment and to give high confidence ratings to pictures with negative 
connotations. A further possibility is that the presentation of stimuli in blocked 
lists of emotion, compared to the mixed lists of positive and negative stimuli of 
Dahl et al. (2006) may have reduced any emotional enhancement (c.f. 
Dewhurst & Parry, 2000). It is also possible that the matching of visual 
characteristics between the positive, negative and neutral stimuli in this 
experiment may have influenced the pattern of results.  
The findings of the influence of emotion on confidence judgements are 
interesting but are not theoretically relevant to the research questions addressed 
in this experiment and therefore will not be discussed further.  
The aim of this experiment was to manipulate the strategy that 
participants used to retrieve memories by asking participants to perform 
different types of memory judgements. Although there were hints in the 
  98 
orthogonal comparisons of different emotional effects with the different tasks, 
the overall interaction in the ANOVA did not reach significance despite the 
relatively large sample size (n=36) in this experiment. It is possible that any 
power benefits from using the within participant design were outweighed by 
carryover effects across conditions. Performance in later tasks may have been 
contaminated by the instructions received for the recognition task recently 
performed and this may have lead to a mixed retrieval strategy being used 
rather than a single retrieval strategy for each different task block. An analysis 
of recognition just from the first block suggested the results in the first block 
may be different from the group averages which include performance over the 
full three blocks (see Appendix 3.2). This suggests that participants may not 
keep retrieval strategies separate in their mind when performing the different 
tasks. 
The difference in memory performance as a result of retrieval strategy 
found in Experiments 1 and 2 was only small and the results from this 
experiment indicate that it may be a difficult effect to demonstrate reliably. 
This was a reasonably powerful within-participants study which should have 
had sufficient power to detect a medium effect (power of 82% to detect an 
effect size of d 0.5 (Clark-Carter, 1997)). The findings from this experiment do 
not give a clear indication of why the paradigm is not working. The hint of 
contamination between tasks suggests that this area of investigation may not be 
amenable to within-participant experimental design. The findings of 
Experiment 1 and 2 do have theoretical interest with regard to how factors at 
the time of retrieving a memory may differentially affect memory for 
emotional and neutral events. However, the degree to which these findings 
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could be generalised to the real-world is not clear. It is possible that the effects 
of retrieval strategy may be found only when participants are exposed very 
briefly to stimuli whereas in most real world situations people would have 
much longer to process and encode information.  
The main purpose of this experiment was to attempt to manipulate 
retrieval strategy in a within-participant design and provide an opportunity to 
investigate this further whilst avoiding the prohibitively large numbers of 
participants which would be required to demonstrate these small effects in a 
between-participants design. This was not successfully achieved in this 
experiment but these experiments did explore some of the interesting 
implications of using different methodologies to investigate the effects of 
emotion on memory. Due to the limitations in pursing this area of investigation 
which have been discussed above, it was decided to move to a new paradigm in 
Experiment 4 to investigate the influence of emotion on memory using an 
alternative method which has recently been used to investigate some interesting 
aspects of this area (e.g. Kensinger et al., 2006). 
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Section 2. Experiment 4: What is an effective paradigm for studying 
emotionÕs effects on memory? 
 
Section 2.1. Introduction 
In Experiment 3 the influence of emotion on the retrieval of memories 
was considered by comparing performance on recognition and subsequent 
judgements of confidence or Remember/Know/Guess. In this experiment we 
further investigate the influence of recognition task on emotional enhancement 
of memory by using a new experimental paradigm with a new set of 
experimental stimuli. This experiment aims to provide an alternative 
examination of how retrieval of memories may be affected by the task used. In 
this introduction there will first be a review of the contribution that research 
with the Remember/Know paradigm has made to the investigation of 
recognition memory and emotionÕs influence on recognition memory. Some of 
this material was briefly reviewed in Chapter 2 but will be considered in more 
detail here. Then we will consider the benefits of a different paradigm to 
examine recognition memory and the further insights it may reveal into the 
influence of emotion on recognition memory. Lastly, we will explore how 
performance on a Remember/Know/New task may specifically relate to 
performance with a paradigm which requires participants to discriminate 
between Same/Similar/New items.  
 
The Remember/Know paradigm and recognition memory 
The Remember/Know paradigm has been used in many experimental 
designs for many different purposes (for a review see Dunn, 2004). The 
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paradigm was first introduced by Tulving ("#$%& to examine different states of 
awareness which were thought to underlie memory retrieval. In this task 
participants are asked to indicate the basis on which they judged a previously 
studied item to be ÔoldÕ. They have to distinguish between a ÔRememberÕ 
response to indicate they are able to remember its prior occurrence and a 
Ô')*+, -./0*)/. 4* 6)769:4. 4;.< /6=0>< ?).+ 64 +:/ *>7 @< /*me other 
criteria. These responses were proposed to reflect autonoetic and noetic 
consciousness which were thought to respectively characterise episodic and 
/.=:)469 =.=*-< /</4.=/ (sB>C6)DE "#$%&G H:4.- +*-? @< I:-76).- ("#$$& led 
to the development of operational definitions of remembering and knowing and 
a dissociation was reported between remember and know responses. 
J:)60B>:46*)/ *K >.C.>/ *K 0-*9.//6)D +.-. K*B)7 4* :KK.94 4;. 0-*0*-46*) *K
R.=.=@.- -./0*)/./ @B4 ;:C. )* .KK.94 *) ')*+ -./0*)/./ (I:-76).-E "#$$&. 
JB9; *K 4;. -./.:-9; /4.==6)D K-*= 4;./. 4+* K6-/4 /4B76./ KB-4;.- 6)C./46D:4.7
4;. .t4.)4 4* +;69; R.=.=@.- :)7 ')*+ -./0*)/./ 9:) @. 76//*96:4.7 @<
different experimental variables (Dunn, 2004).  
s;. 6)4.-0-.4:46*) *K R.=.=@.-T')ow responses depends on whether a 
singleLprocess or dualLprocess model of recognition memory is assumed to be 
more likely (Dunn, 2004). There is a great deal of controversy in the literature 
over theories of recognition memory with different researchers arguing equally 
strongly for the singleLprocess model and others for the dualLprocess model of 
recognition memory (for a review see Malmberg, 2008). The different 
interpretations of results from the paradigm will now be briefly described. 
Within the dual-process interpretation of the Remember/Know paradigm it is 
assumed that Remember and Know responses reflect different forms of 
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memory retrieval and reflect the operation of two qualitatively different 
memory components, or processes. Three competing models have been 
identified of how Remember/Know responses relate to a dual-process model of 
recognition memory (Gardiner, 2001). They are as follows: 
i) R responses reflect subjective experience of retrieval from 
episodic memory, K responses reflect subjective experience of 
retrieval from semantic memory (Tulving, 1985). 
ii) R responses reflect the distinctiveness of processing at study, 
K responses reflect the fluency of processing at test (Rajaram, 
1996). 
iii) R responses identify with the process of recollection, K 
responses identify with the process of familiarity. These 
processes are thought to underlie recognition memory (Jacob, 
Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997). 
Researchers identifying Remember/Know responses within a single-
process model of recognition memory have argued that the different responses 
reflect different levels of confidence in the items produced as a result of 
memory retrieval (e.g. Donaldson, 1996). According to this model participants 
are purported to interpret instructions for the Remember/Know paradigm as 
indicating that more stringent criteria is required for a remember than know 
response, and if there is not enough trace strength of a test item for a know 
response then a new (or guess) response would be made. This interpretation is 
called the signal-detection theory of the Remember/Know paradigm (Dunn, 
2004). 
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The nature of recognition memory and the suitability of different 
theoretical frameworks remains a hotly debated topic in the literature (e.g. 
Knott & Dewhurst, 2007; Malmberg, 2008; Rotello & Macmillan, 2006; 
Wixted, 2007). In this experiment, however, we will be using the 
Remember/Know paradigm in the context of research to investigate emotionsÕ 
influence on memory and therefore will not be making any conclusions with 
regard to support for different models of recognition memory. This is 
consistent with other research in the area of emotion and memory which has 
reported the proportion of responses given without reference to any particular 
theoretical interpretation of the results according to single or dual process 
models of recognition memory (e.g. Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2005). 
The Remember/Know paradigm and emotionsÕ influence on memory 
 There has been a great deal of research that has used the 
Remember/Know paradigm to investigate the influence of emotion on memory. 
As described in Chapter 2, advantages in memory have been found for both 
positive and negative stimuli (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Dolcos et al., 2005; 
Mickley & Kensinger, 2008; Ochsner, 2000). In some studies the advantage 
has been found for positive and negative photographs in both Remember and 
Know responses (Mickley & Kensinger, 2008), whereas in other studies the 
emotional advantage has only been apparent in Remember responses 
(Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Dolcos et al., 2005; Ochsner, 2000). 
The Same/Similar/New paradigm and recognition memory 
There has recently been a body of work published which examined the 
effect of emotion on memory using a new paradigm which identifies 
participantsÕ abilities to identify specific visual details of experimental stimuli 
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(Kensinger et al., 2006; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007a, 2007b). 
In this paradigm participants were shown pictures of objects during the study 
phase; each object in the study phase had a corresponding picture in the test 
phase which was either the same or similar and in addition new pictures were 
shown as distractors. For example, a participant who saw a picture of a spider 
in the study phase would in the test phase see the same picture of a spider or a 
similar picture of a spider. For each object in the test phase participants would 
have to indicate whether it was the same, similar or new. General recognition 
was calculated as the number of times an object seen at encoding was 
remembered either with or without specific details (ÔsameÕ and ÔsimilarÕ 
responses). Specific recognition was measured as the number of ÔsameÕ 
responses, that is, the number of times an object was correctly remembered 
with specific detail.  
 
The Same/Similar/New paradigm and emotionsÕ influence on memory 
For objects presented in isolation there was an enhancement in specific 
memory for negative over neutral pictures but there was no difference in 
general recognition between negative and neutral pictures (Kensinger et al., 
2006). This effect was modulated by the length of time participants were 
exposed to the stimuli. At brief encoding durations of 500ms the negative 
emotional enhancement was only apparent with specific recognition 
(Kensinger et al., 2006), whereas at longer encoding durations of one, two and 
five seconds both specific and general recognition was enhanced (Kensinger et 
al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b). 
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The relation between Remember/Know/New (RKN) & 
Same/Similar/New(SSN) 
The purpose of using the SSN paradigm is to assess the level of detail 
in participantÕs memory, whereas the purpose of using the RKN paradigm is to 
assess the level of subjective awareness in the participantÕs memory. Even 
though the two paradigms have different criteria for giving a particular 
response they have a similar structure of a three level discrimination task which 
warrants a comparison between the two methodologies. This may provide 
further insight into the way in which participants interpret the task instructions 
in each case. A theoretical relationship between SSN and RKN responses was 
proposed by examining the criteria by which participants should respond if 
they are following the instructions for the tasks (See Table 3.5). This 
relationship was considered only for items that would be the same at study and 
test as these would be targets for some form of recognition in both tasks. In 
contrast a similar item would be given a response indicating some form of 
recognition in the SSN task, whereas the appropriate response in the RKN task 
should indicate no recognition memory because the item has not been seen 
before. New items would form the entire set of distractors for the SSN task but 
only a subset of distractors for the RKN task.  
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NOPQS UVXV Criteria for giving responses to same items in the Same, Similar, 
New task and Remember, Know, New task 
Same, Similar, New task Remember, Know, New task 
SameY Z\O]^ _^S` aSSb PScdeSf
recognition of specific visual details 
RememberY Recognition accompanied 
by some recollective experience of 
encoding context 
SimilarY gS]dhb_aS ^iO^ Ob _^S`
similar to this, but not this exact 
photograph, was seen before  
j
g
 
Recognise item but cannot remember 
specific visual details so cannot give a 
k
a
OmeÕ response 
KnowY gS]dhb_^_db O]]d`lOb_Sm Pn
strong feelings of familiarity in 
absence of any recollective experience 
NewY od bd^ eS]dhb_aS _^S` NewY od bd^ recognise item 
 
The criteria for giving a Same, Similar or New response should be 
based on an objective criterion of firstly whether there is any recognition of the 
item, and if there is whether there is recognition of specific visual details (same 
response) or not (similar response). The criteria for giving a Remember, Know 
or New response should also firstly be based on an objective criterion of 
whether there is any recognition of the items, and then considering whether any 
feelings of recollective experience accompany the recognition (Remember 
response) or not (Know 
e
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responses we proposed a relationship to describe how SSN and RKN responses 
may be relatS
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We proposed that a Remember response would only be given in 
instances when there was true recognition of the exact item which would 
include the specific visual details, but that not all instances of true recognition 
would be accompanied by some recollective experience of the encoding 
context. We proposed that a Know response would be given in instances of 
recognition of the item when the memory did include memory for the specific 
visual details but there was no accompanying recollective experience and also 
when there was no memory for the specific visual details but some recognition 
of the item. We proposed that a New response in the RKN task would be given 
in instances where there was no recognition at all of the item (when a new 
response would be given in the SSN task)  and also in some of the instances 
where a similar response would be given in the SSN task when these indicate 
that there is no recognition of this particular item but there is semantic 
activation indicating that an item similar to this was seen before. We are 
making no predictions of the relative proportions for each response and 
therefore roughly one third of each response type is indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Possible relationship between Same, Similar, New and Remember, 
Know, New responses to Same items 
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We predict that emotion would affect the pattern of responses given in 
the RKN and SSN task in the same direction. Therefore, we predict for 
negative items there will be a greater proportion of Remember than Know or 
New responses and a greater proportion of Same than Similar or New 
responses. We predict a greater proportion of Remember responses in the RKN 
task, and Same responses in the SSN task, will be given to negative than 
neutral items (cf. Kensinger et al, 2006). The degree to which the different 
categories of response are affected by emotion could provide some insight into 
any different memory processes being measured by these two tasks. 
 
Section 2.2. Method 
Design 
In this experiment we used a 2 x 2 mixed design with the within 
participants factor of emotion (negative, neutral) and the between participants 
factor of memory task (RKN, SSN). Participants were shown negative and 
neutral stimuli in a within-participant mixed-list design and were in either of 
the memory measurement groups. 
Participants 
Forty-eight participants (26 female) took part in this experiment. All 
were native English-speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age =  
20.88 years, SD = 2.14). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Participants received an inconvenience allowance of £6 for their voluntary 
participation. The School of Psychology, University of Nottingham Ethics 
Committee gave approval for the study. Participants were randomly allocated 
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tasks. 
Materials 
Stimuli ratings 
 We wanted to be sure that the stimuli in our experiment were 
comparable to those used by Kensinger et al. (2006) as it was critical to the 
{}{ | {Ł | } z~} ||}|z {zz| | || |
to use the exact list of stimuli that was used by Kensinger et al., but in order to 
make our stimulus set as close as possible to that of Kensinger we have used 
the same ratings methodology reported by Kensinger et al (2006) and have 
tried to match our stimuli to their ratings where possible.  
To produce the set of stimuli that were used in this experiment an initial 
group of 405 pairs of photographs of objects were selected by the researcher 
with the aim that one third of these stimuli were each of negative, neutral and 
positive emotion. The positive stimuli were not used in this experiment but 
were included for some of the ratings so they could be used in Experiment 5 
(reported later in this thesis). For this experiment the ratings of emotion were 
conducted on a set of stimuli containing only the 270 pairs of potential 
negative and neutral stimuli, not the positive stimuli. This was to ensure that 
the ratings of emotion were given in a similar context to that in which they 
would be experienced by participants of the experiment. All other ratings 
(perceptual features and familiarity) were conducted on the entire set of 405 
pairs of photographs. The average ratings given below are for those stimuli that 
were included in the final set of experimental stimuli. 
Emotion ratings. 
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There were 540 photographs of objects (270 pairs) rated individually 
for valence and arousal on an 11-point scale, from -5 (negative)   positive) 
and -5 (calming / soothing) to  exciting / agitating) respectively. 
Participants were told to base their ratings on their initial reaction to the objects 
in the photographs. Twenty  ¡¢ £ ¤¥¦§¨ ¡©ª¡ «ª©«ª ¦
ratings (13 female; Mean age: 19.55 years, SD 1.61). The negative and neutral 
groups of stimuli were given distinct mean average item ratings (with range 
and standard deviation in parentheses) for valence of -1.89 (-3.90 to -0.40; 
0.82) and 0.79 (-0.35 to 2.55; 0.61) and for arousal of 2.20 (-0.5 to 3.70; 0.82), 
and -0.76 (-2.65 to 1.25; 0.70) respectively. 
Perceptual features: 
 i) Similarity.  
There were 405 pairs of photographs of objects rated for similarity 
between the items in a pair by 10 University of Nottingham students (7 female; 
Mean age: 26.80 years, SD 3.46 years). Each pair was rated on a scale of 1 
(items incredibly similar) to 10 (items incredibly different). The average ratings 
of similarity between items were comparable between the negative and neutral 
and object pairs with item means (with standard deviation in parentheses) of 
3.39 (1.37) and 4.04 (1.28) respectively. 
ii) Dimensions of change. 
There were 405 pairs of photographs of objects rated for the dimensions 
that could differ between the two items in the pair (colour, shape, size, 
orientation) by two University of Nottingham students (2 female; Mean age: 
27.50 years). A rating of 0 indicated that no change in a particular dimension 
occurred (e.g., if both pumpkins were orange); a rating of 0.5 indicated a slight 
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change in a dimension (e.g., a light green pine tree versus a dark green pine 
tree) and a rating of 1 indicated a substantial change (e.g., a red apple versus a 
green apple). Average ratings of how these dimensions changed between the 
items in a pair were comparable between the different emotional groups. The 
item means (with standard deviations in parentheses) for negative and neutral 
object pairs were: for colour .45 (.34), and .70 (.32); for orientation .62 (.35) 
and .61 (.35); for shape .44 (.29) and .41 (.26); and for size .22 (.24) and .17 
(.22) respectively. 
iii) Size. 
There were 405 photographs of objects (1 item from each pair) rated for 
size by one University of Nottingham student (Female, 20 years). Forty-five 
percent of all the experimental stimuli were judged to fit into a shoebox in real 
life. This was similar across groups of negative (34 items) and neutral (48 
items) stimuli.  
Familiarity 
 i) Word frequency and word familiarity. 
Word frequency and word familiarity (Wilson, 1988) for the 270 verbal 
labels of the object pairs were comparable between the negative and neutral 
groups of stimuli. The average ratings (standard deviations in parentheses) for 
negative and neutral stimuli were for written word frequency 59.30 (102.65) 
and 57.02 (195.38) and for word familiarity 388.15 (245.43) and 417.05 
(236.10) respectively. 
ii) Familiarity of object. 
There were 405 photographs of objects (1 item from each pair) rated for 
familiarity on a scale of 1 (highly unfamiliar) to 10 (highly familiar) by one 
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¬­®¯°±²®³´ µ¶ ·µ³³®­¸¹º» ²³¼½°­³¾ Mean average item ratings (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) were comparable for negative º­½ ­°¼³±º¿ µÀÁ°Â³²
and were 4.ÃÄ Å2.46) º­½ Æ¾ÄÇ ÅÇ¾ÈÄ) respectively.  
Procedure 
Study. 
Participants were presented with ÄÃÉ nameable, colour photographs of 
µÀÁ°Â³² ÅÊË ­°¸º³®¯°Ì ÊË ­°¼³±º¿Í¾ Î³°»² Ï°±° Ð±°²°­³°½ ¶µ± ÃÑÑ »² Ï®³¹ º
variable interÒstimulus interval of between 6 º­½ ÄÆ ²°Âµ­½²Ì Ï¹®Â¹ Ïº²
randomly determined for each item. Participants were presented with a 
photograph, then had to make a task decision during the interÒstimulus interval 
whilst a central fixation cross was displayed. In this task participants had to 
®­½®Âº³° À´ Ó°´ Ð±°²² ÅÄ = Yes, 0 = No) whether in the real world the object 
would fit inside a shoebox. A real shoebox was placed next to participants 
throughout the experiment for reference. This was the task used by Kensinger 
et al. (2006) and ensured that, with the short presentation times of stimuli, 
participants did encode and process each object. The order of items was 
pseudorandomised so that no more than four items of one emotion were 
presented sequentially.  
Test. 
After an interval of at least two days participants completed a surprise 
recognition test. Participants allocated to the SSN task were presented with 
three types of stimuli: same, photographs of objects that were exactly the same 
as those at study; similar, objects shared same verbal label but were not 
identical to those at study; and new, objects that had not previously been 
presented. Each object was presented centrally on the screen and participants 
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were prompted to indicate by key press whether the item was same, similar or 
new. Participants were then asked to indicate their level of confidence in this 
decision (low or high) by pressing correspondingly labelled keyboard keys. 
Items were presented in a randomised order. Following Kensinger et al (2006) 
a total of 76 items were shown that were the same at study and test, 76 items 
were shown that were similar to those shown at study (i.e. the other item from 
the object pair) and 38 items were shown that were new. Half of each of the 
same, similar and new items were negative or neutral. All participants were 
presented with exactly the same photographs at test, whether these items were 
the same, similar or new for each participant was counterbalanced by varying 
the item of the object pair and the stimuli lists which were shown at study.  
Participants allocated to the RKN task were firstly given printed 
instructions detailing how to complete the task. These were taken from 
Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn (2005) with an alteration of the first and last 
paragraph where YES and NO were exchanged for ÔRememberÕ or ÔKnowÕ and 
ÔNewÕ respectively. The instructions were as follows (italics added here): 
 
In this test you will see a series of pictures, one picture at a time. Some of the 
pictures are those that you saw in the earlier experimental session. Others are 
not. For each picture, please indicate if you recognise the picture as one you 
saw in the earlier experimental session by pressing ÔRememberÕ or ÔKnowÕ. If 
you do not think the picture was one you saw earlier please press ÔNewÕ. 
 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite 
often recognition brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is 
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that you recognise, as when, for example, you recognise someoneÕs face, and 
perhaps remember talking to this person at a party the previous night. 
 
At other times recognition brings nothing back to mind about what it is you 
recognise, as when, for example, you are confident that you recognise 
someone, and you know you recognise them, because of strong feelings of 
familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing this person before. You don 
(sic) not remember anything about them. 
 
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognizing the pictures you 
saw in the earlier experimental session. Sometimes when you recognise a 
picture as one you saw earlier, recognition will bring back to mind something 
you remember thinking about when the picture appeared then. You recollect 
something you consciously experienced at that time. But sometimes recognizing 
a picture as one you saw earlier, will not bring back to mind anything you 
remember about seeing it then. Instead, the picture will seem familiar, so that 
you feel confident it was one you saw earlier, even though you donÕt recollect 
anything you experienced when you saw it then. 
 
For each picture please press the ÔREMEMBERÕ button, if recognition is 
accompanied by some recollective experience, or the ÔKNOWÕ button, if 
recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of familiarity in the absence of 
any recollective experience.  
 
  ÕÕÖ 
When you think the picture was not one you saw earlier, press the ÔNEWÕ 
button. 
 
If you have any questions please ask the experimenter.  
 
Participants were presented with photographs of same, similar and new 
×ØÙÚÛ ÜÛ ÝÙÞÙ ßÜÞØ×à×ßÜáØÛ ×á ØâÙ ããä ØÜÛå ÙæàÙßØ ßÜÞØ×à×ßÜáØÛ âÜç Øè give a 
éÞÙÚÙÚêÙÞëì éåáèÝë èÞ éáÙÝë ÞÙÛßèáÛÙ Øè ×áç×àÜØÙ ØâÙ×Þ íÙîÙí èï ÜÝÜÞÙáÙÛÛ èï
ØâÙ×Þ ÚÙÚèÞð ïèÞ ØâÙ èêñÙàØ ßÞÙÛÙáØÙçì ÞÜØâÙÞ ØâÜá ò×î×áò Ü éÛÜÚÙëì éÛ×Ú×íÜÞë èÞ
éáÙÝë ÞÙÛßèáÛÙó ôíí èØâÙÞ ÜÛßÙàØÛ èï ØâÙ ßÞèàÙçõÞÙ ÝÙÞÙ ÙæÜàØíð ØâÙ ÛÜÚÙ ×á
êèØâ ØÜÛåÛó 
To enable counterbalancing the items were presented across four lists 
with ö÷ ×ØÙÚÛ ×á ÙÜàâ í×ÛØ øÕù áÙòÜØ×îÙì Õù áÙõØÞÜíúó ô ï×ïØâ í×ÛØ èï ×ØÙÚÛ ÝÜÛ
shown only at test. At the time of debriefing ö÷ participants confirmed they 
were not expecting to have their memory tested. Three participants reported 
they were expecting a memory test and seven participants were not sure. 
Overall memory performance was comparable between these three groups 
therefore this distinction is not considered further.  
  
Section 2.3. Results 
Task A: Same, Similar, New 
ûÙÚèÞð ßÙÞïèÞÚÜáàÙ èá ØâÙ ããä ØÜÛå ÝÜÛ ÙæÜÚ×áÙç êð ÛÙßÜÞÜØÙíð
ÙæÜÚ×á×áò ØâÙ ÞÙÛßèáÛÙÛ ò×îÙá ÝâÙá ßÜÞØ×à×ßÜáØÛ ÝÙÞÙ ßÞÙÛÙáØÙç Ý×Øâ ØâÙ ö
different type of items (items that were same, similar or new at test) (see Table 
öóü)ó ý×ÞÛØíðì Ü þ æ ö ÞÙßÙÜØÙç ÚÙÜÛõÞÙÛ ôäß.ô Ý×Øâ ØâÙ ïÜàØèÞÛ ÙÚèØ×èá
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(negative, neutral) and response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) was conducted 
on the same items. There was a significant main effect of response type 
(F(1.49,34.18) = 10.85, MSE = 1.01, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .32) and a significant 
interaction between emotion*response type (F(2,46) = 6.25, MSE = 0.07, p < 
.01, partial eta
2
 = .21). Post-hoc t-tests were carried out to compare the 
proportion of each response type by emotion. Significantly more negative than 
neutral items were given a ÔsameÕ response (t (23) = 3.57, p < .01) and less 
negative than neutral items were given a ÔnewÕ response (t (23) = -2.26, p < 
.05). There was no significant difference in the proportion of negative and 
neutral items given a ÔsimilarÕ response [t (23) = -1.22, p = .24]. Orthogonal 
contrasts were conducted to further examine the main effect of response type. 
There were significantly more ÔsameÕ than ÔsimilarÕ or ÔnewÕ responses given 
(F(1,23) = 9.88, p < .01) and significantly more ÔsimilarÕ than ÔnewÕ responses 
given (F(1,23) = 14.57, p < .001). 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors emotion (negative, 
neutral) and response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) was then conducted on the 
similar items. There was a significant main effect of response type (F(1.48,34.03) 
= 16.69, MSE = 1.23, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .42) and a significant interaction 
between emotion*response type (F(2,46) = 6.27, MSE = 0.08, p < .01, partial 
eta
2
 = .21). Post-hoc t-tests were carried out to compare the proportion of each 
response type by emotion. There were significantly more same responses given 
to negative than neutral items (t (23) = 3.28, p < .01) and significantly less new 
responses to negative than neutral items (t (23) = -3.22, p < .01). There was no 
significant difference between the proportion of similar responses given to 
negative than neutral items [t (23) = 0.73, p =.47]. Orthogonal contrasts were 
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conducted to further analyse the main effect of response type. There were 
significantly more ÔsimilarÕ than ÔsameÕ or ÔnewÕ responses given (F(1,23) = 
9.82, p < .01) and significantly more ÔnewÕ than ÔsameÕ responses (F(1,23) = 
29.87, p < .001). 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factors emotion (negative, 
neutral) and response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) was then conducted with 
the new items. There was a significant main effect of response type (F(1.44,33.23) 
= 282.93, MSE = 7.48, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .93) but no significant 
interaction between emotion and response type  [F(1.38,31.83) = 1.51, MSE = 
0.02, p = .23, partial eta
2
 = .06]. Orthogonal contrasts were conducted to 
further analyse the main effect of response type and revealed significantly 
more ÔnewÕ than ÔsameÕ or ÔsimilarÕ responses were given (F(1,23) = 349.83, p < 
.001) and significantly more ÔsimilarÕ than ÔsameÕ responses were given (F(1,23) 
= 35.70, p < .001). 
Visual specificity was measured by Kensinger et al. (2006) by 
calculating specific recognition as the ÔsameÕ responses to the same items, and 
general recognition as the ÔsameÕ and ÔsimilarÕ responses to the same items. 
Specific recognition (mean, S.E.) was significantly greater for negative (.50, 
SE .04) than neutral (.41, SE .04) items (t (23) = 3.57, p < .01). General 
recognition was also significantly greater for negative (.85, SE .03) than neutral 
(.76, SE .03) items (t (23) = 2.26, p < .05). 
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Table 3.6. Mean average proportion (SE) of Same, Similar, New items given 
Same/Similar/New responses for Negative and Neutral items 
 
Response type: Same items  Similar items New items 
                               Negative objects 
ÔSameÕ .50 (.04) .18 (.02) .05 (.02) 
ÔSimilarÕ .32 (.03) .46 (.03) .18 (.02) 
ÔNewÕ .18 (.03) .36 (.04) .76 (.03) 
                              Neutral objects 
ÔSameÕ .41 (.04) .12 (.02) .04 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .35 (.03) .44 (.05) .12 (.02) 
ÔNewÕ .23 (.03) .45 (.04) .80 (.03) 
 
Confidence Ratings 
The influence of emotion on the confidence ratings (low, high) and 
response type given to same, similar and new items was analysed by 
conducting a 2 (confidence) x 3 (response type) x 2 (emotion) repeated 
measures ANOVA (for brevity the ANOVA results are reported in Tables 3.7, 
3.8 and 3.9). The emotional content of similar and new items did not affect the 
distribution of confidence ratings as reflected by the lack of a significant three-
way interaction between confidence, response type and emotion. However, this 
interaction was significant with same items, although the associated effect size 
for this interaction was very small. The influence of confidence was checked 
further by analyzing the pattern of results when only high confidence responses 
were included in the analysis. For all types of items the same main effects and 
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interactions in the ANOVAs were found as when analysis was collapsed across 
confidence ratings. Therefore, we follow Kensinger et al (2006) in concluding 
that the level of confidence does not have a major influence on the emotional 
enhancement of visual specificity of memory and we will not discuss 
confidence ratings further. 
 
Table 3.7. Same/Similar/New task: Same items. Repeated measures ANOVA 
to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratings 
Effect F(df) MSE p Partial 
Eta
2
 
Confidence (low,high) x Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x Emotion 
(negative, neutral) 
Confidence 66.59(1,23) 1.73 < .001 .74 
Response type 10.85(1.49,34.18) 0.38 < .001 .32 
Confidence*Response type 23.57(2,46) 0.63 < .001 .51 
Confidence*Emotion 3.73(1,23) 0.03 .07 .14 
Response type*Emotion 6.25(2,46) 0.03 < .01 .21 
Confidence*Response 
type* Emotion 
5.07(2,46) 0.03 < .01 .18 
High Confidence ratings only: Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x 
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Response type 18.13(2,46) 0.98 < .001 .44 
Emotion 3.733(1,23) 0.01 .07 .14 
Response type* Emotion 6.67(2,46) 0.06 < .01 .23 
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Table 3.8. Same/Similar/New task: Similar items. Repeated measures ANOVA 
to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratings 
Effect F(df) MSE p Partial 
Eta
2
 
Confidence (low,high) x Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x Emotion 
(negative, neutral) 
Confidence 32.98(1,23) 0.96 < .001 .59 
Response type 16.69(1.48,34.03) 0.62 < .001 .42 
Confidence*Response type 1.74(1.60,36.87) 0.06 .19 .07 
Confidence*Emotion 6.65(1,23) 0.05 < .05 .22 
Response type*Emotion 6.27(2,46) 0.04 < .01 .21 
Confidence*Response 
type* Emotion 
0.26(2,46) 0.001 .78 .01 
High Confidence ratings only: Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x 
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Response type 7.56(1.52,34.97) 0.46 < .001 .25 
Emotion 6.65(1,23) 0.02 .02 .22 
Response type* Emotion 3.92(2,46) 0.03 < .05 .15 
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Table 3.9. Same/Similar/New task: New items. Repeated measures ANOVA to 
examine influence of emotion on confidence ratings 
Effect F(df) MSE p Partial 
Eta
2
 
Confidence (low,high) x Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x Emotion 
(negative, neutral) 
Confidence 21.47(1,23) 1.07 < .001 .48 
Response type 282.93(1.45,33.23) 5.18 < .001 .93 
Confidence*Response type 22.51(1.06,24.46) 1.81 < .001 .50 
Confidence*Emotion 1.97(1,23) 0.01 .17 .08 
Response type*Emotion 1.51(1.38,31.83) 0.01 .23 .06 
Confidence*Response 
type* Emotion 
0.67(1.42,32.63) 0.01 .47 .03 
High Confidence ratings only: Response type (ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ, ÔnewÕ) x 
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Response type 110.42(1.13,25.99) 7.44 < .001 .83 
Emotion 1.97(1,23) 0.01 .17 .08 
Response type* Emotion 0.71(1.49,34.21) 0.01 .46 .03 
 
Task B: Remember, Know, New 
Memory performance on the RKN task was examined by separately 
analysing responses given to items that were the same at test (targets) and 
items that were similar or new at test (distractors) (see data in Table 3.10). A 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors emotion (negative, neutral) and 
response type (remember, know, new) was conducted with the same items. 
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There was a significant main effect of response type (F(1.41,32.38) = 30.30, MSE 
= 2.28, p <   	 

2
 = .57) and a significant interaction between 
emotion and response type (F(2,46) = 8.06, MSE = 0.10, p <   	 

2
 = 
.26). This interaction was analysed further with post-hoc t-tests to compare the 
responses given to negative and neutral items. Significantly more remember 
responses were given to negative than neutral items (t (23) = 3.87, p <   . 
There was no significant difference in the know responses given to negative 
and neutral i
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neutral) and response type (remember, know, new) was conducted with the 
distractors, that is the items that were similar or new at test. There was a 
significant main effect of response type (F(1.40,32.18) = 72.61, MSE = 4.23, p <
.001, partial eta
2
 = .76) and a significant interaction between emotion and 
response type (F(1.61,36.99) = 21.37, MSE = 0.11, p <   	 
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Orthogonal contrasts revealed that significantly more ÔnewÕ than ÔrememberÕ 
or ÔknowÕ responses were given (F(1,23)=87.75, p < .001) and there was no 
significant difference in whether ÔrememberÕ or ÔknowÕ responses were given 
[F(1,23)=0.04, p = 0.84]. 
 
Table 3.10. Mean average proportion (SE) of Targets (same items) and 
Distractors (similar + new items) given Remember/Know/New responses for 
Negative and Neutral items 
Response 
type: 
Targets  
(Same items) 
Distractors 
(Similar + New 
items) 
Similar 
items 
New items 
                            Negative objects 
Remember .63 (.04) .23 (.02) .35 (.03) .10 (.02) 
Know .22 (.03) .20 (.02) .25 (.02) .14 (.02) 
New .15 (.03) .57 (.03) .39 (.03) .76 (.04) 
                         Neutral objects 
Remember .53 (.05) .15 (.02) .24 (.03) .05 (.01) 
Know .26 (.03) .18 (.02) .23 (.02) .14 (.03) 
New .21 (.03) .67 (.03) .53 (.04) .81 (.03) 
 
Confidence ratings 
The influence of emotion on the confidence ratings and response type 
given to target (same) and distractor (similar and new) items was analysed by 
conducting a 2 (confidence) x 3 (response type; Remember, Know, New) x 2 
(emotion) repeated measures ANOVA (see Tables 3.11 and 3.12). The 
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emotional content of same items did affect the distribution of confidence 
ratings as reflected by the significant three-way interaction between 
confidence, response type and emotion. This interaction was, however, not 
significant with the distractor items. The influence of confidence was checked 
further by analyzing the pattern of results when only high confidence responses 
were included in the analysis. For targets and distractors the same main effects 
and interactions in the ANOVAs were found as when analysis was collapsed 
across confidence ratings. The influence of emotion on confidence ratings in a 
RKN task appears to be greater than the influence it has in a SSN task as 
evidenced by the greater effect size in the three-way interaction for the former 
task. This may prove to an interesting area for investigation however, the main 
focus of this experiment is to compare the efficacy of either task in examining 
the influence of memory on emotion and therefore will not be examined further 
here. 
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Table 3.11. Remember/Know/New task: Same items. Repeated measures 
ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence ratings 
Effect F(df) MSE p Partial 
Eta
2
 
C,/0123/43 56,7891:9; = >3?@,/?3 AB@3 5DE3F3FG3EH8 DI/,7H8 D/37H; =
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Confidence 128.43(1,23) 2.45 < .001 .85 
Response type 30.30(1.41,32.38) 1.62 < .001 .57 
Confidence*Response type 32.70(1.52,35.00) 1.69 < .001 .59 
Confidence*Emotion 11.88(1,23) 0.04 < .01 .34 
Response type*Emotion 8.06(2,46) 0.05 < .001 .26 
Confidence*Response 
type* Emotion 
7.38(2,46) 0.04 < .01 .24 
High Confidence ratings only: R3?@,/?3 AB@3 5DE3F3FG3EH8 DI/,7H8 D/37H; =
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Response type 34.62(1.35,31.05) 3.57 < .001 .60 
Emotion 11.88(1,23) 0.02 < .01 .34 
Response type* Emotion 10.29(2,46) 0.09 < .001 .31 
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Table 3.12. Remember/Know/New task: Distractors (Similar and New items). 
Repeated measures ANOVA to examine influence of emotion on confidence 
ratings 
Effect F(df) MSE p Partial 
Eta
2
 
Confidence (low,high) x Response type (ÔrememberÕ, ÔknowÕ, ÔnewÕ) x 
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Confidence 21.59(1,23) 1.00 < .001 .48 
Response type 72.61(1.40,32.18) 2.12 < .001 .76 
Confidence*Response type 11.79(1.22,28.01) 0.57 < .001 .34 
Confidence*Emotion 3.18(1,23) 0.01 .09 .12 
Response type*Emotion 21.37(1.61,36.99) 0.05 < .001 .48 
Confidence*Response 
type* Emotion 
0.26(2,46) 0.001 .78 .01 
High Confidence ratings only: Response type (ÔrememberÕ, ÔknowÕ, ÔnewÕ) x 
Emotion (negative, neutral) 
Response type 42.63(2,46) 2.63 < .001 .65 
Emotion 3.18(1,23) 0.01 .09 .12 
Response type* Emotion 9.08(2,46) 0.03 < .001 .28 
 
Comparison of memory performance as measured by Same, Similar, New or 
Remember, Know, New task 
The measurement of memory performance by the SSN or RKN task 
was compared by examining responses given to same items at study and test. It 
was not meaningful to compare responses to similar or new items because 
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suitable responses were not equable in the SSN task where a specific response 
of ÔsimilarÕ or ÔnewÕ would be correct whereas for the RKN task these items 
would both be distractors and should be given a ÔnewÕ response. Analysis was 
conducted only on Remember/Know and Same/Similar responses because as 
the total number of responses in each task was the same and the main effect of 
task would be meaningless if all RKN and SSN responses were included. In 
this analysis, a main effect of task will imply a difference in the number of 
ÔNewÕ responses given. A 2 (task) x 2 (response type: same/remember, 
similar/know) x 2 (emotion) was conducted with the between participants 
factor of task and the repeated measures factors of response type and emotion. 
The main effect of response type was significant (F(1,46) = 26.66, MSE = 2.54, p 
< .001, partial eta
2
 = .37). The interaction between response type and task was 
significant (F(1,46) = 6.35, MSE = 0.60, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .12), as was the 
interaction between response type and emotion (F(1,46) = 16.37, MSE = 0.22, p 
< .001, partial eta
2
 = .26). There was a significant main effect of emotion 
(F(1,46) = 11.22, MSE = 0.04, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .20). The interaction 
between emotion and task was not significant [F(1,46) = 0.01, MSE = < 0.01, p = 
.91, partial eta
2
 < .01] and neither was the interaction between response 
type*emotion*task [F(1,46) = 0.31, MSE < 0.01, p = .58, partial eta
2
 = .01]. The 
main effect of task was not significant [F(1,46) = 0.56, MSE = 0.01, p = .46, 
partial eta
2
 = .01]. (See Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4. Responses to Same items in the Same/Similar/New and Remember/ 
Know/New task 
 
Section 2.4. Discussion 
 Using a SSN task we found emotional enhancement of visual 
specificity of memory with greater specific and general recognition for 
negative stimuli. Using a RKN task we found greater levels of recollective 
experience with negative than neutral stimuli. The same pattern of results was 
found with both memory tasks but the results did suggest that different criteria 
may be used to decide which level of response should be given. There was no 
interaction with emotion between the two tasks suggesting that the SSN task is 
uncovering the same pattern of emotional influence on memory as the RKN 
task. The visual specificity of memory with greater specific and general 
recognition for negative stimuli is consistent with the findings of Kensinger et 
al. (2006).  
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 We found that more ÔrememberÕ responses were given to negative than 
neutral photographs, but there was no difference in the number of ÔknowÕ 
responses given. These findings are consistent with those of Ochsner (2000), 
Dewhurst & Parry (2000) and Dolcos et al. (2005) who found the same pattern 
of results. However, they are not consistent with Mickley and Kensinger 
(2008) who also found emotional enhancement of ÔknowÕ responses. 
 The relationship between SSN responses and RKN responses was not 
as predicted. In contrast to the prediction that all Remember responses would 
overlap with Same responses, a greater proportion of Remember responses 
than Same responses given, suggesting that some recollection is based on 
recognition of items without memory for the specific visual detail of that item 
(See Figure 3.5 which indicates the average proportion of responses found in 
the two paradigms. The length of each bar in the figure represents the average 
proportion of that response to same items). 
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between Same/Similar/New and 
Remember/Know/New responses to Same items 
 
 The SSN and RKN tasks appear to be sensitive to emotional 
manipulations in the same way. However, the Remember responses are 
difficult to interpret because they imply that participants may use a Remember 
response even though they cannot remember the specific visual details. This 
was contrary to our expectations but is consistent with the definition of 
Remember/Know/New. The interpretation of findings from experiments using 
the Remember/Know paradigm and the models on which these interpretations 
should be based are hotly debated (e.g. Gardiner, Ramponi & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2002; Macmillan, Rotello & Verde, 2005) and will not be described 
in detail here. Nevertheless, we may speculate that from a two-process theory 
of recognition memory which would propose that Remembering and Knowing 
reflect two different forms of memory process (e.g. Tulving, 1985) we might 
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say that context is easier to remember than specific visual details. Whereas, 
from a single process theory which would propose that Remember and Know 
responses correspond to a different strength of memory drawing from signal 
detection theory (e.g. Donaldson, 1996) we might say that people have to be 
more confident in recognition to say they remember specific visual details of 
the context. One problem here is knowing exactly how participants interpreted 
the RKN instructions. Instructions for the RKN task have been found difficult 
to interpret and have been rewritten as Type 1 and Type 2 recognition rather 
than Recollection and Familiarity for use with people on the autistic spectrum 
(Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000). This is in contrast to the SSN task where 
the instructions are easy to follow. 
 In conclusion, the Same/Similar/New task has been shown to be 
perhaps a cleaner test of memory than the Remember/Know/New task with 
clear and well-defined criteria by which participants should choose their 
responses. The SSN task therefore appears to be an appropriate experimental 
paradigm with which to continue the investigation of emotionÕs influence on 
memory. This SSN paradigm will be used in the next two experimental 
chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4. The influence of emotion on specific visual details of memory 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter we continue to use the Same / Similar / New paradigm 
(Kensinger et al., 2006) to explore the influence of emotion on memory for the 
specific visual details of stimuli. For the remainder of the thesis we will be 
using this paradigm to start to explore the influence of emotion at the time of 
encoding new information into memory. By examining the information on 
which a memory is based, Kensinger et al. (2006) addressed the controversy in 
the literature over whether emotion leads to an increase in memory for details, 
or for gist at the expense of memory for details (e.g. Adolphs et al., 2005). In a 
series of studies, Kensinger and colleagues investigated the level of detail 
contained within memories for emotional stimuli by testing recognition 
memory for specific details and gist (Kensinger et al., 2006; Kensinger et al., 
2007a, 2007b).  
Whilst the enhancement for negative emotion was found in a series of 
studies the effects of positive emotions have not been studied so extensively. 
To our knowledge, memory for details of positive stimuli has only been 
investigated in a single study which found no enhancement in a younger 
college student sample, although a comparison group of older adults did show 
an enhancement in general memory of positive stimuli (Kensinger et al., 
2007a). Kensinger et al. (2007a) argued that an enhancement of memory for 
details of negative, but not positive, emotional stimuli is consistent with 
research showing that positive emotion leads to more gist-based processing, 
whereas negative emotion leads to more detailed processing (Bless et al., 1996; 
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Levine & Bluck, 2004; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Whilst there is some 
empirical support for this idea, for example from research into memory for 
autobiographical life events (e.g. Berntsen, 2002), it is not consistent with a 
number of studies which have shown an enhanced memory for positive items 
(Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Dolcos et al., 2005; for a different interpretation see 
Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Ochsner, 2000). There are therefore inconsistencies in 
the literature on the effects that negative and positive emotions have on 
memory. 
Section 2. Experiment 5: Visual memory specificity for negative and 
positive objects 
Section 2.1. Introduction 
Kensinger et al. found an effect of enhanced visual memory specificity 
in a series of experiments (Kensinger et al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b) using the 
same set of stimuli. The aim of this experiment is to test the effect of either 
valence of emotion and establish the findings of this paradigm before 
beginning a series of experiments to investigate the processes underlying this 
effect. According to Kensinger et al. we would expect to see enhanced visual 
memory specificity for negative, but not positive stimuli. 
 
Section 2.2. Method 
Design 
In this experiment the effect of a factor of emotion with three levels 
(negative, positive, neutral) is examined on two measures of visual memory: 
specific recognition and general recognition. Participants were shown negative, 
positive and neutral stimuli in a within-participant mixed-list design.  
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Participants 
Twenty-four participants took part in this experiment (13 Female). All 
were native English-speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age = 
20.71 years, SD = 1.65). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Participants received an inconvenience allowance of £6 for their voluntary 
participation. The School of Psychology, University of Nottingham Ethics 
Committee gave approval for the study. 
Materials 
The stimuli used in this experiment were selected from the same initial 
set of 405 pairs of photographs of objects which were reported in Chapter 3, 
Experiment 4. A new set of participants rated the stimuli for emotion, as in 
Experiment 4 this only included negative and neutral photographs, whereas 
positive photographs were also included in the emotion ratings given for this 
experiment. The ratings of perceptual features and familiarity were taken from 
those given by participants for Experiment 4. A different final subset of 
photographs were used for the experimental stimuli in Experiment 5 than in 
Experiment 4. This was due to the need to ensure only one pair of each type of 
object was included across positive, negative and neutral stimuli. The means 
and standard deviations given are for the 285 pairs (95 each of negative, 
neutral, positive) of stimuli included in this experiment. See Figure 4.1 for an 
example of pairs of stimuli. 
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Figure 4.1. Examples of pairs of negative, neutral and positive objects used in 
Experiment 5. These were presented in colour for the experiment. 
Emotion ratings. 
There were 810 photographs of objects (405 pairs) rated individually 
for valence and arousal on an 11-point scale, from -5 (negative) to +5 (positive) 
and -5 (calming / soothing) to +5 (exciting / agitating) respectively. 
Participants were told to base their ratings on their initial reaction to the objects 
in the photographs. Twenty University of Nottingham students conducted the 
ratings (15 female; Mean age: 20.15 years, SD 0.75). The negative, neutral and 
positive groups of stimuli were given distinct mean average item ratings (with 
range and standard deviation in parentheses) for valence  of -2.37 (-4.35 to -
0.50; 0.90), 0.60 (-0.45 to 1.55; 0.46) and 2.36 (1.55 to 3.45; 0.41) and for 
arousal of 1.91 (0.70 to 3.53; 0.65), -0.26 (-0.45 to 0.5; 0.41) and 0.65 (-1.65 to 
2.55; 0.97) respectively. 
Perceptual features 
 i) Similarity.  
There were 405 pairs of photographs of objects rated for similarity 
between the items in a pair by 10 University of Nottingham students (7 female; 
Mean age: 26.80 years, SD 3.46 years). Each pair was rated on a scale of 1 
(items incredibly similar) to 10 (items incredibly different). The average ratings 
of similarity between items were comparable between the negative, neutral and 
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positive object pairs with item means (with standard deviation in parentheses) 
of 3.40 (1.39), 4.09 (1.26) and 3.59 (1.32) respectively. 
ii) Dimensions of change. 
There were 405 pairs of photographs of objects rated for the dimensions 
that could differ between the two items in the pair (colour, shape, size, 
orientation) by two University of Nottingham students (2 female; Mean age: 
27.50 years). A rating of 0 indicated that no change in a particular dimension 
occurred (e.g., if both pumpkins were orange); a rating of 0.5 indicated a slight 
change in a dimension (e.g., a light green pine tree versus a dark green pine 
tree) and a rating of 1 indicated a substantial change (e.g., a red apple versus a 
green apple). Average ratings of how these dimensions changed between the 
items in a pair were comparable between the different emotional groups. The 
item means (with standard deviations in parentheses) for negative, neutral and 
positive object pairs were: for colour .46 (.34), .68 (.31) and .56 (.37); for 
orientation .61 (.35), .55 (.34) and .55 (.37); for shape .44 (.29), .42 (.27) and 
.38 (.28); and for size .21 (.24), .20 (.24) and .20 (.25) respectively. 
iii) Size. 
There were 405 photographs of objects (1 item from each pair) rated for 
size by one University of Nottingham student (Female, 20 years). Thirty-eight 
percent of all the experimental stimuli were judged to fit into a shoebox in real 
life. This was similar across groups of negative (34 items), neutral (39 items) 
and positive stimuli (38 items).  
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Familiarity 
 i) Word frequency and word familiarity. 
Word frequency and word familiarity (Wilson, 1988) for the 405 verbal 
labels of the object pairs were comparable between the negative, neutral and 
positive groups of stimuli. The average ratings (standard deviation in 
parentheses) for negative, neutral and positive stimuli were for verbal word 
frequency 68.24 (151.53), 67.73 (195.21) and 63.86 (75.97) and for word 
familiarity 394.34 (243.83), 430.95 (227.43) and 469.64 (224.37) respectively. 
ii) Familiarity of object. 
There were 405 photographs of objects (1 item from each pair) rated for 
familiarity on a scale of 1 (highly unfamiliar) to 10 (highly familiar) by one 
University of Nottingham student. Mean average item ratings (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) were comparable for negative, neutral and positive 
objects and were 4.41 (2.43), 4.48 (3.74) and 3.94 (3.76) respectively.  
Procedure 
Study. 
Participants were presented with 228 nameable, colour photographs of 
objects (76 negative, 76 neutral, 76 positive). Items were presented for 500 ms 
with a variable inter-stimulus interval of between 6 and 14 seconds, which was 
randomly determined for each item. Participants were presented with a 
photograph, then had to make a task decision during the inter-stimulus interval 
whilst a central fixation cross was displayed. In this task participants had to 
indicate by key press (1 = Yes, 0 = No) whether in the real world the object 
would fit inside a shoebox, which was placed next to participants throughout 
the experiment. This was the task used by Kensinger et al. (2006) and ensured 
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that, with the short presentation times of stimuli, participants did encode and 
process each object. The order of items was pseudorandomised so that no more 
than four items of one emotion were presented sequentially.  
Test. 
After an interval, of at least two days, participants completed a surprise 
recognition test. Participants were presented with three types of stimuli: same, 
photographs of objects that were exactly the same as those at study; similar, 
objects shared same verbal label but were not identical to those at study; and 
new, objects that had not previously been presented. Each object was presented 
centrally on the screen and participants were prompted to indicate by key press 
whether the item was same, similar or new. Participants were then asked to 
indicate their level of confidence in this decision (low or high) by pressing 
correspondingly labelled keyboard keys. Items were presented in a randomised 
order. A total of 114 items were shown that were the same at study and test, 
114 items were shown that were similar to those shown at study (i.e. the other 
item from the object pair) and 57 items were shown that were new. One third 
of each of the same, similar and new items were negative, neutral or positive. 
All participants were presented with exactly the same photographs at test, 
whether these items were the same, similar or new for each participant was 
counterbalanced by varying the item of the object pair and the stimuli lists 
which were shown at study. To enable counterbalancing the items were 
presented across four lists with 57 items in each list (19 negative, 19 neutral, 19 
positive). A fifth list of items was shown only at test. At the time of debriefing 
22 participants confirmed they were not expecting to have their memory tested. 
Two participants were not sure. Overall memory performance from those who 
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were not sure if there was going to be a memory test was comparable to that of 
the rest of the group. 
 
Section 2.3. Results 
The data for this experiment are presented in table 4.1 with the 
proportion of items given a ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ or ÔnewÕ response reported as a 
function of item type (same, similar or new) and emotion of object (negative, 
neutral or positive)
1
. Memory for specific visual detail was analysed in line 
with Kensinger et al. (2006) by calculating specific recognition defined as 
ÔsameÕ responses and general recognition defined as ÔsameÕ + ÔsimilarÕ 
responses to items that were the same at study and test (See Figure 4.2). 
Analyses of Variance were conducted to examine whether the emotion of the 
items influenced specific recognition and general recognition. When 
assumptions for sphericity are not met this is shown by degrees of freedom 
with decimal places. In these instances the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p 
values are reported. Planned contrasts were conducted to compare recognition 
for emotional vs. neutral stimuli and then negative vs. positive stimuli.  
 
                                                
1
 The level of chance for correct recognition performance was 40% for same and similar items. 
i.e. 40% chance of giving ÔsameÕ response to same item. It was 20%for new items. There were 
114 same items, 114 similar items and 57 new items. 
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Figure 4.2. Mean average specific and general recognition to negative, neutral 
and positive objects (+SE). Specific recognition was enhanced by both 
negative and positive emotion, but there was no emotional enhancement for 
general recognition. 
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Table 4.1. Experiment 5: Proportion of same/similar/new items given 
ÔsameÕ/ÔsimilarÕ/ÔnewÕ responses (Mean, S.E.) for negative, neutral and 
positive objects 
 
 
Same items  Similar items New items 
Response 
type: 
                                   Negative objects 
ÔSameÕ .50 (.03) .17 (.02) .02 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .34 (.02) .49 (.03) .22 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .17 (.02) .34 (.04) .76 (.03) 
                          Neutral objects 
ÔSameÕ .39 (.03) .13 (.02) .04 (.02) 
ÔSimilarÕ .40 (.03) .44 (.04) .21 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .21 (.03) .44 (.04) .75 (.04) 
                          Positive objects 
ÔSameÕ .46 (.04) .15 (.02) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .33 (.02) .46 (.03) .21 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .21 (.03) .39 (.04) .76 (.03) 
 
 
The ANOVA on general recognition revealed no significant main effect 
of the factor emotion [F(2,46) = 2.09, MSE = 0.02, p = .14, p
2
 = .08]. The 
ANOVA on specific recognition did reveal a significant main effect of the 
factor emotion (F(2,46) = 8.33, MSE = .07, p<.001, p
2
 = .27). Planned contrasts 
on the factor of emotion revealed a significant difference between specific 
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recognition of emotional and non-emotional stimuli (F(2,46) = 14.91, p<.01) but 
not between positive and negative stimuli [F(2,46) = 1.58, p = .22]. This 
reflected an enhancement of specific recognition for both positive and negative 
stimuli with no significant difference in the level of enhancement between the 
two valences of emotion. 
The emotional content of items did not affect the distribution of 
confidence ratings. ANOVAs conducted on the high confidence responses 
alone for the same, similar and new items revealed the same pattern of main 
effects and interactions as when the analysis was conducted on all of the 
responses collapsed across confidence levels. Therefore, the confidence ratings 
will not be discussed further. The possibility of a response bias towards giving 
an incorrect ÔsameÕ response to emotional, rather than neutral, items was 
checked by analysing responses to new items, which had not been seen before 
the recognition test. A 3 (emotion) x 3 (response type) ANOVA found no 
evidence for such a response bias. 
 
Section 2.4. Discussion 
An enhancement of visual memory specificity for positive and negative 
emotional stimuli was found relative to neutral stimuli. There was no emotional 
enhancement of general recognition. Our findings of an enhancement of 
specific, but not general, recognition for negative emotional stimuli are 
consistent with those of Kensinger et al. (2006, 2007a) who investigated 
negative arousing and neutral stimuli. However, the finding of a positive 
emotional enhancement of specific recognition is not consistent with earlier 
research by Kensinger et al. (2007a) who did not find an enhancement of 
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memory for positive stimuli. These findings are not easily explained by 
arguments that negative emotions lead to an analytical style of processing and 
therefore heightened memory for details, whereas positive emotions lead to a 
more heuristic style of processing and no enhancement in memory for details 
(Kensinger et al., 2007a). If this were the case we would not have expected to 
find an enhancement of specific recognition for positive objects. In conclusion, 
we have demonstrated that visual memory specificity can be enhanced by both 
positive and negative emotional content. It is not clear whether attentional 
narrowing could explain these results and so Experiment 6 was conducted to 
further examine this possibility. 
 
Section 3. Experiment 6: Central-peripheral trade-offs in visual memory 
specificity for scenes 
Section 3.1. Introduction 
Visual memory specificity for positive and negative emotional objects, 
in comparison to neutral objects, was demonstrated in Experiment 5. 
One way to examine inconsistencies that have been found in the 
memory literature of effects that positive and negative emotions have on 
memory is to consider emotionsÕ effects on memory for different elements of a 
scene. Emotion has been shown to have different effects on memory for central 
compared to peripheral details of a scene. For example, in a scene of a person 
being attacked on a street, details of the attacker would be central to the scene, 
whereas details of a car parked in the street would be peripheral to the scene. In 
comparison to memory for a neutral event, memory for central details of an 
emotional event was enhanced whilst memory for peripheral details was 
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impaired (Christianson & Loftus, 1991).  This trade-off may be the result of 
negative emotional arousal causing a narrowing of attention on to details 
associated with the emotional item, which are closely attended to and therefore 
later remembered, whilst information that is peripheral to the emotion is not 
attended to (cf. Easterbrook, 1959) and therefore likely to be forgotten. 
Kensinger et al. (2007b) interpreted this as support for the role of attention-
focusing at the time of encoding in the emotional enhancement of memory. 
They tested their interpretation by presenting objects as part of a contextually 
relevant scene and found a central-peripheral trade-off in specific and general 
recognition memory for negative emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, 
with an enhancement in memory for the negative object (central element) 
associated with a detriment to memory for the background on which the object 
was presented (peripheral element). Kensinger et al. (2007b) further 
investigated the role of attention in this central-peripheral trade-off by giving 
participants task instructions which directed their attention to central and 
peripheral aspects of the scene and showed that this eradicated the trade-off by 
increasing memory for the peripheral details. They argued that these findings 
support the idea that within natural viewing conditions, attentional processes at 
encoding play an important role in emotional enhancement of visual memory 
specificity.  
 This possibility will be investigated further by examining visual 
memory specificity for objects and the neutral backgrounds on which they will 
be presented. This experimental paradigm is adapted from Kensinger et al. 
(2007b) who investigated memory for negative and neutral objects that were 
placed on neutral backgrounds. The aim of this experiment is to examine 
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whether visual specificity for positive and negative objects remains when they 
are presented on neutral backgrounds and form part of a more ecologically 
valid scene than the objects presented in isolation in Experiment 5. A further 
aim is to consider if the emotional effects could be explained by attention 
narrowing at encoding which would be suggested by better memory for the 
central emotional object at the expense of memory for the peripheral 
background. Alternatively, improved memory for the central emotional object 
and the neutral background together may suggest the enhancement results from 
a generalised increase in physiological arousal which could lead to an overall 
increase in efficiency of cognitive processing. Positive and negative emotions 
may influence memory through different routes and indeed while negative 
stimuli may lead to a narrowing of attention (e.g. Christianson et al., 1991), 
positive stimuli can lead to a broadening of attention (Fredrickson, 2001). We 
predict that we will find evidence for a central-peripheral trade-off in memory 
for negative stimuli. 
 
Section 3.2. Method 
Design 
A within-participants design was used to examine the factors of 
emotion with three levels (negative, positive and neutral) and scene component 
with two levels (object or background) on two measures of memory; specific 
recognition and general recognition.  
Participants 
Eighteen participants took part in this experiment (10 female). All were 
native English speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age = 24.5 
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years, SD = 3.07). Participants received an inconvenience allowance of £3 for 
their voluntary participation. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. 
Materials 
Seventy-two scenes were created using the stimuli from Experiment 5 
(photographs of objects) and additional pairs of photographs for neutral 
backgrounds of the scenes. The backgrounds were selected from internet 
databases of images (Google Images) and from photographs taken specifically 
for this experiment by the researcher. Scenes were created using one pair each 
of negative, neutral and positive objects where it made contextual sense for all 
the objects to be placed on the same background. 12 versions of each scene 
were created using pairs of backgrounds that had the same verbal label and a 
similar appearance (see Figure 4.3).  Each version of the scene comprised one 
background from a pair, and one item from one of the object pairs. For 
example, one scene could have a background of a picket fence with a negative 
object of a sheep skull, or a neutral object of a tool box or a positive object of a 
lamb. By placing each object from the three object pairs (negative, neutral & 
positive object pairs) with either background 12 versions could be created. At 
test participants were shown the object and background components of a scene 
separately. When components of a similar version of a scene were presented to 
participants these could be of a similar object and/or background. Each version 
of one scene had approximately the same amount of background covered by 
the object. 
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Figure 4.3. Examples of stimuli. Stimuli were shown in colour for the 
experiment. One pair each of negative objects, neutral objects, positive objects 
and neutral backgrounds were used to create 12 versions of each scene to allow 
counterbalancing of whether items shown at test were same, similar or new in 
comparison to items shown at study. 
 
 
The ratings obtained for Experiment 5 were used to match the negative, 
neutral and positive groups of stimuli for ratings of perceptual features and 
familiarity and to provide distinct groups of emotional valence and arousal. It 
was more difficult to obtain close matches between the ratings of negative, 
neutral and positive object pair groups in this experiment than in Experiment 5 
due to the necessity of ensuring that scenes were contextually and graphically 
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congruent with a pair of negative, neutral and positive objects. Average ratings 
of how these dimensions changed between the items in a pair were comparable 
between different emotional groups. The item means (with standard deviations 
in parentheses) for negative, neutral and positive object pairs were: for 
orientation .62 (.33), .56 (.33) and .55 (.36); for shape .45 (.30), .42 (.28) and 
.37 (.28); and for size .22 (.24), .20 (.25) and .19 (.24) respectively. There were 
also comparable average mean ratings (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) between negative, neutral and positive object groups for similarity 
between objects within a pair 3.38 (1.38), 3.94 (1.30) and 3.75 (1.29); and for 
familiarity of the object 4.49 (2.40), 4.57 (3.82) and 3.93 (3.79) respectively. A 
comparable number of objects would fit into a shoebox for negative, neutral 
and positive emotion groups, these were 27, 31 and 26 respectively. The 
negative object pairs had a lower average rating for the change of colour 
between two items in a pair than the positive and neutral pairs, the average 
means (with standard deviations in parentheses) were .46 (.32), .62 (.32) and 
.60 (.36) respectively. Therefore, the colour of one item from each of 15 
negative pairs (which had low ratings) was altered by adjusting the saturation 
levels of the red/green/blue channels in Adobe Photoshop. These adjusted pairs 
of items were rated for the dimension of change in colour by two participants 
and had a new overall average .56 (SD = .32) which was comparable to the 
ratings for neutral and positive object pairs. 
The negative, neutral and positive objects all had distinct item mean 
average ratings (with range and standard deviation in parentheses) for valence -
2.51 (-4.35 to -0.55; 0.81), .53 (-0.45 to 1.45; 0.46) and 2.33 (1.55 to 3.45; 
0.41) and for arousal 1.97 (0.75 to 3.55; 0.64), -0.23 (-1.20 to 0.45; 0.36) and 
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0.59 (-1.65 to 2.55; 0.98) respectively. Backgrounds were rated by one 
participant on a scale from -5 (negative) to +5 (positive) for valence and -5 
(calming) to +5 (exciting) for arousal and were given ratings for arousal in the 
range -1 to +1 and valence in the range -1 to +2. Verbal labels of the 
backgrounds were generated by two raters to ensure agreement and avoid any 
ambiguity between different pairs of backgrounds. It was crucial to the 
experimental design that participants considered only one specific object or 
background pair when completing the memory test. When two raters generated 
the same background label then this was chosen, when there was disagreement 
a third rater was consulted and the label generated by the majority of raters was 
chosen. Rater agreement for the verbal labels of the objects was not checked as 
these were not ambiguous.  
Procedure 
Study. 
 Participants were presented with 48 scenes composed of a neutral 
background and either a negative, neutral or positive object. Each scene was 
displayed for two seconds and participants then had to indicate by key press on 
a 1-7 Likert type scale whether they would like to move closer or further away 
from the scene. The scenes were presented in a pseudo-randomised order so no 
more than four scenes with the same type of emotion object were shown 
sequentially. (For results of study phase ratings see meta-analysis in Section 
5.2, Chapter 5). 
Test. 
Participants completed a memory test after an interval of 30 minutes, 
during which time participants completed an unrelated experiment. For the 
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memory test participants were presented separately with components of 72 
scenes (i.e. the backgrounds and objects were presented separately). Each item 
was presented with a prompt above the picture asking the participant ÒDid you 
see a ________?Ó with the blank completed with the verbal label of the item. 
There was another prompt below the picture asking participants to indicate by 
key press whether the item was same / similar / new in comparison to items 
from the study phase. All items were presented in a random order with objects 
and backgrounds presented centrally on screen. 24 backgrounds and objects 
were exactly the same as those from the study phase, 24 backgrounds and 
objects were similar to those from the study phase (i.e. the other half of the 
object or background pair) and 24 backgrounds and objects were new and had 
not been shown previously in the experiment. One third of each of the same, 
similar and new objects were negative, neutral or positive. One third of each of 
the same or similar backgrounds had been displayed at study with a negative, 
neutral or positive object. Whether an item was same / similar / new at test was 
counterbalanced by altering which version of the scene participants had seen at 
study. Participants saw the components of only one version of each scene at 
test. Three sets of stimuli were used for the memory test, the set seen by each 
participant depended on the counterbalancing at study. At the time of 
debriefing 16 participants confirmed the memory test was a surprise, two 
participants were not sure. Overall memory performance from those who were 
not sure if there was going to be a memory test was comparable to that of the 
rest of the group. 
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Section 3.3. Results 
The data for this experiment are reported in Table 4.2 with the 
proportion of items given a ÔsameÕ, ÔsimilarÕ or ÔnewÕ response reported as a 
function of item type (same, similar or new), scene component (object or 
background) and emotion of object (negative, neutral or positive)
2
. (For 
statistical analysis of the responses given to different items (SSN) see 
Appendix 4.1.) The results were analysed by calculating specific recognition 
and general recognition in the same way as for Experiment 5 (see Figure 4.4). 
Repeated measures ANOVA were conducted on the data. All analyses reported 
are based on items that were the same at study and test. When assumptions for 
sphericity are not met this is shown by degrees of freedom with decimal places. 
In these instances the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p values are reported.  
 
                                                
2
 The level of chance for correct recognition performance was 33% for each item type. i.e. 33% 
chance of giving ÔsameÕ response to same item. The level was the same for objects and 
backgrounds. There were 24 each of same, similar and new objects and backgrounds. 
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Table 4.2. Mean responses (SE) for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) and emotion type (negative, neutral or 
positive). For new backgrounds the same data appear in negative, neutral and 
positive as these backgrounds were not associated with any particular object. 
                                                                          Item Type: 
 Same  Similar  New  Same  Similar  New 
Response 
type: 
Negative objects Background (Negative) 
ÔSameÕ .87 (.04) .32 (.04) .04 (.02)   .30 (.06) .22 (.04) .13 (.03) 
ÔSimilarÕ .10 (.03) .52 (.06) .15 (.03)   .28 (.03) .25 (.05) .22 (.04) 
ÔNewÕ .03 (.02) .16 (.04) .81 (.04)   .42 (.06) .53 (.06) .65 (.05) 
 Neutral objects Background (Neutral) 
ÔSameÕ .74 (.04) .27 (.05) .04 (.02)   .44 (.06) .18 (.03) .13 (.03) 
ÔSimilarÕ .17 (.03) .45 (.06) .15 (.03)   .23 (.03) .37 (.05) .22 (.04) 
ÔNewÕ .09 (.04) .28 (.06) .81 (.03)   .33 (.07) .45 (.05) .65 (.05) 
 Positive objects Background (Positive) 
ÔSameÕ .83 (.04) .32 (.05) .05 (.02)   .44 (.05) .21 (.04) .13 (.03) 
ÔSimilarÕ .08 (.02) .46 (.06) .13 (.03)   .24 (.05) .28 (.04) .22 (.04) 
ÔNewÕ .09 (.04) .22 (.04) .82 (.02)   .32 (.06) .51 (.06) .65 (.05) 
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Figure 4.4. Mean average specific and general recognition to neutral 
backgrounds presented with negative, neutral or positive objects and negative, 
neutral or positive objects presented with neutral backgrounds (+SE). 
 
Separate ANOVAs were conducted with specific recognition and 
general recognition. A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures 
ANOVA on specific recognition revealed a significant main effect of scene 
component with greater specific recognition for objects than backgrounds 
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(F(1,17) = 81.94, MSE = 4.79, p<.001, p
2
 = .83) and a significant interaction 
between scene component and emotion (F(2,34) = 6.83, MSE = 0.17, p<.01, p
2
 
= .29). There was no significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) = 1.04, MSE = 
0.03, p = .37, p
2
 = .06]. Planned contrasts revealed the difference between 
specific recognition of backgrounds with worse recognition for those with an 
emotional than neutral object was approaching significance [F(1,17) = 4.19, p = 
.06] and there was significantly worse recognition for backgrounds with a 
negative than positive object(F(1,17) = 4.86, p<.05). For the objects there was 
significantly greater specific recognition of emotional than neutral objects 
(F(1,17) = 9.70, p<.01) but no significant difference between positive and 
negative objects [F(1,17) = 0.30, p = .59]. 
A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA on 
general recognition revealed a significant main effect of scene component with 
greater recognition for the objects than for the backgrounds (F(1,17) = 29.13, 
MSE = 2.19, p<.001, p
2
 = .63). There was no significant main effect of 
emotion [F(2,34) = 0.27, MSE = 0.01, p = .77, p
2
 = .02] but the interaction 
between scene component and emotion was approaching significance [F(2,34) = 
3.18, MSE = 0.07, p = .05, p
2
 = .16]. Planned contrasts revealed no 
significant difference between general recognition of backgrounds with 
emotional or neutral objects [F(1,17) = 0.62, p = .44], although the worse general 
recognition for backgrounds with negative than positive objects was 
approaching significance [F(1,17) = 3.40, p = .08]. There was no significant 
difference between recognition of neutral vs. emotional objects [F(1,17) = 0.94, 
p = .35] nor between positive and negative objects [F(1,17) = 1.86, p = .19]. 
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The possibility of a response bias towards giving an incorrect ÔsameÕ 
response to emotional, rather than neutral, items was checked by analysing 
responses to new items, which had not been seen before the recognition test. 
Analyses using 3 (emotion) x 3 (response type) ANOVAs were carried out 
separately for recognition of the objects and backgrounds and found no 
evidence for such a response bias. 
 
Section 3.4. Discussion 
An enhancement of specific recognition was found for both positive 
and negative objects with impairment for backgrounds only for scenes with a 
negative object. There was no emotional enhancement for memory of objects 
in general recognition
3
, although an impairment in memory for backgrounds 
with negative objects did approach significance, suggesting the central-
peripheral trade-off is more pronounced when measuring specific, than general, 
recognition. The central-peripheral trade-off in specific recognition with 
negative emotion suggests that attention narrowing onto the negative objects 
may explain this enhancement of specific recognition of negative objects. 
Conversely, the lack of central-peripheral trade-off with positive emotion 
suggests that factors other than attentional focus at the time of encoding are 
needed to explain this effect.  
These findings of negative and positive emotional enhancement for the 
memory of objects presented on a neutral background are similar to those of 
Experiment 5 when objects were presented in isolation. A shorter time delay 
                                                
3
 There was a near ceiling effect in general recognition of objects which may have prevented 
any emotional enhancement of this measure from being found. The general recognition of 
backgrounds was much lower than of objects and therefore allowed emotional influences to be 
found. 
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was used between the study and test phase for Experiment 6 than Experiment 5 
to produce similar levels of memory performance even with the more complex 
stimuli used and to avoid floor effects in memory for the background. The 
same pattern of emotional effects on object memory was shown after the 30 
minute delay in Experiment 6 as after the delay of at least 2 days in Experiment 
5. 
Our findings of a central/ peripheral trade-off for specific and general 
recognition with a negative emotional enhancement for objects and impairment 
for backgrounds are consistent with those of Kensinger et al. (2007b). 
Although, again, our finding of positive emotional enhancement for specific 
recognition of objects is not consistent with KensingerÕs earlier research, the 
lack of peripheral impairment for memory of backgrounds with positive objects 
is consistent with proposals that positive emotion may lead to a broadening of 
attention (Fredrickson, 2001; Freitas et al., 2008; Kensinger et al., 2007a; 
Rowe et al., 2007).  
In conclusion, the central/peripheral trade-off in specific recognition 
suggests that the negative emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity 
may be due to attentional factors at encoding but that positive emotional 
enhancement of visual memory specificity is not. This will be investigated 
more directly in Experiment 7.  
 
  157 
 
Section 4. Experiment 7: Biases in spatial distribution of attention at the 
time of encoding 
Section 4.1. Introduction 
Negative emotion can have different effects on memory for the details 
of central and peripheral elements of visual scenes and these are modulated by 
time and task instructions. These effects could be interpreted as indicating that 
factors at the time of encoding are involved in the emotional enhancement of 
memory. Kensinger et al. (2006) suggested that attentional effects may 
contribute to this emotional enhancement in two different ways. One 
possibility is that the automatic and preferential focus of attention onto 
emotional stimuli (e.g. Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) may lead to more 
automatic encoding of visual details for emotional than neutral items. An 
alternative is a more controlled process in which participants focus more of 
their attention on the task with negative items.  
 Kensinger et al. (2007b) explored the influence of attention on the 
emotional enhancement of memory by manipulating task instructions and 
interpreted the results as indicating that attentional processes had been affected 
(Kensinger et al., 2007b). This interpretation, however, is not directly 
supported by providing any actual measure of attentional processes. We 
propose to explore participantsÕ attentional strategies during the task; if 
attentional strategy is related to central-peripheral trade-offs it would provide 
direct evidence for Kensinger et al.Õs speculation; however, if attentional 
strategy is not related to central-peripheral trade-offs it would severely weaken 
Kensinger et al.Õs interpretations. One method of exploring the distribution of 
attention across stimuli is to measure the eye movements people make when 
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viewing stimuli and examine how these relate to their subsequent memory. Eye 
movements have been argued to provide a behavioural indication of the 
allocation and location of attention (e.g. Henderson, 2003) when participants 
engage in tasks that resemble real-life interactions. Although, it is possible to 
create specific task parameters in a controlled laboratory setting that show 
attention shifts without the need for eye movement (e.g. Posner, 1980). It is 
broadly argued that in naturalistic scene viewing visual attention is closely 
indexed by eye movements (e.g. Land & Tatler, 2009). Our task resembles the 
naturalistic viewing of scenes, and under these circumstances, we believe that 
recorded eye movements provide a good index of visual attention.  
The theory that attention influences the emotional enhancement of 
memory has been previously investigated by measuring eye movements at a 
time when the technology had first become available and this showed that 
attention was an associated, but not necessary, condition for the influence of 
emotion on memory (Christianson et al., 1991). Christianson et al. (1991) 
found that participants had an enhanced memory of the central object of an 
upsetting event relative to a neutral event, and that this was associated with a 
greater number of fixations on the central object in the upsetting event than in 
the neutral event. This shows an association of attention with the memory 
enhancement process. The emotional enhancement of memory remained, 
however, even when the distribution of attention was controlled across 
emotional and neutral conditions by restricting participants to only one eye 
fixation on the critical slide and directing participants to look at the same detail 
in both conditions. This indicates that attention is not a necessary condition for 
emotion to influence memory. Christianson et al. (1991) proposed that, instead 
  159 
 
of an attentional encoding explanation, either pre-attentive processing or post-
stimulus elaboration could explain the results; however, support for these 
theories has not been found (Hulse, Allan, Memon, & Read, 2007; Libkuman, 
Stabler, & Otani, 2004).  Although at the time Christianson et al.Õs (1991) 
research was pioneering in the measure of eye movements, the technology 
limited the design in a number of ways; it allowed analysis of eye movements 
on only one critical scene per participant, and the number, position and location 
of eye fixations had to be determined by watching a slow motion video of the 
scene with the fixation spot superimposed onto the original stimuli and 
manually indicating whether fixations were central or peripheral to the scene 
and indicating the start/stop time for fixations. This methodology may have 
reduced accuracy of the eye movement measurements, and in combination with 
data from only one viewing instance per participant, may limit the 
generalisability of the findings. 
Christianson et al. (1991) provided some measure of categorical 
comparison between memory for central and peripheral aspects of the scene, 
but the involvement of attention in memory for details within those categories 
is still not clear and a number of predictions could be made from previous 
literature. The research by Kensinger and colleagues using memory specificity 
paradigms is a rare example in the literature of a systematic examination of the 
influence of emotion on memory. We will measure attention at the time of 
encoding to examine how the spatial distribution of attention is involved in this 
emotional enhancement of memory. Based on KensingerÕs research and 
arguments that negative emotions lead to a narrowing of attention whilst 
positive emotions lead to a broadening of attention (Fredrickson, 2001; Freitas 
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et al., 2008; Kensinger et al., 2007a; Rowe et al., 2007) we would predict that 
eye movement measurements will reflect greater attention on negative than 
neutral or positive objects, with less attention on backgrounds with negative 
than neutral or positive objects.  
Attention at the time of encoding has previously been examined using 
divided attention tasks to assess the amount of attentional capacity required for 
the emotional enhancement of memory (e.g. Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 
2007) but these studies have not been able to assess the relative distribution of 
attention to central and peripheral elements of stimuli, which the measurement 
of eye movements will allow. Eye movements enable us to record several 
different measurements: total gaze duration as a measure of the amount of time 
people look at different components of a scene, number of fixations to indicate 
the amount of eye movements people make when looking at different 
components of a scene and average fixation duration as a more sensitive 
measure of processing difficulty where longer durations are often found with 
more complex stimuli. Research into reading has shown that words which are 
rarely encountered have longer average fixation durations than words which 
are commonly encountered (Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989), suggesting that 
average fixation duration reflects processing difficulty.  
The aim of this experiment is to examine whether the central/peripheral 
trade-off found with negative, but not positive or neutral, scenes in Experiment 
6 could be explained by attentional effects at encoding. We predict that for 
negative objects people will tend to look for a greater amount of time at the 
object than the background, but that any such bias will be reduced or absent for 
neutral and positive stimuli. We predict that the same pattern of memory 
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results will be found as for Experiment 6 with a central/peripheral trade-off for 
negative, but not neutral or positive, stimuli. We hypothesise that a 
central/peripheral trade-off in memory for scenes containing negative objects 
will be associated with attentional effects at encoding.  
Section 4.2. Method 
Design 
A within-participants mixed list design was used with scenes of a 
neutral background and either a negative, neutral or positive object to examine 
participantsÕ eye movements at the time of encoding.  
Participants 
Twenty-one participants were tested but data from 3 were excluded as 
their eye movement data did not record accurately (see Results for details). 
Data from 18 participants (11 female) is included in the analysis. All 
participants were native English speaking University of Nottingham students 
(mean age = 20.11 years, SD = 4.90). Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. Participants received an inconvenience allowance of £4 for their 
voluntary participation.  
Materials 
The same stimuli were used in this experiment as in Experiment 6. The 
location of some of the objects in the scenes was altered from Experiment 6 to 
counterbalance the location of the object in the scenes; for 50% of trials the 
object was located centrally (in the same location as the pre-trial fixation cross) 
and for 50% of trials the object appeared at a non-central location, requiring 
participants to make an eye movement to fixate on the object and away from 
the fixation cross. A Sensorimotoric iViewX  Remote Eye-tracking Device was 
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used to measure eye movements. Eye-tracking measurements were recorded at 
50 Hz (a recording taken every 20 milliseconds) using a computer provided by 
Sensorimotoric. The experiment was run using E-Prime on a Compusys PC 
with a 17Ó CRT monitor and a screen resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. 
Participants sat with their head resting on a chin rest and a rounded bar 
forehead rest, with the chair height adjusted to a position comfortable for them. 
The monitor was placed 60cm from the participant. The visual angle subtended 
by the monitor was 30  horizontally and 23
 
vertically.
  
 
Procedure 
Study. 
The procedure of the experiment was the same as Experiment 6 with a 
few alterations to allow for the recording of participantsÕ eye movements 
during the study phase. Responses in the approach/avoidance task during the 
study phase were made by a mouse click on a visual scale instead of a key 
press as in Experiment 6. This was to minimise head movements and 
subsequent interference with eye movement recordings. Participants were told 
that the purpose of the study was to investigate how people perceive pictures 
and their eye movements would be recorded but they should view the pictures 
as they would normally. Participants were given task instructions on computer 
and their eye movements were calibrated in the eye-tracker. Participants first 
completed the task with five example scenes to allow them to get used to the 
eye-tracker and provide the opportunity to re-calibrate if necessary. These 
scenes were drawings of landscapes and differed in appearance from the 
experimental photographic stimuli. Participants were instructed to keep their 
head as still as possible whilst they were completing the task. A fixation cross 
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of one second was displayed before and after each picture to aid with recording 
of eye movements.  After the practice participantsÕ eye movements were re-
calibrated and the main experiment began. Participants were presented with 48 
scenes, of which one third each of the objects were negative, neutral or 
positive. The same counterbalanced lists of experimental stimuli were used as 
in Experiment 6. (For results of study phase ratings see meta-analysis in 
Section 5.2, Chapter 5). 
Test. 
 After an interval of 30 minutes, the test phase was conducted with 
exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 6. At the time of debriefing 13 
participants confirmed that the memory test was a surprise and 5 participants 
were not sure. Overall memory performance from those who were not sure if 
there was going to be a memory test was comparable to that of the rest of the 
group. 
Section 4.3. Results 
Memory Results 
Analysis of the memory data from Experiment 7 was conducted in the 
same way as for Experiment 6 (See Table 4.3 and Figure 4.5). (For statistical 
analysis of the responses given to different items see Appendix 4.1.) A 2 (scene 
component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA on specific recognition 
revealed a significant main effect of scene component with greater specific 
recognition for the objects than backgrounds (F(1,17) = 22.63, MSE = 2.37, 
p<.001, p
2
 = .57). There was no significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) = 
2.08, MSE = 0.06, p = .14, p
2
 = .10] but the interaction between scene 
component and emotion approached significance [F(2,34) = 3.20, MSE = 0.07, p 
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= .05, p
2
 = .159]. Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference 
between recognition of backgrounds with neutral or emotional objects [F(1,17) = 
0.30, p = .59], although the worse recognition for backgrounds with a negative 
than positive object did approach significance [F(1,17) = 3.37, p = .08]. There 
was significantly greater recognition of emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 
4.50, p<.05) but no significant difference between recognition of negative and 
positive objects [F(1,17) = 0.25, p = .63]. 
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Table 4.3. Mean responses (SE) for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) and emotion type (negative, neutral or 
positive). For new backgrounds the same data appears in negative, neutral and 
positive as the backgrounds were not associated with any particular object. 
Item type: 
 Same  Similar  New  Same  Similar  New 
Response type: Negative objects Background (Negative) 
ÔSameÕ .76 (.05) .28 (.04) .03 (.02)     .37 (.05) .23 (.03) .07 (.17) 
ÔSimilarÕ .17 (.04) .56 (.06) .22 (.04)    .26 (.04) .36 (.04) .21 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .08 (.03) .16 (.04) .74 (.05)    .37 (.06) .41 (.05) .72 (.04) 
 Neutral objects Background (Neutral) 
ÔSameÕ .66 (.06) .26 (.04) .03 (.02)     .45 (.06) .19 (.04) .07 (.17) 
ÔSimilarÕ .19 (.03) .44 (.06) .17 (.04)     .23 (.03) .41 (.03) .21 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .15 (.04) .30 (.07) .80 (.04)     .32 (.05) .40 (.04) .72 (.04) 
 Positive objects Background (Positive) 
ÔSameÕ .78 (.05) .31 (.05) .03 (.01)    .49 (.06) .17 (.04) .07 (.17) 
ÔSimilarÕ .14 (.03) .49 (.06) .13 (.03)     .28 (.05) .39 (.05) .21 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .08 (.03) .19 (.04) .84 (.04)     .24 (.05) .44 (.05) .72 (.04) 
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Figure 4.5. Mean average specific and general recognition to neutral 
backgrounds presented with negative, neutral or positive objects and negative, 
neutral or positive objects presented with neutral backgrounds (+SE). 
 
 
 
A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA on 
general recognition revealed a significant main effect of scene component with 
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greater recognition for the objects than backgrounds (F(1,17) = 18.29, MSE = 
1.15, p<.001, p
2
 = .52). There was no significant main effect of emotion 
[F(2,34) = 2.62, MSE = 0.06, p = .09, p
2
 = .13].  There was a significant 
interaction between scene component and emotion (F(2,34) = 3.60, MSE = 0.05, 
p<.05, p
2
 = .18). Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference between 
recognition of backgrounds with a neutral or emotional object [F(1,17) = 0.34, p 
= .57]  but the worse recognition of backgrounds with a negative than positive 
object did approach significance [F(1,17) = 4.11, p = .06]. There were no 
significant differences between recognition of emotional and neutral objects 
[F(1,17) = 2.92, p = .11] nor between negative and positive objects [F(1,17) = 0.11, 
p = .75].       
The possibility of a response bias towards emotional stimuli was 
checked as for Experiment 6 and no evidence for such a bias was found. 
Eye Movement Results 
 
The eye movement recording data was converted into a text file using 
the iView IDF Converter that is the manufacturerÕs standard program provided 
by SensoriMotoric. This file was converted into a format suitable for iLab 
toolbox using iView Output Utility (Van Heuven, 2008). The iLab toolbox for 
MatLab (Gitelman, 2002) was used to extract fixations from the data. A 
dispersion-threshold identification algorithm was used to identify fixations as 
groups of consecutive points within a particular dispersion. The dispersion 
threshold was set to include 1.5  of visual angle at 51 pixels with a minimum 
duration threshold of 100ms (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). iView Output 
Utility was used to identify whether fixations were made on to the object or 
background of scenes. MS Excel was used to collate trial data and determine 
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participant averages across items for the eye movement measures. Trials with 
x,y co-ordinates of 0,0 recorded (i.e. blinks or other loss of tracking) for more 
than 15% of a trial, and less than 1500ms of valid fixations for that trial (75% 
of trial duration), were defined as containing excessive blinks and excluded 
from analysis. Data from 3 of the original 21 participants were removed 
because more than five trials had excessive blinks as defined above. 
 Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to examine whether the 
emotion of the object in the scene (negative, neutral, positive) and scene 
component (object, background) interacted with the different eye movement 
measures (see Table 4.4). The following ANOVAs were also conducted with 
the additional factor of object location (central or not central). Location of the 
object had been manipulated to ensure this was not responsible for the first 
fixation location. Object location always interacted with scene component but 
as this factor did not interact with emotion these results are not discussed 
further.  
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Table 4.4. Mean average (SE) number of fixations, gaze duration and fixation 
duration made on object or background scene components for scenes with a 
neutral background and a negative, neutral or positive object. 
Emotion Object Background 
 No. of Fixations 
Negative 5.45 (0.15) 1.60 (0.14) 
Neutral 5.26 (0.19) 1.94 (0.12) 
Positive 5.17 (0.20) 1.92 (0.14) 
 Total Gaze duration (ms) 
Negative 1421.92 (28.57) 419.29 (26.14) 
Neutral 1358.71 (31.46) 486.58 (27.43) 
Positive 1327.99 (35.58) 516.30 (30.99) 
 Mean Fixation Duration (ms) 
Negative 270.92 (9.64) 290.24 (14.59) 
Neutral 274.19 (12.84) 266.39 (11.71) 
Positive 272.85 (16.40) 297.72 (14.00) 
 
A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA 
analysing the number of fixations for the factors scene component and emotion 
revealed a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,17) = 316.59, MSE = 
326.17, p<.001, p
2
 = .95) but not of emotion [F(2,34) = 1.06, MSE = 0.05, p = 
.36, p
2
 = .06]. There was a significant interaction between scene component 
and emotion (F(2,34) = 4.57, MSE = 0.98, p<.05, p
2
 = .21). Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant difference in the number of fixations made onto an 
emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.24, p = .63] but did reveal a significantly 
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greater number of fixations on the object in negative than positive scenes 
(F(1,17) = 5.06, p < .05). Planned contrasts also revealed  no significant 
difference in the number of fixations made onto the background of a scene 
presented with an emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 2.65, p = .12] but did 
reveal a significantly reduced number of fixations on the background in scenes 
with a negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 9.55, p < .01). 
The number of fixations were examined further by analysing the 
number of fixations made on the object as a proportion of the total number of 
fixations on the scene (fixations on the object/fixations on the object + 
fixations on the background). The mean average proportions (with standard 
error in parentheses) for scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object were 
.77 (.02), .73 (.01) and .73 (.02) respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA on 
this proportion with the factor emotion revealed a significant main effect 
(F(2,34) = 5.82, MSE = 0.01, p<.01, p
2
 = .26). Planned contrasts of this factor 
revealed no significant difference between emotional and neutral items [F(1,17) 
= 2.15, p = .16] but did reveal that this proportion was significantly greater for 
scenes with a negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 11.68, p<.001). 
A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA 
analysing the total gaze duration for the factors emotion and scene component 
revealed a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,17) = 335.16, MSE = 
2.16
E7
, p<.001, p
2
 = .95) but not of emotion [F(2,34) = 0.10, MSE = 40.62, p = 
.90, p
2
<.01]. There was a significant interaction between emotion and scene 
component (F(2,34) = 6.21, MSE = 85711.57, p<.01, p
2
 = .27). Planned 
contrasts revealed no significant difference between the total gaze duration on 
an emotional or neutral object in the scene [F(1,17) = 0.33, p = .57]  but did 
  171 
 
reveal a significantly longer total gaze duration on a negative than positive 
object in a scene (F(1,17) = 14.44, p < .01). Planned contrasts also revealed no 
significant difference between total gaze duration on the background of scenes 
with an emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.50, p = .49] but did reveal 
significantly lower total gaze duration on the background for scenes with a 
negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 17.68, p < .01). (See Figure 4.6). 
Total gaze duration was further examined by analysing the total gaze 
duration on the object as a proportion of the total gaze duration on the scene 
(total gaze duration on the object/total gaze duration on the object + total gaze 
duration on the background). The mean average proportions (with standard 
error in parentheses) for scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object were 
.77 (.01), .74 (.01) and .72 (.02) respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA on 
this proportion with the factor emotion revealed a significant main effect 
(F(2,34) = 6.47, MSE = 0.01, p<.01, p
2
 = .28). Planned contrasts of this factor 
revealed no significant difference between emotional and neutral items [F(1,17) 
= 0.46, p = .51] but did reveal that this proportion was significantly greater for 
scenes with a negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 17.37, p<.001). 
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Figure 4.6 Average total gaze duration on background and object scene 
components across scenes containing a negative, neutral or positive object 
 
A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA 
analysing the average fixation duration for the factors emotion and scene 
component revealed no significant main effects for emotion [F(2,34) = 2.68, 
MSE = 2115.42, p = .08, p
2
 = .14] nor scene component [F(1,17) = 3.42, MSE 
= 3973.57, p = .08, p
2
 = .17] although the interaction between emotion and 
scene component approached significance [F(2,34) = 2.89, MSE = 2749.80, p = 
.07, p
2
 = .15]. Planned contrasts for the object revealed no significant 
difference between the average fixation duration for scenes with an emotional 
or neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.33, p = .58] or with a negative or positive object 
[F(1,17) = 0.04, p = .85]. Planned contrasts for the background revealed 
significantly shorter average fixation durations on backgrounds of scenes with 
a neutral than emotional object (F(1,17) = 7.35, p < .05) but no significant 
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difference between scenes with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 0.42, p = 
.52]. 
Section 4.4. Discussion 
We again found an enhancement of specific recognition for both 
positive and negative objects with impairment in backgrounds only for those 
scenes with a negative object. The findings with general recognition were the 
same as for Experiment 6; no significant emotional enhancement in general 
recognition of objects but impairment in memory for backgrounds of scenes 
with a negative object. The memory results for this experiment demonstrated a 
similar pattern of results to those from Experiment 6 with a new set of 
participants. There were some differences in the exact values but the pattern of 
main effects and interactions were comparable between the two experiments.  
We found support for the proposal that attention at encoding is 
important for the negative emotional enhancement of memory with a greater 
number of fixations and longer gaze durations on the negative object, than 
positive object, in scenes with a neutral background. The similar average 
fixation duration for emotional and neutral objects suggested that rather than 
negative objects requiring more complex processing, participants chose to 
explore the negative objects in scenes with more fixations than the neutral or 
positive objects. If negative objects were more complex to process then we 
would have expected to find longer average fixation durations for negative than 
neutral or positive objects, which we did not. The finding of significantly 
shorter average fixation duration for backgrounds of scenes with a neutral 
object appears to be an anomaly in the data as we have no explanation for why 
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these backgrounds should be less complex to process and this finding is at odds 
with the other patterns of results found throughout this series of experiments. 
The results from the eye movement recordings are consistent with the 
central-peripheral trade-off in memory that was found for scenes with a 
negative, but not positive or neutral, object. Taken together these results 
suggest attentional effects at the time of encoding may contribute to the 
enhancement of visual specificity of memory by negative emotion. The lack of 
any attentional effects with scenes with a positive object suggest that attention 
effects at encoding are not responsible for the enhancement of visual 
specificity of memory by positive emotion and that an alternative explanation 
is required.  
The attention narrowing we found for negative stimuli was consistent 
with previous research examining eye movements which found attention 
narrowing for negative, in comparison to neutral, stimuli (Christianson et al., 
1991). Christianson et al. (1991) found that although attention narrowing was 
related to a negative emotional enhancement of memory it was not necessary 
for the memory effect to occur because the emotional enhancement remained 
even when attention was controlled across neutral and emotional slides, for 
instance by allowing participants only one fixation on the critical slide. Our 
findings suggest that the negative enhancement in this experiment is due to the 
additional fixations on negative objects allowing greater encoding of negative 
details and ultimately enhancing negative visual memory specificity. 
The difference in eye movements between scenes with a positive or 
negative object, and the similarity in eye movements between scenes with a 
positive and with a neutral object, provided no evidence that the enhancement 
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of memory for positive objects was due to attention at encoding. This attention 
narrowing with scenes with negative, but not positive, objects is consistent 
with one account of emotionsÕ effects on memory (e.g. Kensinger et al., 
2007a), which would argue for a broadening effect of positive emotion on 
attention and a narrowing effect of negative emotion. However, proponents of 
alternative theories of the effect of emotion on memory (Mather, 2007; Vogt, 
De Houwer, Koster, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2008) may argue that the lack 
of attention narrowing with scenes with a positive object may be due to the 
lower average levels of arousal for positive than negative stimuli, rather than 
emotional valence. This will be expanded further in the general discussion. 
 
Section 5. Chapter Discussion 
We found enhanced visual memory specificity for negative and positive 
emotional objects when these were presented in isolation and when presented 
on a contextual background. A central-peripheral trade-off in memory was 
found for negative objects with an enhancement in memory for the central 
object at the cost of memory for the peripheral background. This was in 
contrast to the positive objects where the enhancement in memory for the 
object was not accompanied by a detriment in memory for the peripheral 
details. The same pattern of trade-offs was found when assessing specific and 
general recognition, but these only reached statistical significance with specific 
recognition, suggesting that these trade-offs are more sensitive to measurement 
by specific than general recognition. Central-peripheral trade-offs in memory 
were reflected in the measures of attention. Attention, as measured by eye 
movements, was narrowed onto negative objects in a scene, but not onto 
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positive or neutral objects. These findings will now be considered in relation to 
the effect of emotion on memory for details, the involvement of attention at 
encoding in these memory effects and support for the different accounts of 
emotionsÕ effects on memory. 
The findings with negative emotional stimuli from this study are 
consistent with previous investigations, including the specific findings reported 
by Kensinger et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b).  A central-peripheral trade-off with 
negative emotional stimuli is consistent with previous studies that have 
investigated this effect using different paradigms (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; 
Cook et al., 2007; Touryan et al., 2007). The association between this trade-off 
with negative emotional stimuli and attentional narrowing at encoding is 
consistent with previous research by Christianson et al. (1991), although these 
authors demonstrated that the narrowing of attention, as assessed by eye 
movements, was not necessary for the emotional enhancement in memory to 
occur. Alternative methodologies have been used to examine the role of 
attention in the emotional enhancement of memory, one of which examined the 
attentional capacity required for this enhancement to occur. By dividing 
attention at the time of study, and at test, between a primary memory task and a 
secondary task (e.g. random number generation) the enhancing effects of 
negative emotion have been found to be independent of attention (Clark-Foos 
& Marsh, 2008; Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 2007). There have been 
different interpretations of these results. Talmi et al. (2007) argued that the 
effects of emotion on memory and attention are independent, whereas Clark-
Foos & Marsh (2008) argued that there may be a conscious route by which 
emotion enhances memory through attention and then an unconscious route, 
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independent of attention, which is used when attentional resources are 
constrained. The relationship between emotion and memory may greatly 
depend on context (Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008). Although this study strongly 
supports the idea of a causal relationship between attention and the emotional 
enhancement of visual specificity of memory of negative items the fact that we 
did not independently manipulate attention means that we cannot rule out 
alternative explanations.  
The attentional and memory effects found with positive emotional 
stimuli from this study are not so easily explained as those with negative 
emotional stimuli. The enhancement for the details of positive valence objects 
was not consistent with KensingerÕs earlier research which reported no 
enhancement in memory for details of positive objects (Kensinger et al, 
2007a). The effects of negative emotion on memory may be more resilient than 
those of positive emotion and this may explain why we replicated the effects 
for negative emotion but had different findings with positive emotion. 
However, we have now replicated the effect in 3 studies and 2 stimulus sets.  
One possibility is that positive stimuli in our experiment differed with 
regard to the level of approach motivation to those in KensingerÕs study. 
Approach motivation refers to an urge to move toward an object, whereas 
withdrawal motivation refers to an urge to move away from an object. The 
level of approach motivation induced by positive emotional stimuli can 
determine how this emotion influences attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2008) and this could be a route through which different sets of positive stimuli 
differentially influence memory. Our stimuli were pre-rated on valence and 
arousal and we have measures on approach motivation from the study phase of 
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the experiment and these clearly show that positive stimuli were not only 
higher in valence, but also in approach motivation (see meta-analysis Section 
5.2, Chapter 5). 
The enhancement of memory for details of positive objects provides 
evidence against arguments that positive emotion leads to more gist-based 
processing (Bless et al., 1996; Levine & Bluck, 2004; Storbeck & Clore, 2005) 
as this would not predict an enhancement in memory for details. It also 
provides evidence against arguments that response bias is responsible for any 
effects found with positive emotion (e.g. Dougal & Rotello, 2007). There are 
previous findings with which an enhancement of memory by positive emotion 
is consistent. These include findings of a general enhancement of memory for 
positive stimuli (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Kern et al., 2005; Talmi et al., 2007) 
and proponents of the theory that emotional arousal, not valence, is the critical 
factor in emotionsÕ effects on memory would be likely to predict an 
enhancement of memory for positive emotionally arousing stimuli (Mather, 
2007; Vogt et al., 2008). 
 To our knowledge there are no studies of central-peripheral trade-offs 
in recognition memory for positive stimuli. There is, however, one recent 
article comparing the descriptions of recalled negative and positive emotional 
autobiographical events. Talarico, Berntsen & Rubin (2009) found that 
descriptions of negative life events contained a reduced number of peripheral 
details to those of positive life events. It is not possible to objectively judge the 
accuracy of recalled memories of personal life events but these findings are 
consistent with our finding of impaired memory for peripheral details for 
scenes with a negative object compared to scenes with a positive object. The 
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lack of a central-peripheral trade-off in memory for positive objects is also 
consistent with research showing that positive emotions lead to a broadening of 
attention (e.g. Bless et al., 1996). We found no evidence for an effect of 
positive emotion on the spatial distribution of attention across stimuli. 
However, our measure of attention was based purely on eye movements and it 
is possible that people widen their spotlight of attention, and so make cognitive 
processing easier, without affecting eye movements. An alternative 
measurement of attention could be a task such as the dot probe task which has 
been used to demonstrate attentional biases towards and away from emotional 
stimuli (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). The lack of attentional narrowing with 
positive stimuli may seem inconsistent with evidence that additional attentional 
resources at encoding can completely account for a positive emotional 
enhancement of memory for pictures (Talmi et al., 2007). However, these 
additional attentional resources may be used to more deeply encode and 
ruminate on the semantic meaning of the positive emotional stimuli, rather than 
to affect the spatial distribution of attention. The negative emotional stimuli 
used in this experiment were of a threatening nature that would have the same 
meaning to most people (e.g. a knife, a severed arm) whereas, the positive 
emotional stimuli may have required more interpretation to fully experience the 
emotion (e.g. a birthday cake). Alternatively, positive emotions may enhance 
memory through a different route than negative emotions and this may be 
unrelated to attention.  Positive stimuli may be more successfully encoded, and 
subsequently remembered, as a result of the faster processing of positive than 
negative information (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmuller, & Danner, 
2008). In this study participantsÕ attention may have been initially attracted to 
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the positive objects, these could have been more quickly processed and 
successfully encoded than the negative objects, attention could then have been 
released from the positive objects, leaving sufficient time to encode the details 
of the background of the scene and thus avoid any impairment to memory. 
Note, however, there was no support for this in average fixation durations. 
 There is no single theory of the effects of emotion on memory which 
can explain the pattern of results found in this study. Our results are not fully 
consistent with KensingerÕs (2007a) proposal of a valence account of emotion, 
nor with an alternative theory which proposes that it is the arousing nature of 
emotional stimuli, rather than their positive or negative valence, which is 
responsible for these emotional effects (e.g. Mather, 2007; Vogt et al., 2008). 
Vogt et al. (2008) argued for a predominant effect of emotional arousal, over 
valence, with slower disengagement of spatial attention for stimuli high in 
arousal, than low in arousal, regardless of valence. Mather (2007) argued for 
the importance of emotional arousal and proposed a specific theory to explain 
how visual memory specificity may be enhanced for arousing objects. Mather 
(2007) argued that emotionally arousing objects attract attention, which 
enhances binding of the objectsÕ constituent features and then leads to 
interference in working memory making it more difficult to maintain other 
bound representations. This interference leads to an impairment (or no effect) 
on associations between the objects and other distinct objects or background 
contextual information, and explains the central-peripheral trade-offs found 
with emotionally arousing stimuli. According to Vogt et al. (2008) and Mather 
(2007) we would have expected to find enhancement for details of both 
positive and negative emotionally arousing central objects and this would lead 
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to a detriment in memory for peripheral details in both cases. The lack of a 
central-peripheral trade-off in memory for positive emotional stimuli in this 
experiment could be explained by the lower levels of emotional arousal for the 
positive than negative stimuli. Due to the nature of stimuli used in this 
experiment it was not possible to fully match the arousal levels across valence, 
but it is possible that a central-peripheral trade-off in memory for positive 
stimuli would appear if it were possible to match arousal levels between 
negative and positive stimuli. 
 In conclusion, these results replicated findings of Kensinger and 
colleagues (2006, 2007a, 2007b) with regards to negative objects using a new 
stimulus set. However, they call into question the degree to which all such 
emotional effects can be attributed to overt attentional processes at the time of 
encoding and also highlight the different processes which may be responsible 
for the effects of positive emotions on memory. The effects of negative 
emotion appear to be associated with spatial differences in attention, as 
measured by eye movements, but the effects of positive emotion do not. 
  182 
Chapter 5 Ð Which alternatives to attention focusing could explain 
emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity? 
 
Section 1. Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter we further explore the way in which cognitive processes 
may be affected by emotion and lead to the enhancement of memory for 
specific visual details. From chapter 4 we concluded that the focusing of 
attention onto the source of emotion was an important factor in the process of 
enhancement of memory by negative emotion but not by positive emotion. 
However, there have been studies of memory for central and peripheral 
information which have not supported the attentional narrowing hypothesis 
(e.g. Libkuman, Nichols-Whitehead, Griffith, & Thomas, 1999; Wessel, van 
der Kooy, & Merckelbach, 2000). 
In this chapter we firstly replicate the finding of attention narrowing 
from chapter 4 and then investigate whether any other measures of memory 
performance reveal further insight into the process by which emotion 
influences memory for specific visual details. We then consider the influence 
of any carry-over of emotion that might occur between stimuli, the unexpected 
nature of emotional stimuli and the distinctiveness of emotional stimuli. These 
are all other potential factors which may in some way be responsible for the 
emotional enhancement of memory for specific visual details. We will now 
consider the relevant literature for each of these different possibilities. 
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Alternative measures of memory: Associative Memory & Implicit Memory 
 In chapter 4 the measurements of memory performance were restricted 
to specific and general recognition of objects and backgrounds. Examining 
alternative measures of memory performance may provide further insight into 
the processes underlying the emotional enhancement of memory for specific 
visual details.  
 Touryan et al. (2007) proposed that emotion may directly influence the 
associative binding in memory of an item to peripheral information concerning 
that item. They argued that evidence that stress can disrupt hippocampal 
processing, a neural structure related to memory formation and binding, 
provides support for this proposal. Stress can therefore lead to the creation of 
fragmented memories and this may explain the dissociation between memory 
for central emotion-eliciting information and peripheral contextual information 
(Touryan et al., 2007). 
 Touryan et al., (2007) examined memory for the association between 
central and peripheral elements of negative and neutral events. Peripheral 
information was defined as information presented with an event but which was 
semantically and spatially separate from that event. Participants viewed 
negative emotional and neutral pictures from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 
2001). Peripheral information was a neutral cartoon-like object placed in one 
corner of the picture. The peripheral information was spatially and 
conceptually disparate from the central event information to reduce the 
possibility of pre-existing semantic associations and avoid ambiguous 
definitions of which elements of the scenes were central or peripheral. The use 
of spatial and conceptually disparate peripheral objects allowed 
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counterbalancing of presentation of objects with neutral or negative scenes. 
(Similarly to the experiments reported in our paradigm where the presentation 
of neutral backgrounds was counterbalanced across different emotional 
objects). Memory was assessed by free recall of objects and pictures, a mirror-
reversal test of pictures to indicate whether participants had a specific memory 
of the picture and could distinguish the original presentation from a picture 
flipped horizontally by 180 degrees and lastly a cued association memory test. 
In the cued association test participants were shown the study picture without 
the embedded peripheral object and had to identify which of three objects 
shown below were initially shown with this particular picture. All objects had 
initially been presented embedded on an IAPS picture. Touryan et al. (2007) 
found enhanced memory for the negative pictures in the free recall and the 
mirror-reversal test. This may indicate evidence of enhanced memory for the 
gist and specific details of negative emotional pictures. There was no emotional 
influence on free recall of the peripheral object. There was impairment in 
memory for the association between a peripheral object and picture with 
negative emotion. This was a novel method of assessing the binding of 
peripheral and item information and indicated that negative emotion can reduce 
memory for these associations, beyond the influence of memory for the 
peripheral information itself. Touryan et al (2007) argued that these findings 
could result from reduced attention and encoding of the peripheral objects with 
negative emotion. However, if there is attention narrowing then reduced 
memory for peripheral objects placed on negative scenes should also be 
evident and this was not the case. As an alternative they suggest emotion could 
modulate working memory during retrieval which could then disrupt the 
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associative binding (Touryan et al, 2007). These findings suggest that the 
examination of associative memory binding may provide further insight into 
the effects of emotion on memory.  
 In addition to examining associative memory in this chapter we will 
also examine a measure of implicit memory. With these type of tasks 
performance may indicate recognition in cases when participants may not 
necessarily be able to explicitly access this memory. The involvement of 
implicit memory mechanisms in emotionsÕ influence on memory is suggested 
by findings of a role for implicit memories in clinical disorders of emotion, 
such as depression (Barry, Naus, & Rehm, 2004). The critical link between 
memory and preference formation has been directly demonstrated by research 
investigating how preference for a neutral object is influenced by memory for 
an association between that neutral object and an emotional image (Ghuman & 
Bar, 2006). When participants explicitly remembered the affective associations 
they were found to prefer neutral shapes that had been associated with positive 
images. However, when they did not explicitly remember the affective 
associations they preferred neutral shapes that had been associated with 
negative images. Ghuman & Bar (2006) proposed that this preference in the 
absence of memory for items with a negative association is due to a mechanism 
which produces an inherent incentive to rapidly assess potential threats in the 
environment.  
In this chapter we will examine the influence of a previously embedded 
emotional or neutral object on preference for neutral backgrounds. This use of 
a preference judgement to assess levels of memory was also used in chapter 2 
to assess whether exposure to stimuli affected preference judgements in a mere 
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exposure paradigm. In chapter 2 we found that prior exposure to stimuli had no 
influence on judgements of preference for negative, neutral or positive 
photographs from the IAPs database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). In this 
case, we concluded that due to the complex nature of these stimuli preference 
judgements were based on the meaning conveyed by the photographs and 
therefore this left no opportunity for the influence of prior exposure. In contrast 
in this chapter we will be examining preference judgements to neutral pictures 
which formed the background of the stimuli and therefore it should be less 
likely that preference is influenced by semantic judgements. 
 
Carry-over of emotion across stimuli 
 One aspect of experimental design which relates to the emotion 
experienced by participants is the carry-over of emotion across stimuli. It is 
possible that when presenting emotional stimuli to participants there are effects 
which continue onwards after presentation of that particular stimulus 
(McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Waters, Sayette, & Wertz, 2003). One way in 
which these type of effects have been investigated is by using a variant of the 
Stroop (1935) task where participants must name the colour in which words are 
presented. In the emotional Stroop effect, emotional words are presented in 
different font colours and participants are asked to name the colour whilst 
ignoring the word. This is often slower for emotional than neutral words (for a 
review see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).  
 One factor which has been investigated is the impact of stimuli order on 
the Stroop effect. Slower responses to certain types of words have been 
demonstrated in blocked groups of concern-related stimuli but these effects can 
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greatly diminish or disappear with mixed lists of neutral and concern-related 
stimuli (Waters & Feyerabend, 2000). It has been argued that there may be 
carry-over effects in the blocked Stroop task where participants ruminate about 
previous words as they continue to colour-name target items later in the 
sequence. These carry-over effects in blocks with concern-related words may 
increase the size of the Stroop effect in blocked versions of the stroop (see 
Waters et al., 2003). Waters et al (2003) demonstrated carry-over effects in a 
Stroop task with smokers where the concern-related words were about  
smoking.  
An alternative interpretation of this emotional Stroop effect is that 
emotional words automatically attract attention, distracting the participant from 
the colour-naming task and therefore increasing the time required to name the 
colour of the emotional words, relative to the neutral words. McKenna & 
Sharma (2004) used a Stroop-like task to investigate the intrusion of emotion 
on cognitive processing. They investigated a fast interference effect described 
as interference of emotion with the response within the trial of a threatening 
stimulus (the theory that emotional words automatically attract attention which 
is proposed by many authors in this area) and a slow interference effect 
described as the interference of emotion with stimuli presented after the 
threatening stimulus. They found evidence for a slow effect which lasted for 
one subsequent trial, but no evidence for a fast interference effect. They 
discussed several possible mechanisms which might explain the pattern of 
disruption found from negative emotional stimuli. McKenna & Sharma (2004) 
firstly discounted the theory that mood inductions across stimuli may explain 
the effects, one reason given was that the disruption effects observed lasted for 
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less than one second, whereas mood induction normally takes many seconds to 
develop. They suggest that the slow effects they found may be interpreted as 
negative stimuli preventing the disengagement of attention or that interference 
may result from preparation to respond to a threat which may be demonstrated 
through interference to a subsequent stimulus.  
In the experimental design used here it will not be possible to assess the 
interference from a slow effect of emotional disruption as an interstimulus 
interval of no more than 32 milliseconds was found to be necessary (McKenna 
& Sharma, 2004) for these effects to occur. In the paradigm used there is at 
least 2 seconds between each stimulus presentation as a result of the fixation 
crosses shown before and after each stimulus. Increasing the intertrial trial 
interval has been shown to reduce the interference from negative stimuli and 
intervals of 1 second were found to produce a disruption of only 11 
milliseconds (Sharma & McKenna, 2001). This suggests that any slow effects 
of interference are unlikely to have any impact on the experimental design 
here. 
It is possible that the fast effects of interference from emotional 
disruption within a trial may be a contributory factor to the lack of memory for 
peripheral details of negative emotional stimuli. It has been proposed that these 
interference effects in the emotional stroop are due to the automatic attention 
grabbing of emotional stimuli which leads to a reduced response time to the 
task (e.g. Williams et al, 1997). It is possible that there is automatic grabbing of 
attention by the negative objects in a scene which then interferes with the 
processing of the backgrounds of these stimuli, leading to impaired memory for 
these peripheral details.  
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Factors unrelated to intrinsic emotion (Distinctiveness and surprise) 
 It is possible that the influences of emotion on cognition that are 
demonstrated in experimental paradigms such as those used in this thesis may 
be due to factors associated with the emotional stimuli that are not elements 
intrinsic to the experience of emotion. The two factors which we will explore 
in this chapter are the influence of the unexpected and surprising nature of the 
emotional stimuli and the relative distinctiveness of the emotional stimuli 
within the experiment as a whole. 
i )Unexpected nature of emotional stimuli 
 The possibility that the influence of emotional stimuli may be due to 
their unexpected nature has been explored particularly in studies using a one 
story slide show. This has often been done by comparing memory for an 
emotional, neutral and surprising version of an event. Christianson et al. (1991) 
presented participants with a thematic series of slides with one critical slide in 
the middle of the series on which memory was tested. This critical slide 
differed depending on the condition: in the neutral condition this showed a 
woman riding a bike, in the emotional condition the was woman lying on the 
ground beside her bike bleeding from a head injury and in the unusual 
condition the woman was carrying the bicycle on her shoulder. Enhanced 
memory was found for the emotional version, whilst similar levels of memory 
were found for the neutral and unusual version of an event.  
However, other research has found that novelty may be important in the 
relationship between emotion and memory. Hope & Wright (2007) investigated 
the role of visual attention in the weapon focus effect and found that both 
unusual and threatening objects may capture attention and be better 
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remembered than neutral objects. The weapon focus effect (Loftus et al., 1987) 
is the phenomenon that criminal incidents involving the presence of a weapon 
will have a negative impact on eyewitness memory of details such as the 
perpetratorÕs facial characteristics and clothes. Hope & Wright (2007) 
suggested that in order to clarify the components of the weapon focus effect the 
roles of emotion and novelty must be disentangled. The weapon focus effect is 
similar to the emotional effects being investigated here with the enhancement 
of memory for central object details and impairment in memory for peripheral 
details. These findings described above support the legitimacy of considering 
the influence of novelty or unusualness of the emotional stimuli on the memory 
and attentional effects being investigated.  
Unusual and novel stimuli could be described as stimuli which surprise 
the participant when viewed. Neural investigations have found distinct brain 
regions are activated when expecting unpleasant, compared to pleasant and 
neutral stimuli and there may be a specific neural network for internal 
adaptation and preparation processes to enable adequate reactions to expected 
unpleasant events (Herwig, Abler, Walter, & Erk, 2007). This suggests there 
may be a differing impact on cognitive processes and behaviour of unpleasant 
stimuli that are encountered unexpectedly.  
The level of surprise experienced can be moderated by warning 
participants of the nature of the next stimulus to be presented. The presentation 
of warnings to participants has been shown to affect the ability to perceive 
complex stimuli. Being given a cue of a specific example of the next stimulus 
to be seen has improved the perception of complex objects, in a task where 
participants must discriminate between normal and distorted images of famous 
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faces or places (Puri & Wojciulik, 2008). Although there was no influence on 
performance when participants were cued with just  the general category, rather 
than a specific example.  
ii) Distinctiveness of emotional stimuli 
Another possibility is that emotional stimuli may differ to other stimuli 
in an experiment with regard to their relative distinctiveness. This concept was 
initially discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, where emotional stimuli were 
presented in blocked lists and we argued that some of the difficulty in finding 
emotional effects in memory may have been due to this element of the 
experimental design. It has been argued that at least some of the memory 
effects attributed to emotion were actually due to item distinctiveness 
(Schmidt, 2002). Dewhurst & Parry (2000) found an emotional enhancement 
for positive and negative words in the number of correct Remember responses, 
but not correct Know responses with mixed lists. However, when blocked lists 
of positive, negative or neutral words were used Dewhurst & Parry (2000) 
found that the emotional enhancement was eliminated. This was due to higher 
recognition of neutral items with blocked lists rather than lower recognition of 
emotional items. Similar elimination of an emotional enhancement has been 
found by presenting emotional pictures in pure rather than mixed lists (Talmi et 
al., 2007).  
Schmidt & Saari  (2007) investigated why distinctiveness of emotional 
stimuli may lead to this effect. Possibilities considered include the 
interpretation that distinctive/emotional material receives increased processing 
relative to common/neutral material; there may be a contrasting memory 
representation between distinctive and common information or that the 
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distinctiveness of emotional stimuli creates an attention magnet leading to 
increased attention at encoding. Schmidt & Saari (2007) used the Stroop 
paradigm and compared memory for taboo emotional words, nontaboo 
emotional words and neutral words. They concluded that the taboo and 
nontaboo emotional stroop effect are different phenomena. They found recall 
of taboo words exceeded memory for neutral words in both mixed-list and 
between-subjects pure list designs and that good memory for nontaboo 
emotional words appeared to depend less on increased attention at encoding 
than for taboo words, and more on item distinctiveness.  
 Therefore, in this chapter we will consider how distinctiveness of 
emotional stimuli might relate to the effects found in this thesis by examining 
the influence of blocked or pure lists of emotional stimuli on memory for the 
details of both central and peripheral details of the stimuli. Firstly, we return to 
associative and implicit memory which are examined in the first experiment of 
this chapter.  
 
Section 2. Experiment 8:  
Section 2.1. Introduction 
 The aim of this experiment is to replicate the findings of Experiment 7 
with a new set of participants and investigate if there are reasons, other than 
attention narrowing, which may explain the lack of a central-peripheral trade 
off in memory for scenes with a positive object. Specifically, whether there is 
enhanced memory for the association between the object and background with 
positive emotion or whether an implicit memory of which object is associated 
with which background is formed. 
  193 
 We predict that the pattern of memory results for specific and general 
recognition and the eye movement results will replicate the findings of 
Experiment 7. That is to say emotional enhancement of specific and general 
recognition for negative and positive stimuli, a central-peripheral trade-off in 
memory for negative stimuli and attention narrowing onto the object in scenes 
with a negative object. We predict that the positive emotional enhancement of 
memory will to some extent be due to greater memory for the association 
between the object and the background which will be revealed in the level of 
memory for that association and also in some degree of implicit memory 
reflected in a greater preference for backgrounds which have been previously 
presented with positive objects. 
Section 2.2. Method 
Design 
A within-participants mixed list design was used with scenes of a 
neutral background and either a negative, neutral or positive object. The aim of 
the experiment was to examine participantsÕ eye movements at the time of 
encoding and investigate whether a range of measures of memory performance 
could provide insights into factors other than attention which could explain the 
emotional enhancement of memory. The design of the associative memory test 
is similar to that used by Touryan et al (2007). 
Participants 
22 participant took part in this experiment, data from 4 were excluded 
due to problems with the calibration of the eye tracker. Data from 18 
participants (13 female) were included in this experiment. All were native 
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English speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age =  20.9 years, 
SD = 2.5). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Participants 
were given an inconvenience allowance of £5 for their voluntary participation.  
Material 
The same materials were used as in Experiment 7. 
Procedure 
Study  
The same procedure was used as for Experiment 7. (For results of study 
phase ratings see meta-analysis in Section 5.2, Chapter 5). 
Test 
The procedure for the test phase was identical to that for Experiment 7, 
with the addition of two memory tests which were completed after the 
Same/Similar/New test. Participants were unaware that they would be given 
additional memory tests. After the Same/ Similar / New test participants were 
first tested for their preference for the neutral backgrounds which had been 
presented during the experiment. The backgrounds were presented to the 
participants one at a time  and in a random order, without the object. 
Participants rated how much they liked the background on an 11 point Likert 
type scale using labeled computer keys to respond. An 11 point scale was used 
as this provided the same range of possible responses as the scale used to rate 
the backgrounds for emotion in Experiment 6. The ratings ranged from 1 (not 
at all) to 11 (like it very much).  Next participantsÕ memory for the associations 
between the 48 objects and backgrounds that were presented as composite 
images during the study phase was tested. Participants were presented with a 
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background they had seen in the study phase with three objects presented 
beneath. Each object had been shown previously to participants during the 
study phase. In each triad of objects there was one negative, one neutral and 
one positive object. Participants had to indicate by key press which object had 
been presented with that background in the study phase of the experiment. 
Each triad of objects was presented to participants three times during this 
memory test. Participants were shown all 48 backgrounds that they had seen 
previously in the study phase. 
 At the debrief 15 participants confirmed that the memory test was a 
surprise, 3 participants were not sure. Overall memory performance was 
comparable between these two groups. 
Section 2.3. Results 
Memory Data 
Analysis of the memory data from Experiment 8 was carried out in the 
same way as for experiment 7 (see Table 5.1). (For statistical analysis of the 
responses given to different items see Appendix 5.1.) The influence of emotion 
on specific and general recognition was examined by conducting separate 
repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors scene component (object, 
background) and emotion (negative, neutral, positive) (See Figure 5.1).   
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Table 5.1: Mean proportion of responses (SE) for objects and backgrounds as a 
function of item type (same, similar or new) and emotion type (negative, 
neutral or positive) 
 
Item type: 
 Same  Similar  New  Same  Similar  New 
Response type: Negative objects Background (Negative) 
ÔSameÕ .78 (.04) .34 (.04) .01 (.01) .33 (.05) .13 (02) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .15 (.03)  .50 (.05) .17 (.04) .26 (.04) .38 (.06) .18 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .07 (.03) .16 (.04) .81 (.04) .41 (.05) .50 (.06) .79 (.04) 
 Neutral objects Background (Neutral) 
ÔSameÕ .72 (.06) .18 (.04) .01 (.01) .46 (.07) .16 (.03) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .16 (.03) .50 (.04) .13 (.04) .17 (.04) .31 (.05) .18 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .13 (.03) .32 (.05) .87 (.04) .37 (.05) .53 (.05) .79 (.04) 
 Positive objects Background (Positive) 
ÔSameÕ .83 (.04) .25 (.05) .02 (.01) .43 (.06) .23 (.04) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .10 (.03) .53 (.05) .09 (.02) .24 (.04) .33 (.05) .18 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .06 (.03) .22 (.04) .89 (.03) .33 (.06) .44 (.06) .79 (.04) 
NB. Data for new backgrounds is averaged across emotion as it was not 
possible for any of these backgrounds to be associated with an emotion. 
 
For specific recognition there was a significant main effect of scene 
component (F(1,17) = 42.88, MSe = 3.75, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .72) with 
greater specific recognition for the objects than backgrounds. There was no 
significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) = 2.56, MSe = 0.05, p = .09, partial 
eta
2
 = .13]. There was a significant interaction between emotion and scene 
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component (F(2,34) = 5.45, MSe = 0.10, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .24). Planned 
contrasts revealed that there was no significant difference between specific 
recognition of backgrounds initially presented with an emotional or neutral 
object [F(1,17) = 2.32, p = .15] but the worse recognition of backgrounds 
presented with a negative than positive object did approach significance [F(1,17) 
= 4.38, p = .05]. Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater recognition for 
emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 6.47, p < .05) and that the greater 
recognition of positive than negative objects approached significance [F(1,17) = 
3.77, p = .07]. 
For general recognition there was a significant main effect of scene 
component (F(1,17) = 33.66, MSe = 2.19, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .66) with 
greater general recognition for the objects than backgrounds. There was no 
significant main effect of emotion, although it did approach significance [F(2,34) 
= 2.69, MSe = 0.03, p = .08, partial eta
2
 = .14], and no significant interaction 
between emotion and scene component [F(2,34) = 1.91, MSe = 0.02, p = .17, 
partial eta
2
 = .10]. Planned contrasts revealed that although there was no 
significant difference between general recognition of backgrounds with a 
neutral or emotional object [F(1,17) = 0.01, p = .93] there was significantly 
reduced recognition for backgrounds with a negative than positive object 
(F(1,17) = 5.13, p < .05). Planned contrasts revealed the greater general 
recognition of emotional than neutral objects did approach significance [F(1,17) 
= 3.55, p = .08] but the difference between positive and negative objects was 
not significant [F(1,17) = 0.19, p = .67]. 
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Figure 5.1: Specific and General Recognition to Negative, Neutral or Positive 
objects presented with Neutral Backgrounds and Neutral Backgrounds 
presented with Negative, Neutral or Positive objects 
 
Preference for Backgrounds 
A repeated measures ANOVA with the factor emotion (negative, 
positive, neutral) found no significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) =  1.35, 
MSe = 0.41, p = .27, partial eta
2
 = .07].  
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Associative Memory 
 In the associative memory test participants were shown one neutral 
background and had to choose between a negative, neutral and positive object 
to indicate which object had been presented with the background as a 
composite image in the study phase of the experiment. It is possible that 
participants were biased into choosing an object of a particular type even 
though they did not have memory for that object; i.e. a response bias. To 
further examine this possibility we analysed the results for the associate 
memory test by calculating the number of times that participants chose the 
correct object as a proportion of the number of times they chose that type of 
object throughout the associate memory test. i.e. the number of times 
participants correctly chose the negative object as a proportion of the total 
number of times they chose the negative object during the memory test. This 
provided a measure of correct associative memory which had been corrected 
for bias to respond with a particular emotion regardless of memory and was 
analysed by conducting a repeated measures ANOVA with the factor of 
emotion. The main effect of emotion was not significant [F(2,34) = 0.46, MSe < 
0.01, p = .64, partial eta
2
 = .03]. Planned contrasts found no significant 
difference between responses to emotional or neutral items [F(1,17) = 0.68, p = 
.42], nor between responses to positive or negative items [F(1,17) < 0.01, p = 
.95]. 
 
 
 
Results of Eye Movement Analysis 
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Data were extracted and analysed in exactly the same way as for 
experiment 7 (see table 5.2).  Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to 
examine whether the emotion of the object in the scene (negative, neutral, 
positive) and scene component (object, background) interacted with the 
different eye movement measures. The following ANOVAs were also 
conducted with the additional factor of object location (central or not central). 
Object location always interacted with scene component but as this factor did 
not interact with emotion these results are not discussed further. Additionally 
for average fixation duration there was a main effect of object location. 
Repeated measures ANOVA analysing the number of fixations for the 
factors emotion and scene component found no significant main effect for 
emotion [F(2,34) = 0.49 , MSe = 0.02, p = .62, partial eta
2
 = .03], but did find a 
significant main effect for scene component (F(1,17) =  533.33, MSe = 480.28, p 
< .001, partial eta
2
 = .97), with a significantly greater number of fixations on 
the object than the background. There was a significant interaction between 
emotion and scene component (F(2,34) =  7.16, MSe = 3.02, p < .01, partial eta
2
 
= .30). Planned contrasts revealed a significantly greater number of fixations 
were made on emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 10.19, p < .01), there 
was a greater number of fixations on negative than positive objects which 
approached statistical significance [F(1,17) = 4.26, p = .06]. There was a 
significantly greater number of fixations on backgrounds with neutral than 
emotional objects (F(1,17) = 7.67, p < .05), and a significantly greater number of 
fixations on backgrounds with a positive than negative object (F(1,17) = 4.77, p 
< .05). 
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 The number of fixations made were also analysed by examining the 
number of fixations made on the object as a proportion of the total number of 
fixations on the scene (fixations on the object/fixations on the object + 
fixations on the background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of .81 
(.02) on scenes with a negative object, .74 (.02) on scenes with a neutral object 
and .76 (.02) on scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures ANOVA 
on this proportion with the factor emotion revealed a significant main effect 
(F(2,34) = 6.57, MSe = 0.02, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .28). Planned contrasts 
revealed this proportion was significantly greater for scenes with an emotional 
than neutral object (F(1,17) = 8.86, p < .01) and significantly greater for scenes 
with a negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 5.01, p < .05). 
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Table 5.2: Eye measurements on object or background scene components for 
scenes with a neutral background and negative, neutral or positive object 
 
Emotion Object Background 
 No. of Fixations 
Negative 6.40 (0.20) 1.56 (0.14) 
Neutral 5.81 (0.20) 2.12 (0.16) 
Positive 6.07 (0.20) 1.96 (0.14) 
 Total gaze duration (ms) 
Negative 1512.36 (44.83) 372.71 (28.21) 
Neutral 1371.46 (48.67) 494.24 (33.00) 
Positive 1414.86 (41.74) 458.68 (35.22) 
 Mean fixation Duration (ms) 
Negative 245.95 (11.91) 259.74 (12.67) 
Neutral 247.35 (11.92) 260.29 (16.55) 
Positive 244.87 (11.36) 248.12 (10.01) 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA analysing the total gaze duration for the 
factors emotion and scene component found no significant main effect for 
emotion [F(2,34) = 0.83, MSe = 854.79, p = .44, partial eta
2
 = .05] but there was 
a significant main effect for scene component (F(1,17) = 346.16, MSe = 2.65
E7
, p 
< .001, partial eta
2
 = .95) with significantly longer total gaze durations on the 
object than the background of the scene. There was also a significant 
interaction between emotion and scene component (F(2,34) = 5.76, MSe = 
163149.41, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .25). Planned contrasts revealed significantly 
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longer total gaze duration on the emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 9.61, 
p < .01), with the longer total gaze duration on negative than positive objects 
approaching significance [F(1,17) = 4.30, p = .05]. For the backgrounds there 
was significantly lower total gaze duration on the backgrounds that had been 
presented with emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 6.82, p < .05) with the 
lower total gaze duration on backgrounds of scenes with positive than negative 
objects approaching significance (F(1,17) = 3.83, p = .07). (See Figure 5.2). 
The total gaze duration was also analysed by examining the total gaze 
duration on the object as a proportion of the total gaze duration on the entire 
scene (total gaze duration on the object/total gaze duration on the object + gaze 
duration on the background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of  .80 
(.02) on scenes with a negative object, .73 (.02) on scenes with a neutral object 
and .76 (.02) on scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures ANOVA 
on this proportion with the factor emotion revealed a significant main effect 
(F(2,34) = 5.37, MSe = 0.02, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .24). Planned contrasts 
revealed a significant difference between this proportion for scenes with an 
emotional and neutral object (F(1,17) = 8.45, p < .01) but the difference between 
scenes with a negative and positive object only approached significance [F(1,17) 
= 3.64, p = .07]. 
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Figure 5.2. Average total gaze duration on object and background scene 
components of scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA analysing the average fixation duration for 
the factors emotion and scene component found no significant effect for 
emotion [F(2,34) =  0.814, MSe = 569.42, p = .45, partial eta
2
 = .05] but did find 
a significant effect for scene component (F(1,17) = 5.51, MSe = 2695.02, p < 
.05, partial eta
2
 = .25]. There was no significant interaction between emotion 
and scene component [F(2,34) = 0.46, MSe = 309.03, p = .63, partial eta
2
 = .03]. 
Planned contrasts found no significant difference between average fixation 
duration on neutral and emotional objects [F(1,17) = 0.46, p = .51], nor between 
positive and negative objects [F(1,17) = 0.04, p = .85]. Planned contrasts also 
found no significant difference between average fixation duration on 
backgrounds of scenes with a neutral or emotional object [F(1,17) = 0.39, p = 
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.54], nor on backgrounds of scenes with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 
1.10, p = .31]. 
Section 2.4. Discussion 
These results very closely follow those from Experiment 7. We found 
an emotional enhancement for the specific recognition of positive and negative 
objects, with the same pattern for general recognition although this effect only 
approached statistical significance here. 
We found a central-peripheral trade off in memory with impairment in 
the general recognition for backgrounds that had initially been presented with 
negative objects, with this impairment in specific recognition approaching 
statistical significance.  
The eye movement measurements of number of fixations and gaze 
duration showed evidence of attention narrowing at encoding onto the 
emotional objects. Participants looked for longer and with more fixations at 
negative than positive or neutral objects, and looked for a shorter time at 
backgrounds on which there was a negative object. There were no emotional 
differences with average fixation duration, suggesting that the differences in 
the other eye movement measurements were not due to the emotional stimuli 
being inherently more complex. 
The above results are consistent with predictions we made that the 
emotional enhancement of specific and general recognition of objects, central-
peripheral trade-off with negative emotion and accompanying attentional 
narrowing would replicate the pattern of results found in Experiment 7. This 
demonstrates the reliability of these effects and gives a strong foundation of 
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consistent experimental findings from which to manipulate different factors of 
the procedure and explore the processes underlying this effect.  
We found no significant emotional influence on memory for the 
association between an object and the background on which it was initially 
presented. These findings are not consistent with our prediction that there 
would be greater memory for this association with positive emotion. We had 
predicted that there would be a greater link in memory between backgrounds 
and objects when that object was positive, but we found no evidence of this for 
positive or negative emotions.  
These findings are not consistent with those of Touryan et al. (2007) 
who found reduced memory of the association between a peripheral object and 
the photograph on which it had been presented when the photograph had been 
negative, rather than neutral. There were differences in the paradigm of 
Touryan et al. and that used here which may explain the differences. Touryan 
et al. (2007) were testing memory for the association between an object that 
was both spatially and conceptually disparate from the central image 
(photograph) whereas we were testing memory for the association between 
peripheral background of the scene and the central object and therefore the 
peripheral object was only spatially disparate, not also conceptually disparate. 
Additionally, the task here may have been easier than that in Touryan et al. 
(2007) and greater levels of performance may have masked any emotional 
differences. Performance was at approximately 60% in Touryan et al (2007) 
compared to approximately 80% in this experiment. 
There was no evidence that memory for an emotional object affected 
any implicit memory for the background as measured by level of preference to 
  207 
the background when presented later in isolation. All backgrounds were 
emotionally neutral and therefore we would have expected any evidence for 
implicit memory to be manifested by an increased preference for backgrounds 
that had initially been presented with a positive object and a decreased 
preference for those presented with a negative object. These findings are not 
consistent with our prediction that there would be some implicit memory of the 
association between objects and backgrounds. These findings are not consistent 
with theories proposing a role for implicit memory mechanisms in the 
relationship between emotion and memory (e.g. Barry et al., 2004), however, it 
may be that the relationship between preference, memory and emotion is more 
complex and has been masked by additional factors. The lack of emotional 
influence on preference judgements found in this experiment is similar to the 
findings of preference in Chapter 2 where there was no influence of prior 
exposure on preference for emotional or neutral stimuli. It is possible that it is 
difficult to uncover influences on preference that are independent of any prior 
knowledge and opinions of the participants and that the types of stimuli used in 
this thesis are too complex to uncover such differences. 
The findings of association memory and preference for the backgrounds 
are not consistent with the predictions which we made and suggest that these 
factors are not related to the visual memory specificity found with negative and 
positive emotion. This experiment found no evidence for two possible 
explanations of enhanced visual memory specificity by positive emotion, 
namely increased associative memory and some form of implicit memory. 
Therefore, Experiment 9 was conducted to examine the possibility that 
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distinctiveness of positive emotional stimuli may explain the visual memory 
specificity enhancement. 
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Section 3. Experiment 9 
 
Section 3.1. Introduction 
 Experiment 8 did not support associative binding or implicit memory as 
underlying the observed memory differences. Therefore, we will now consider 
whether the distinctiveness of emotional stimuli may contribute towards these 
effects. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, distinctiveness of 
emotional stimuli has been argued to play an important role in the emotional 
enhancement of memory (e.g. Talmi et al., 2007). This possibility is explored 
in this experiment by blocking the presentation of stimuli into lists containing 
stimuli of one type of emotion. 
In line with previous research in this area we predict that the 
presentation of stimuli in blocks of emotion will eradicate the emotional 
enhancement of both specific and general recognition. We also predict that the 
attention focusing seen onto negative objects in a scene in Experiment 7 will be 
eradicated. 
Section 3.2. Method 
Design 
A within-participants blocked list design was used with scenes of a 
neutral background and a negative, neutral or positive object to examine the 
role of distinctiveness in the emotional enhancement of visual memory 
specificity. Eye movement measurements will also be recorded to examine the 
influence of distinctiveness on the distribution of visual attention whilst 
participants are encoding the scenes. 
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Participants 
18 participants (12 female) took part in this experiment. All were native 
English speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age = 19.39 years, 
SD = 1.38). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Participants 
received an inconvenience allowance of £3 for their voluntary participation. 
Materials 
The same materials were used as in experiment 7. 
Procedure 
Study 
All aspects of the experiment were identical to those of experiment 7, 
apart from the following adaptations to allow for the presentation of stimuli in 
blocked lists. After participants had been shown the example stimuli and eye 
calibration was complete participants were presented with additional 
instructions. There was an interval of 20 seconds before the first block of 
stimuli were shown, during this time participants were told they would be 
shown 16 pictures which were mostly unpleasant (if the first block was 
negative). In order to increase the anticipation participants might feel about the 
upcoming negative block of stimuli it was emphasized that if they feel upset by 
these pictures they are free to withdraw from the experiment at any stage. After 
the 20 second interval participants were presented with 16 experimental stimuli 
of neutral backgrounds with a negative object for 2 seconds each. A central 
fixation was shown for 1 second before and after each stimulus. After each 
picture participants completed the encoding task indicating whether they would 
like to move closer or further away from the scene. The second block of stimuli 
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were then shown, preceded by a 20 second interval with warning of the 
emotion of pictures to be shown, as before. For the positive block of stimuli 
participants were told the pictures would be mostly pleasant. The third block of 
stimuli was then shown. For the neutral block of stimuli participants were told 
the pictures would be mostly neither pleasant nor unpleasant. 
The version of each scene that was presented at study was 
counterbalanced in the same way as for Experiment 7. The order of blocks of 
stimuli was counterbalanced across participants. (For results of study phase 
ratings see meta-analysis in Section 5.2, Chapter 5). 
Test 
This was conducted in exactly the same way as Experiment 7. 
 
Section 3.3. Results 
Results of Memory Data 
Analysis of the memory data from Experiment 9 was carried out in the 
same way as for experiments 6, 7 and 8 (See Table 5.3). (For statistical 
analysis of the responses given to different items see Appendix 5.1.) 
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Table 5.3: Mean responses (SE) for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) and emotion type (negative, neutral or 
positive) 
Item type: 
 Same  Similar  New  Same  Similar  New 
Response type: Negative objects Background (Negative) 
ÔSameÕ .86 (.05) .24 (.05) .01 (.01) .42 (.05) .20 (.05) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .10 (.04) .66 (.06) .17 (.04) .21 (.03) .26 (.03) .16 (.02) 
ÔNewÕ .04 (.02) .10 (.04) .81 (.05) .38 (.05) .53 (.06) .81 (.02) 
 Neutral objects Background (Neutral) 
ÔSameÕ .68 (.06) .23 (.05) .03 (.02) .48 (.07) .21 (.04) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .19 (.05) .52 (.05) .08 (.03) .24 (.04) .36 (.04) .16 (.02) 
ÔNewÕ .13 (.03) .25 (.03) .89 (.05) .28 (.05) .43 (.05) .81 (.02) 
 Positive objects Background (Positive) 
ÔSameÕ .79 (.05) .31 (.05) .02 (.02) .51 (.08) .26 (.05) .03 (.01) 
ÔSimilarÕ .17 (.05) .56 (.06) .09 (.03) .18 (.04) .28 (.06) .16 (.02) 
ÔNewÕ .03 (.02) .13 (.02) .89 (.03) .31 (.08) .46 (.07) .81 (.02) 
 
NB. Data for new backgrounds is averaged across emotion as it was not 
possible for any of these backgrounds to be associated with an emotion. 
 
The influence of emotion on the two measures of memory performance 
was examined by conducting separate 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs with 
the factors scene component (background, object) and emotion (negative, 
neutral, positive) on specific and general recognition. For specific recognition 
there was a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,17) = 42.16, MSe = 
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2.56, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .71) with greater specific recognition for the 
objects than backgrounds. There was no significant main effect of emotion 
[F(2,34) = 1.18, MSe = 0.05, p = .32, partial eta
2
 = .07]. There was a significant 
interaction between emotion and scene component (F(2,34) = 4.89, MSe = 0.14, 
p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .22). Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater 
specific recognition for emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 7.44, p < .05) 
but no significant difference between negative and positive objects [F(1,17) = 
2.91, p = .11]. Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference between 
specific recognition of backgrounds which were initially presented with 
emotional or neutral objects [F(1,17) = .04, p = .84] nor negative or positive 
objects [F(1,17) = 1.87, p = .19]. (See Figure 5.3). 
For general recognition there was a significant main effect of scene 
component (F(1,17) = 28.70, MSe = 1.72, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .63) with 
greater general recognition for the objects than backgrounds. There was no 
significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) = 0.56, MSe = 0.02, p = .58, partial 
eta
2
 = .03]. There was a significant interaction between emotion and scene 
component (F(2,34) = 4.26, MSe = 0.08, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .20). Planned 
contrasts revealed significantly greater general recognition for emotional than 
neutral objects (F(1,17) = 7.17, p < .05) but no significant difference between 
negative and positive objects [F(1,17) = 0.11, p = .75]. Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant difference between general recognition for backgrounds 
which were initially presented with emotional or neutral objects [F(1,17) = 2.25, 
p = .15] nor negative or positive objects [F(1,17) = .84, p = .37]. 
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Figure 5.3. Specific and general recognition to negative, neutral or positive 
objects presented with neutral backgrounds and neutral backgrounds presented 
with negative, neutral or positive objects 
 
Results of Eye Movement Analysis 
The eye movements were extracted from the data and analysed in 
exactly the same way as described for Experiment 7 and 8. Repeated measure 
ANOVAs were used to examine whether the emotion of the object in the scene 
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(negative, neutral, positive) and scene component (object, background) 
interacted with the different eye movement measures (see Table 5.4. The 
following ANOVAs were also conducted with the additional factor of object 
location (central or not). Location of the object had been manipulated to ensure 
this was not responsible for the first fixation location. Object location always 
interacted with scene component but as this factor did not interact with emotion 
these results are not discussed further here.  
 
Table 5.4. Eye measurements on object or background scene components for 
stimuli of negative, neutral or positive emotions 
Emotion Object Background 
 No. of Fixations 
Negative 3.28 (0.22) 3.73 (0.26) 
Neutral 3.30 (0.20) 3.81 (0.16) 
Positive 3.22 (0.17) 3.79 (0.21) 
 Total gaze duration (ms) 
Negative 859.17 (56.75) 952.30 (48.86) 
Neutral 847.87 (32.97) 961.82 (39.87) 
Positive 837.58 (42.87) 969.58 (39.20) 
 Mean Fixation Duration (ms) 
Negative 277.13 (13.37) 271.84 (12.27) 
Neutral 272.55 (12.83) 268.88 (15.08) 
Positive 275.68 (14.79) 266.73 (10.32) 
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The number of fixations made onto a scene were analysed by 
conducting a 3 (emotion) x 3 (scene component) repeated measures ANOVA 
which found a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,17) = 6.18, MSe 
= 6.97, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .27), with a significantly greater number of 
fixations on the background than the object. The main effect of emotion was 
not significant [F(2,34) = 0.57, MSe = 0.03, p = .57, partial eta
2
 = .03] and nor 
was the interaction between emotion and scene component [F(2,34) = 0.03, MSe 
= 0.03, p = .97, partial eta
2
 < .01].  
The number of fixations made were further analysed by examining the 
number of fixations made on the object as a proportion of the total number of 
fixations on the scene (fixations on the object/fixations on the object + 
fixations on the background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of  .47 
(.03) on scenes with a negative object, .46 (.02) on scenes with a neutral object 
and .46 (.02) on scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures ANOVA 
on this proportion with the factor emotion revealed no significant main effect 
[F(2,34) = 0.05, MSe < 0.01, p = .95, partial eta
2
 < .01]. Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant differences between this proportion between scenes 
with an emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.02, p = .88], nor between scenes 
with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 0.10, p = .75]. 
The total gaze duration was examined by conducting a 3 (emotion) x 2 
(scene component) repeated measures ANOVA for the factors emotion and 
scene component which found no significant main effect for emotion [F(2,34) = 
0.06, MSe = 42.20, p = .94, partial eta
2
 < .01]. The main effect for scene 
component did approach significance [F(1,17) = 4.35, MSe = 344932.52, p = 
.05, partial eta
2
 = .22], with longer total gaze duration on the background than 
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object in a scene. There was no significant interaction between emotion and 
scene component [F(2,34) = 0.06, MSe = 3405.46, p = .94, partial eta
2
 < .01]. 
(See Figure 5.4). 
The total gaze duration was further analysed by examining the gaze 
duration on the object as a proportion of the total gaze duration on the scene 
(total gaze duration on the object/ total gaze duration on the object + total gaze 
duration on the background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of .47 
(.03) on scenes with a negative object, .47 (.02) on scenes with a neutral object 
and .46 (.02) on scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures ANOVA 
on this proportion with the factor emotion revealed no significant main effect 
[F(2,34) = 0.05, MSe < 0.01, p = .96, partial eta
2
 < .01]. Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant differences between this proportion between scenes 
with an emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.01, p = .93], nor between scenes 
with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 0.11, p = .75]. 
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Figure 5.4. Average gaze duration on object and background scene components 
for scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object 
The average fixation duration was examined by conducting a 3 
(emotion) x 3 (scene component) repeated measures ANOVA for the factors 
emotion and scene component. The main effect of emotion was not significant 
[F(2,34) = 0.61, MSe = 151.53, p = .56, partial eta
2
 = .04] and nor was the main 
effect of scene component [F(1,17) = 1.72, MSe = 962.36, p = .21, partial eta
2
 = 
.09]. There was no significant interaction between emotion and scene 
component [F(2,34) = 0.20, MSe = 65.91, p = .82, partial eta
2
 = .01]. Planned 
contrasts revealed no significant difference between the average fixation 
duration on emotional or neutral objects [F(1,17) = 0.81, p = .38], nor between 
negative or positive objects [F(1,17) = 0.06, p = .81]. 
Section 3.4. Discussion 
There was higher specific and general recognition for positive and 
negative, than neutral objects. This is contrary to the predictions we made of an 
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eradication of any emotional enhancement of memory with the presentation of 
stimuli in blocked lists. The pattern of results indicated that, similarly to 
Experiments 6, 7 and 8, the emotional enhancement for negative objects was 
limited to a central-peripheral trade-off in memory. Although this was not 
statistically significant
1
 in this experiment, the pattern of results was strikingly 
similar to that in the previous experiments.  
There was no influence of emotion on attention as measured by eye 
movements. The lack of attentional effects in the presence of an emotional 
enhancement of memory is not consistent with predictions made that the 
attentional effects would disappear when the emotional enhancements were 
eradicated, because the attentional effects have disappeared even though the 
emotional enhancements remain. 
The presentation of stimuli in blocks produced profound differences in 
how participants distributed their attention across the scene; participants spent 
significantly longer looking at the background than object for each type of 
scene. This is in contrast to when stimuli were presented in mixed lists of 
negative, neutral and positive stimuli; participants then spent significantly 
longer looking at the object than background for each scene, with the 
differences significantly more pronounced for scenes with a negative object. It 
appears that changing the mode of presentation lessened participantsÕ interest 
in any of the objects, as well as removing any additional interest for negative 
objects. Alternatively, it is possible that the change of emotion across stimuli 
may have led to the attentional narrowing in the other experiments where 
                                                
1
 A meta-analysis reported at the end of this chapter compared the memory results for 
experiments 6-10 and found no significant differences between the experiments. Although the 
central-peripheral trade-off with negative stimuli is not significant in this experiment, the 
pattern of results is similar to that in the other experiments. Therefore, in this experiment we 
interpret the findings as indicating there is a central-peripheral trade-off with negative stimuli. 
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mixed lists of stimuli were used. In this experiment, the blocking of stimuli 
into groups of negative, neutral or positive stimuli would have prevented this 
change of emotion. It would be possible to analyse the existing results of 
Experiment 8 to consider the influence of change in emotion. However, the 
possibility of this explanation occurred to us late in the process of writing up 
this thesis and as it would take considerable time to complete this analysis this 
has not been included. This remains, however, a possible explanation. Related 
to this idea is the possibility of carry-over of emotion across emotional stimuli 
(cf. McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Waters et al., 2003). It is possible that there 
was interference in the influence of emotion when stimuli were presented in 
mixed lists. The slow effects of interference that have been described in the 
Stroop task may have had an influence on this task, although in this experiment 
the inter-stimulus interval greatly exceeded the brief duration shown to be 
required for the carry-over of emotion ((McKenna & Sharma, 2004). 
Despite no evidence of attention narrowing the emotional enhancement 
of visual memory specificity remained for negative and positive pictures. This 
suggests that instead of the narrowing of attention being a requirement for 
negative emotional visual memory specificity it is an associated but not 
necessary effect.  
These findings suggest that the positive and negative emotional visual 
memory specificity is not due to distinctiveness of emotional stimuli as the 
emotional memory effects remained even when distinctiveness was controlled. 
However, although presenting stimuli in blocked lists controlled relative 
distinctiveness within the experiment by presenting stimuli in blocked lists, it is 
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possible that the emotional stimuli are more distinctive relative to everything 
else in the world than neutral stimuli (cf. Talmi et al, 2007). 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the role of distinctiveness 
in the emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity, however, the eye 
movement results provided some unexpected insight into the processes 
responsible for the emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity. These 
findings suggest that visual memory specificity may not be primarily due to 
attentional processes at encoding (as argued by Kensinger et al., 2007b). 
To emphasise the presentation of stimuli in blocks participants were 
told in advance the emotion of the pictures that would be subsequently 
presented. However, this means that we cannot disentangle the effects of 
distinctiveness and an advanced knowledge of the emotion when interpreting 
the findings of this experiment. Therefore, in the next experiment we will 
examine whether having an advanced knowledge of the emotion affects the 
way that attention is distributed across emotional and non-emotional scenes, 
and whether this affects the emotional memory effects. If advanced knowledge 
prevents the attention narrowing seen with negative emotional visual memory 
specificity then it would suggest the element of surprise may be the reason for 
attention narrowing, rather than the emotion itself. This would have 
implications for theories of why emotion leads to an enhancement of memory. 
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Section 3. Experiment 10: 
Section 3.1. Introduction 
In experiment 9 it was found that when stimuli were blocked according 
to the emotion of the object in a scene there was emotional visual specificity of 
memory but no evidence of attentional narrowing onto the object in negative 
scenes. There was a confounding variable in experiment 9 that participants 
were warned in advance of the emotion of the objects that would be presented 
in the next block in addition to the change from mixed to blocked lists of 
stimuli. Experiment 10 was conducted to untangle this confounding variable by 
presenting stimuli in the same pseudorandomised lists as experiment 6 and 7, 
but providing participants with a warning of the emotion that would be present 
in the object of the next scene. 
Blocking lists of stimuli into separate emotional groups may have two 
effects; emotional stimuli may no longer be distinct from other stimuli around 
them (i.e. not distinctive relative to the surrounding stimuli) and they may also 
no longer be unexpected. In pseudorandomised lists participants cannot know 
whether a negative, neutral or positive stimulus will be displayed next and 
emotional stimuli may create different effects when they are experienced 
unexpectedly than neutral stimuli. As discussed in the chapter introduction, 
different neural networks are activated for unpleasant events that are expected 
(Herwig et al, 2007) which implies the possibility of correspondingly different 
processes activated for unpleasant events that are unexpected.  
However, in Experiment 9 we found that the emotional enhancement of 
memory was not eradicated by blocking the stimuli into emotional groups. The 
aim of this experiment is to further investigate the factors that influence the 
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central-peripheral trade off in the enhancement of memory. Blocking lists did 
not eradicate the emotional enhancement of memory but it may have affected 
the processes responsible for the effect because the attention narrowing as 
evidenced by eye movements was no longer present. Further understanding of 
the conditions under which this attentional narrowing is present may provide 
insight into the processes underlying this emotional enhancement of memory. 
We predict that the warning of the emotion of the subsequent stimulus 
is critical in the effect that the blocking of stimuli into emotional groups had on 
attentional narrowing and that a similar pattern of results will be found in this 
experiment as in Experiment 9. 
Section 3.2. Method 
Design 
 A within-participants mixed list design was used with scenes of a 
neutral background and either a negative, neutral or positive object to examine 
the effect of a warning of the emotion of the stimulus on specific and general 
recognition and participantsÕ eye movements at the time of encoding. 
Participants 
18 participants (9 female) took part in this experiment. All were native 
English speaking University of Nottingham students (mean age =  20.50 years, 
SD = 2.20). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. An 
inconvenience allowance of £3 was received by each participant for their 
voluntary participation. 
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Materials 
The same materials were used as in experiment 7. An additional symbol 
was shown to participants before each picture to provide warning of the 
emotion contained within that stimulus. A sad / neutral / smiley face symbol 
(! " #) was used to indicate that the object in the next picture would be 
negative, neutral or positive. These symbols were from the Wingdings font and 
were displayed at font size 25 in the centre of the screen instead of the fixation 
cross. 
Procedure 
Study  
All aspects of the experiment were identical to those of experiment 7, 
apart from the warning that participants were given of the emotion of the object 
that would appear in the next scene. The warning took the format of a small 
symbol which replaced the fixation cross that appeared before the scene. 
Participants were told in the instructions that before each picture they would be 
shown a symbol which would indicate whether the next picture would be 
pleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant or unpleasant. They were shown 
which symbol indicated an unpleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant or 
pleasant picture before they began the experiment. (For results of study phase 
ratings see meta-analysis in Section 5.2, Chapter 5). 
Test  
This was conducted in exactly the same way as for experiment 7. 
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Section 3.3. Results 
Results of the Memory Data 
 Analysis of the memory data from Experiment 10 was carried out in the 
same way as for experiment 6, 7, 8 and 9. (For mean data see Table 5.5). (For 
statistical analysis of the responses given to different items see Appendix 5.1.) 
 
Table 5.5: Mean responses (SE) for objects and backgrounds as a function of 
item type (same, similar or new) and emotion type (negative, neutral or 
positive) 
Item type: 
 Same  Similar  New  Same  Similar  New 
Response type: Negative objects Background (Negative) 
ÔSameÕ .83 (.04) .36 (.06) .02 (.01) .35 (.04) .19 (.04) .05 (.02) 
ÔSimilarÕ .09 (.03) .51 (.05) .12 (.03) .19 (.05) .33 (.06) .13 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .08 (.03) .13 (.03) .86 (.03) .46 (.05) .47 (.05) .82 (.03) 
 Neutral objects Background (Neutral) 
ÔSameÕ .57 (.07) .28 (.05) .04 (.02) .47 (.04) .27 (.04) .05 (.02) 
ÔSimilarÕ .24 (.05) .42 (.06) .15 (.04) .22 (.03) .27 (.06) .13 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .18 (.04) .31 (.05) .81 (.04) .31 (.04) .46 (.04) .82 (.03) 
 Positive objects Background (Positive) 
ÔSameÕ .76 (.04) .29 (.04) 0 (0) .42 (.05) .21 (.03) .05 (.02) 
ÔSimilarÕ .16 (.03) .57 (.04) .13 (.04) .22 (.05) .33 (.04) .13 (.03) 
ÔNewÕ .08 (.03) .14 (.03) .87 (.04) .35 (.05) .46 (.06) .82 (.03) 
 
NB. Data for new backgrounds is averaged across emotion as it was not 
possible for any of these backgrounds to be associated with an emotion. 
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Memory for the separate elements of the scenes was analysed by 
conducting separate repeated measures ANOVAs on specific recognition and 
general recognition. A 2 (scene component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures 
ANOVA with the factors scene component and emotion on specific recognition 
revealed a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,17) = 57.15, MSe = 
2.48, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .77) with greater specific recognition for the 
objects than backgrounds. There was no significant main effect of emotion 
[F(1.38,23.46) = 1.95, MSe = 0.05, p = .17, partial eta
2
 = 0.10]. There was a 
significant interaction between emotion and scene component (F(2,34) = 14.54, 
MSe = 0.31, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .46). Planned contrasts revealed 
significantly greater specific recognition of emotional than neutral objects 
(F(1,17) = 19.47, p < .001) and no significant difference between negative and 
positive objects [F(1,17) = 2.74, p = .12]. Planned contrasts revealed no 
significant difference in specific recognition for backgrounds which had been 
initially presented with an emotional or neutral object [F(1,17) = 2.37, p = .14] 
nor with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 2.59, p = .13]. (See Figure 5.5). 
For general recognition there was a significant main effect of scene 
component (F(1,17) =  41.78, MSe = 1.78, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .71) with 
greater general recognition for the objects than backgrounds. There was no 
significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) =  1.16, MSe = 0.02, p = .33, partial 
eta
2
 = .06]. There was a significant interaction between emotion and scene 
component (F(1.46,24.83) =  10.02, MSe = 0.14, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .37). 
Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater general recognition of 
emotional than neutral objects (F(1,17) = 8.19, p < .05) but no significant 
difference between negative and positive objects [F(1,17) < 0.01, p = 1.00]. 
  227 
Planned contrasts revealed the impairment in general recognition for 
backgrounds which had been displayed with an emotional than neutral object 
was approaching significance [F(1,17) = 3.85, p = .07] and there was 
significantly worse general recognition for backgrounds with a negative than 
positive object (F(1,17) = 5.82, p < .05). 
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Figure 5.5. Specific and General Recognition to Negative, Neutral or Positive 
objects presented with Neutral Backgrounds and Neutral Backgrounds 
presented with Negative, Neutral or Positive objects 
 
Results of Eye Movement Analysis 
Data were extracted and analysed in exactly the same way as for 
experiments 7, 8, and 9.  Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to examine 
whether the emotion of the object (negative, neutral, positive) and scene 
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component (object, background) interacted with the different eye movement 
measures (See Table 5.6). The following ANOVAs were also conducted with 
the additional factor of object location (central or not central). Object location 
always interacted with scene component but as this factor did not interact with 
emotion these results are not discussed further. Additionally for average 
fixation duration and gaze duration there was a main effect of object location. 
The number of fixations was analysed by conducting a 2 (scene 
component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA for the factors emotion 
and scene component and found no significant main effect for emotion [F(2,34) 
=  0.48, MSe = 0.04, p = .62, partial eta
2
 = .03]. There was a significant main 
effect for scene component (F(1,17) =  271.83, MSe = 618.74, p < .001, partial 
eta
2
 = .94) with significantly more fixations on the object than the background. 
The interaction between emotion and scene component was approaching 
significance [F(2,34) =  3.18, MSe = 1.10, p = .05, partial eta
2
 = .16]. The 
number of fixations made were further analysed by examining the number of 
fixations made on the object as a proportion of the total number of fixations on 
the scene (fixations on the object/fixations on the object + fixations on the 
background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of .79 (.02) on scenes 
with a negative object, .76 (.02) on scenes with a neutral object and .76 (.02) on 
scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures ANOVA on this proportion 
with the factor emotion revealed the main effect was approaching significance 
[F(2,34) = 2.61, MSe = 0.01, p = .09, partial eta
2
 = .13]. Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant difference between the proportion between scenes with 
an emotional and neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.76, p = .39], but the proportion was 
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significantly greater for scenes with a negative than positive object (F(1,17) = 
4.78, p < .05). 
 
Table 5.6. Eye measurements on object or background scene components for 
stimuli of negative, neutral or positive emotions 
Emotion Object Background 
 No. of Fixations 
Negative 7.06 (.19) 1.87 (.15) 
Neutral 6.72 (.24) 2.08 (.17) 
Positive 6.68 (.21) 2.14 (.19) 
 Total gaze duration (ms) 
Negative 1405.13 (59.61) 356.32 (25.36) 
Neutral 1345.25 (58.15) 404.44 (33.90) 
Positive 1345.40 (58.04) 414.71 (34.02) 
 Mean Fixation Duration (ms) 
Negative 206.16 (9.20) 203.21 (8.53) 
Neutral 206.70 (8.94) 199.88 (9.60) 
Positive 205.98 (9.07) 206.47 (10.39) 
 
The total gaze duration was analysed with a 2 (scene component) x 3 
(emotion) repeated measures ANOVA with the factors emotion and scene 
component. There was no significant main effect of emotion [F(2,34) =  0.34, 
MSe = 373.25, p = .72, partial eta
2
 = .02] but there was a significant main 
effect of scene component (F(1,17) =  186.47, MSe = 2.56
E7
, p < .001, partial 
eta
2
 = .92) with significantly longer total gaze durations on the object than the 
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background of the scene. There was no significant interaction between emotion 
and scene component [F(2,34) =  2.15, MSe = 38587.27, p = .13, partial eta
2
 = 
.11]. (See Figure 5.6). 
The total gaze duration was also analysed by examining the total gaze 
duration on the object as a proportion of the total gaze duration on the entire 
scene (total gaze duration on the object/ total gaze duration on the object + total 
gaze duration on the background). There was an average proportion (S.E.) of 
.79 (.02) on scenes with a negative object, .77 (.02) on scenes with a neutral 
object and .76 (.02) on scenes with a positive object. A repeated measures 
ANOVA on this proportion with the factor emotion revealed no significant 
main effect (F(2,34) = 2.31, MSe = 0.01, p = .15, partial eta
2
 = .11). Planned 
contrasts revealed no significant difference between the proportion between 
scenes with an emotional and neutral object [F(1,17) = 0.43, p = .52], but the 
proportion was significantly greater for scenes with a negative than positive 
object (F(1,17) = 5.01, p < .05). 
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Figure 5.6. Average gaze duration on object and background scene components 
of scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object 
 
The average fixation duration was analysed by conducting a 2 (scene 
component) x 3 (emotion) repeated measures ANOVA with the factors 
emotion and scene component. There was no significant main effect for 
emotion [F(2,34) =  0.31, MSe = 77.90, p = .74, partial eta
2
 = .02] nor for scene 
component [F(1,17) =  1.35, MSe = 258.27, p = .26, partial eta
2
 = .07]. There 
was also no significant interaction between emotion and scene component 
[F(2,34) =  0.41, MSe = 120.25, p = .67, partial eta
2
 = .02]. Planned contrasts for 
the average fixation duration revealed no difference for emotional or neutral 
objects [F(1,17) = 0.03, p = .86], nor between negative or positive objects [F(1,17) 
< 0.01, p = .95]. Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference between 
scenes with an emotional or neural object [F(1,17) = 0.82, p = .38], nor between 
scenes with a negative or positive object [F(1,17) = 0.18, p = .67]. 
  233 
 
Section 3.4. Discussion 
There was emotional enhancement of specific recognition and general 
recognition for negative and positive objects. A central-peripheral trade-off 
was found in general recognition with the impairment to memory for 
backgrounds which had been presented with a negative object.  
 The pattern of results for the eye movement measures were similar to 
those found in Experiment 7. There was more attention given to objects than 
backgrounds in all cases with this being more exaggerated with negative 
objects where an even greater proportion of attention was paid to the object 
than background. This was revealed in measurements of number of fixations 
and gaze duration. There was no significant difference in average fixation 
duration. 
 These results are not as we had predicted. We expected to find a similar 
pattern of results in this experiment when an advanced warning of the emotion 
of the stimulus was given, as in Experiment 9 when stimuli were presented in 
blocks of emotion. Instead, we found emotional enhancement of recognition 
for both positive and negative emotion in specific and general recognition, with 
a central-peripheral trade-off for memory with negative emotion accompanied 
by attention narrowing. These findings suggest that the key element to the 
eradication lack of attention narrowing on negative stimuli was the blocking of 
stimuli into groups of one emotional valence, rather than the advanced warning 
of emotion that participantsÕ received. 
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Section 4. Chapter Discussion 
 The purpose of this chapter had been to examine factors other than 
attentional effects at encoding which might explain the emotional enhancement 
of memory for specific visual details that we have consistently found. We 
considered whether associative memory, implicit memory, item distinctiveness 
or surprise may be involved in this effect. We found no evidence of 
involvement of associative memory, implicit memory or surprise in these 
effects but did find that item distinctiveness had an influence on the attentional 
effects found. With blocked emotional and neutral stimuli there was no 
evidence of attentional effects on negative stimuli, nevertheless the emotional 
enhancement and central-peripheral trade-off in memory remained.  
These experiments have had unforeseen findings in that we found 
attentional narrowing at encoding appears not to be necessary for the emotional 
enhancement of specific visual details in memory. It is possible that there is a 
dual route to the emotional enhancement of memory, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
It has been argued that the effects of emotion on memory and attention are 
independent (Talmi et al., 2007) and alternatively, it has been argued that there 
may be a conscious route by which emotion enhances memory through 
attention and then an unconscious route, independent of attention, which is 
used when attentional resources are constrained (Clark-Foos & Marsh, 2008). 
Another possibility is that the negative emotional objects automatically grab 
attention as found in the emotional stroop task (e.g. Williams et al, 1997) and 
this leads to the impairment in memory for the peripheral background with 
negative emotion. This type of attention grabbing may not be possible to 
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identify with eye movement recordings because it may not be manifest in the 
spatial exploration of a scene.  
One aim of this chapter was to find a dissociation in factors that might 
be related to the positive and not negative emotional enhancement of memory, 
however, we have not found any factors that were related to the positive 
emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity. We have ruled out the 
involvement of item distinctiveness, surprise, implicit memory and associative 
memory. The implications of these findings will be further discussed in the 
thesis discussion as they also relate to the findings of Chapter 4. 
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Section 5. Comparison of encoding ratings, memory performance 
and eye tracking between Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10 
 
Section 5.1. Introduction 
 In chapters 4 and 5 the same experimental paradigm was used in a 
series of experiments and therefore we compare below the results found across 
all experiments. Some differences in effect size and significance were found in 
the different experiments but the memory results found were all in the same 
direction. This is similar for the eye-tracking results, although a different 
pattern was found in Experiment 9 where blocked lists were used.  
 
Section 5.2 Study phase results from Experiments 6 Ð 10 
The mean ratings given in the approach/avoidance task which 
participants completed as the encoding task in Experiments 6 Ð 10 are given in 
Table 5.7. Individual repeated measure ANOVA analyses with the factor 
emotion are shown for each experiment in Table 5.8. These show that for all 
experiments the average ratings from participants indicated that they wanted to 
move closer towards the positive pictures and further away from the negative 
pictures.  
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Table 5.7. Average ratings (standard deviation) on approach/avoidance task for 
scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object 
Experiment Negative Neutral Positive 
6 4.54 (1.10) 3.30 (1.11) 2.79 (0.94) 
7 5.12 (0.78) 3.90 (0.30) 3.17 (0.45) 
8 4.74 (0.76)  3.69 (0.58) 2.97 (0.66) 
9 4.75 (0.46) 3.92 (0.52) 3.16 (0.47) 
10 5.26 (0.62) 3.58 (0.46) 2.74 (0.53) 
NB. For Expts 7 Ð 10 N=18; due to technical error recording data for Expt 6 
N=15 
 
Table 5.8. ANOVA analyses and planned comparisons on approach/avoidance 
task  
ExpÕt ANOVA Planned 
comparisons 
(Neg > Neu) 
Planned 
comparisons 
(Neu > Pos) 
6 F(1.20,16.79) = 35.78, MSe = 20.37, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .72 
F(1,17) = 21.51, 
p < .001 
F(1,17) = 27.77, 
p < .001 
7 F(2,34) = 71.81, MSe = 17.42, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .81 
F(1,17) = 54.95, 
p < .001 
F(1,17) = 51.66, 
p < .001 
8 F(2,34) = 34.12, MSe = 14.35, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .67 
F(1,17) = 24.39, 
p < .001 
F(1,17) = 19.87, 
p < .001 
9 F(2,34) = 63.97, MSe = 11.40, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .79 
F(1,17) = 41.77, 
p < .001 
F(1,17) = 30.35, 
p < .001 
10 F(1.47,25.01) = 76.80, MSe = 29.69, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .82 
F(1,17) = 56.77, 
p < .001 
F(1,17) = 38.77, 
p < .001 
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A meta-analysis analysis was conducted to compare the study phase 
ratings of approach/ avoidance given to the stimuli in Experiments 6 Ð 10. A 3 
x 5 ANOVA with the within participants factor of emotion (negative, neutral, 
positive) and the between participants factor of experiment (6,7,8,9,10) was 
conducted. There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1.54,126.49) = 
259.97, MSe = 81.33, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .76), a main effect of experiment 
(F(4,82) = 2.47, MSe = 0.61, p = .05, partial eta
2
 = .11) and a significant 
interaction between emotion and experiment (F(8,164) = 2.32, MSe = 0.72, p < 
.05, partial eta
2
 = .10). Planned comparisons for the main effect of emotion 
revealed significantly greater ratings for negative than neutral (F(1,82) = 
179.110, p < .001) and for neutral than positive (F(1,82) = 146.58, p < .001). 
Post-hoc analyses of TukeyÕs HSD were conducted to examine the interaction 
between emotion and experiment. This revealed only one significant result 
which was that ratings for neutral stimuli were significantly lower in 
Experiment 6 than in Experiment 9 (p < .05). 
 
Section 5.2. Memory Results  
The experimental stimuli were exactly the same for Experiments 6 Ð 10. 
In experiments 9 and 10 there were some adjustments made to the presentation 
of stimuli. These were as follows: Experiment 9 - stimuli were presented in 
blocks of emotion type rather than in a pseudorandomised list and participants 
were warned of the emotion of the stimuli in the upcoming block; Experiment 
10 Ð participants were given a warning of the emotion of the next stimulus. The 
results across all of these experiments (6 Ð 10) showed the same pattern of 
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emotional influence on the results but the levels of significance differed 
between some of the experiments. In cases where the difference was not 
significant but the results were in the same direction as for other experiments 
we interpreted the results as being consistent with earlier experiments. To test 
for this interpretation we analysed the influence of emotion on specific and 
general recognition for central and peripheral components of a scene by 
conducting ANOVAs separately on specific and general recognition, as in the 
earlier analysis reported on these measures of memory performance, but with 
the addition of the between-participants factor of experiment. The analysis 
reported within the reports of individual experiments was of planned contrasts 
comparing performance with emotional vs. neutral stimuli, and then further 
analyses to compare performance with negative vs. positive stimuli. This 
analysis was consistent with the theoretical predictions that we were making in 
each chapter. In this meta-analysis we also conducted additional bonferroni 
corrected t-tests to compare recognition between negative, neutral and positive 
items, as all of these differences are not measured using the orthogonal planned 
contrasts. 
 
Section 5.2.1. Statistical Analysis 
The influence of experiment on specific and general recognition was 
analysed by conducting separate 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 5 
(experiment) for the different types of memory (see figures 5.7 and 5.8). A  3 x 
2 x 5 ANOVA with the repeated measures factors of emotion and scene 
component and between participants factor of experiment for specific 
recognition revealed there was a significant main effect of scene component 
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(F(1,85) = 220.26, MSe = 15.63, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .72) and a significant 
main effect of emotion (F(2,170) = 5.75, MSe = 0.17, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .06). 
The main effect of experiment was not significant [F(2,170) = 0.36, MSe = 0.02, 
p = .84, partial eta
2
 = .02]. The interaction between scene component and 
experiment was not significant [F(4,85) = 1.14, MSe = 0.08, p = .34, partial eta
2
 
= .05], nor was the interaction between emotion and experiment [F(8,170) = 
0.65, MSe = 0.02, p = .74, partial eta
2
 = .03]. The interaction between scene 
component and emotion was significant (F(2,170) = 31.14, MSe = 0.72, p < .001, 
partial eta
2
 = .27). The interaction between scene component*emotion* 
experiment was not significant [F(8,170) = 0.77, MSe = 0.02, p = .63, partial eta
2
 
= .04]. Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater specific recognition of 
backgrounds initially presented with neutral than emotional objects (F(1,89) = 
5.87, p < .05) and significantly worse recognition of backgrounds initially 
presented with negative than positive objects (F(1,89) = 16.52, p < .001). 
Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater specific recognition of 
emotional than neutral objects (F(1,89) = 42.98, p < .001) but no significant 
difference between the specific recognition of positive and negative objects 
[F(1,89) = 1.09, p = .30]. 
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Figure 5.7. Specific and general recognition of objects as function of emotion 
averaged across Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Specific and general recognition of backgrounds as function of 
emotion of object with which they were initially presented averaged across 
Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
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A  3 x 2 x 5 ANOVA with the repeated measures factors of emotion 
and scene component and between participants factor of experiment for general 
recognition revealed a significant main effect of scene component (F(1,85) = 
145.94, MSe = 8.91, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .63) and a significant main effect 
of emotion (F(2,170) = 4.82, MSe = 0.10, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .05). The main 
effect of experiment was not significant [F(4,85) = 0.48, MSe = 0.01, p = .75, 
partial eta
2
 = .02]. The interaction between scene component and experiment 
was not significant [F(4,85) = 0.46, MSe = 0.03, p = .77, partial eta
2
 = .02] and 
nor was the interaction between emotion and experiment [F(8,170) = 0.35, MSe = 
0.01, p = .95, partial eta
2
 = .02]. The interaction between scene component and 
emotion was significant (F(2,170) = 18.41, MSe = 0.30, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = 
.18). The interaction between scene component, emotion and experiment was 
not significant [F(8,170) = 1.02, MSe = 0.02, p = .42, partial eta
2
= .05]. Planned 
contrasts revealed the greater general recognition of backgrounds initially 
presented with neutral than emotional objects was approaching significance 
[F(1,89) = 3.75, p = .06] and there was significantly worse general recognition 
for backgrounds initially presented with negative than positive objects (F(1,89) = 
15.16, p < .001). Planned contrasts revealed significantly greater general 
recognition of emotional than neutral objects (F(1,89) = 20.94, p < .001) but no 
significant difference in the general recognition of positive and negative 
objects [F(1,89) = 0.63, p = .43]. 
 To fully investigate the emotional influence on specific and general 
recognition of objects and backgrounds of scenes we conducted bonferroni 
corrected t-tests (see Table 5.9). These confirmed the same pattern of results 
for specific and general recognition. There was significantly enhanced 
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recognition of positive and negative objects compared to neutral objects, but no 
difference in recognition of positive or negative objects. For recognition of the 
backgrounds, there was reduced recognition for backgrounds initially presented 
with a negative object  compared to backgrounds presented with a neutral or 
positive object, and no difference in the level of recognition for backgrounds 
presented with a neutral or positive object. 
 
Table 5.9. Results of paired samples t-tests to compare recognition across 
emotions for specific and general recognition. (Bonferroni corrected p value = 
0.004) 
   
   
   
t df p 
Negative - Neutral -4.36 89 < .001 
Negative Ð Positive -4.06 89 < .001 Backgrounds 
Neutral Ð Positive .10 89 .92 
Negative Ð Neutral 5.99 89 < .001 
Negative Ð Positive 1.04 89 .30 
Specific 
Recognition 
Objects 
Neutral Ð Positive -5.79 89 < .001 
Negative Ð Neutral -3.60 89 < .001 
Negative Ð Positive -3.89 89 < .001 Backgrounds 
Neutral Ð Positive -.42 89 .67 
Negative Ð Neutral 4.84 89 < .001 
Negative Ð Positive .80 89 .43 
General 
Recognition 
Objects 
Neutral - Positive -3.70 89 < .001 
 
Section 5.2.3. Discussion 
 We found no evidence that the pattern of memory results and the 
influence of emotion was any different in any of the Experiments 6 Ð 10. The 
critical interaction between scene component and emotion was evident. We 
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found enhanced specific and general recognition for positive and negative 
emotional objects. This was accompanied by a central-peripheral trade-off in 
memory for the backgrounds which manifested in a worse specific and general 
recognition of the backgrounds which had been initially presented with a 
negative object.  
 
 The memory results for the different experiments are summarised in 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10. Although some levels of recognition may appear to differ 
between experiments, when these are compared between all experiments it 
becomes apparent that there are no large differences from one experiment to 
another but that the results from all experiments differ slightly. Statistical 
analysis confirmed no significant difference in levels of recognition between 
the different experiments. 
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Figure 5.9. Specific and General Recognition to Objects by emotion for 
Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 
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Figure 5.10. Specific and General Recognition to Backgrounds by emotion of 
object initially presented with for Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 
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Section 5.3. Eye movement results 
 The same measurements of eye movements at the time of encoding 
stimuli were taken for Experiments 7, 8, 9 & 10. In the individual analysis of 
each of the experiments reported earlier we found that in Experiment 9 the 
attention narrowing onto a negative object in a scene found in Experiments 7, 8 
and 10 was eradicated. We would predict that the eye movements for 
Experiment 9  will be significantly different compared to the results from the 
other experiments but there would be no other significant differences between 
the other experiments. 
 
Section 5.3.1. Statistical analysis 
 The influence of emotion and scene component on eye movements 
across different experiments was analysed by conducting a series of 3 
(emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 4 (experiment) ANOVAs on the different 
measures of eye movements.  
 Average Number of fixations 
 A 3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA with the repeated measures factors of emotion and 
scene component and between participants factor of experiment was conducted 
on the average number of fixations made. (See Figures 5.11 and 5.12). The 
main effect of emotion was not significant [F(2,136) = 0.10, MSe = 0.01, p = .91, 
partial eta
2
 < .01]. The main effect of scene component was significant (F(1,68) 
= 726.04, MSe = 967.39, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .91) with a greater number of 
fixations on the object than the background. The main effect of experiment was 
also significant (F(3,68) = 15.59, MSe = 19.28, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .41). The 
interaction between scene component and experiment was significant (F(3,68) = 
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116.20, MSe = 154.82, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .84) and the interaction between 
emotion and scene component was significant (F(2,136) = 7.39, MSe = 3.62, p < 
.001, partial eta
2
 = .10). The interaction between emotion and experiment was 
not significant [F(6,136) = 0.79, MSe = 0.05, p = .58, partial eta
2
 = .03]. The 
interaction between emotion, scene component and experiment was not 
significant [F(6,136) = 1.03, MSe = 0.51, p = .41, partial eta
2
 = .04]. Post-hoc 
TukeyÕs HSD comparisons revealed that a significantly smaller average 
number of fixations was made in Experiment 7 than in Experiments 8 and 10, 
and in Experiment 9 than in Experiments 8 and 10 (q = 4.00, p < .05; q = 8.08, 
p < .001; q = 4.32, p < .05; q = 8.39, p < .001 respectively). The number of 
fixations on the object in a scene was significantly different between each of 
the different experiments (p < .01 / .001 for each combination Expt 7 vs 9 q = 
13.38, Exp 7 vs 10 q = 10.04, Exp7 vs 8 q = 5.28, Exp 9 vs 10 q = 23.42, Exp 8 
vs 9 q = 18.66, Exp 8 vs 10 q = 4.76). There was a significantly greater number 
of fixations on the object than the background in Experiments 7, 8 and 10 (q = 
22.13, 26.85, 30.47, p < .001 all cases, respectively), whereas in Experiment 9 
there was a significantly greater number of fixations on the background than 
object (q = 3.23, p < .05).  A significantly reduced number of fixations were 
made on the object in Experiment 9 in comparison to Experiments 7, 8 and 10 
(q = 13.38, 18.66, 23.42, p < .001 all cases, respectively), whereas a 
significantly greater number of fixations were made on the background in 
Experiment 9 in comparison to Experiments 7, 8 and 10 (q = 12.94, 12.56, 
11.55, p < .001 all cases, respectively). Significantly fewer fixations were made 
on the object in Experiment 7 than Experiments 8 and 10 (q = 5.28, 10.04,  p < 
.01,  .001 respectively), and in Experiment 8 than in Experiment 10 (q = 4.76, p 
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< .01). Post-hoc TukeyÕs HSD were used to analyse the interaction between 
scene component and emotion and these revealed significantly greater number 
of fixations on the negative object in a scene than a neutral or positive object (q 
= 9.60, 9.05, p < .001 all cases, respectively), and a correspondingly 
significantly fewer number of fixations on the background in scenes with a 
negative object than a neutral or positive object (q = 10.36, 9.03, p < .001 all 
cases, respectively). A significantly greater number of fixations were made on 
the object than background in scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object 
(q = 24.68, 20.46, 20.86 respectively).  
Planned contrasts revealed a significantly smaller number of fixations 
on backgrounds which were initially presented with an emotional than neutral 
object (F(1,71) = 4.54, p < .05) and a significantly smaller number of fixations 
on backgrounds presented with a negative than positive object (F(1,71) = 10.04, 
p < .01). Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference in the number of 
fixations made on emotional and neutral objects [F(1,71) = 3.24, p = .08] but 
there were a significantly greater number of fixations on negative than positive 
objects (F(1,71) = 10.05, p < .01).  
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Figure 5.11. Experiments 7- 10: Average number of fixations on different 
components of scene 
 
Figure 5.12. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Aggregated values for average number of 
fixations on different components of scenes according to emotional valence of 
object 
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 The number of fixations made on different scene components was 
further analysed by examining the proportion of fixations made on the object as 
a proportion of fixations made on the entire scene (see Figure 5.13). A 3 
(emotion) x 4 (experiment) ANOVA with the repeated measures factor of 
emotion and the between-participants factor of experiment revealed a main 
effect of emotion (F(2,136) = 7.65, MSe = 0.03, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .10) and 
a main effect of experiment (F(3,68) = 1112.28, MSe = 0.40, p < .001, partial 
eta
2
 = .83). The interaction between emotion and experiment was not 
significant [F(6,136) = 0.82, MSe < 0.01, p = .56, partial eta
2
 = .04]. Planned 
contrasts revealed this proportion was significantly greater for scenes with an 
emotional and neutral object (F(1,68) = 4.69, p < .05), and significantly greater 
proportion for scenes with a negative than positive object (F(1,68) = 11.25, p < 
.001). The significant main effect of experiment was further explored using 
post-hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests. These 
revealed that this proportion was significantly reduced for Experiment 9 in 
comparison to all other Experiments, but there were no other differences (Expt 
7 > Expt 9, p < .001; Expt 10 > Expt 9, p < .001; Expt 8 > Expt 9, p < .001). 
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Figure 5.13. Proportion of number of fixations on the object in comparison to 
scene as a whole. 
Average total gaze duration  
A  3 x 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on the total gaze duration for the repeated 
measures factors emotion and scene component and the between-participants 
factor of experiment. (See Figure 5.14). This revealed a significant main effect 
of scene component (F(1,68) = 569.24, MSe = 5.09
E7
, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = 
.89) with longer total gaze duration on the object than background. The main 
effect of emotion was not significant [F(2,136) = 0.58, MSe = 468.15, p = .56, 
partial eta
2
 = .01] and nor was the main effect of experiment [F(3,68) = 2.38, 
MSe = 22861.75, p = .08, partial eta
2
 = .10]. The interaction between emotion 
and experiment was not significant [F(6,136) = 0.35, MSe = 280.93, p = .91, 
partial eta
2
 = .02]. The interaction between scene component and experiment 
was significant (F(3,68) = 86.30, MSe = 7721847.53, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = 
.79) and the interaction between emotion and scene component was significant 
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(F(1.79,5.37) = 7.12, MSe = 232535.77, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .10). The 
interaction between emotion, scene component and experiment was not 
significant [F(6,136) = 0.95, MSe = 27609.21, p = .47, partial eta
2
 = .04]. Post-
hoc TukeyÕs HSD pair-wise comparisons were conducted to further investigate 
the significant interactions between scene component and experiment and 
between emotion and scene component. Total gaze duration on the object was 
significantly lower in Experiment 9 than in Experiments 7, 8 and 10 (q = 22.56, 
25.31, 22.38, p < .001 all cases, respectively). Correspondingly, total gaze 
duration on the background was significantly longer in Experiment 9 than in 
Experiment 7, 8 and 10 (q = 21.08, 22.48, 24.64, p < .001 all cases, 
respectively). Total gaze duration was significantly longer on the object than 
background in Experiments 7, 8 and 10 (q = 22.00, 24.35, 23.91, p < .001 all 
cases, respectively). There was a significantly longer total gaze duration on the 
negative object in a scene than a neutral or positive object (q = 20.62, 20.42, p 
< .001 all cases, respectively), and a correspondingly significantly lower total 
gaze duration on the background in scenes with a negative object than a neutral 
or positive object (q = 18.46, 19.37, p < .001 all cases, respectively). There was 
significantly longer total gaze duration on the object than background in scenes 
with a negative, neutral or positive object (q = 21.97, 18.27, 18.20 
respectively).  
Planned contrasts revealed no significant difference in the total gaze 
duration on the object in a scene between emotional and neutral objects [F(1,71) 
= 3.34, p = .07] but there was significantly longer total gaze duration on 
negative than positive objects (F(1,71) = 12.08, p < .001). Planned contrasts 
revealed significantly lower total gaze durations on backgrounds with an 
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emotional than neutral object (F(1,71) = 72.60, p < .001) and lower total gaze 
durations on backgrounds with a negative than positive object (F(1,71) = 115.08, 
p < .001).  
 
Figure 5.14. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Average total gaze duration on different 
components of scene 
 
 
 The average total gaze duration on different scene components was 
further analysed by examining the proportion of gaze duration on the object as 
a proportion of total gaze duration on the entire scene (see Figure 5.15). A 3 
(emotion) x 4 (experiment) ANOVA with the repeated measures factor of 
emotion and the between-participants factor of experiment revealed a main 
effect of emotion (F(2,136) = 6.14, MSe = 0.03, p < .01, partial eta
2
 = .09) and a 
main effect of experiment (F(3,68) = 106.65, MSe = 0.39, p < .001, partial eta
2
 
= .83). The interaction between emotion and experiment was not significant 
[F(6,136) = 0.94, MSe < 0.01, p = .47, partial eta
2
 = .04]. Planned contrasts 
revealed no significant difference between this proportion for scenes with an 
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emotional and neutral object [F(1,68) = 2.30, p = .13], but did reveal a 
significantly greater proportion for scenes with a negative than positive object 
(F(1,68) = 10.93, p < .01). The significant main effect of experiment was further 
explored using post-hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
tests. These revealed that this proportion was significantly reduced for 
Experiment 9 in comparison to all other Experiments, but there were no other 
differences (Expt 7 > Expt 9, p < .001; Expt 10 > Expt 9, p < .001; Expt 8 > 
Expt 9, p < .001). 
 
Figure 5.15. Proportion of total gaze duration on the object in comparison to 
scene as a whole 
  
Average fixation duration 
A 4 x 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine the influence of 
experiment, emotion and scene component on the average fixation duration. 
(See Figure 5.16). An ANOVA with the repeated measures factors of emotion 
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and scene component and the between-participants factor of experiment 
revealed a significant main effect of experiment (F(3,68) = 9.10, MSe = 
40244.92, p < .001, partial eta
2
 = .28). The main effect of emotion was not 
significant [F(2,136) = 1.04, MSe = 516.75, p = .36, partial eta
2
 = .02], nor was 
the main effect of scene component [F(1,68) = 1.92, MSe = 1151.24, p = .17, 
partial eta
2
 = .03]. The interaction between scene component and experiment 
was significant (F(3,68) = 3.74, MSe = 2246.21, p < .05, partial eta
2
 = .14). The 
interaction between emotion and experiment was not significant [F(6,136) = 1.61, 
MSe = 799.07, p = .15, partial eta
2
 = .07], nor was the interaction between 
emotion and scene component [F(2,136) = 1.05, MSe = 587.08, p = .35, partial 
eta
2
 = .01] and nor was the interaction between emotion, scene component and 
experiment (F(6,136) = 1.58, MSe = 886.03, p = .16, partial eta
2
 = .07]. The 
significant main effect of experiment and significant interaction between scene 
component and experiment were further explored using TukeyÕs HSD, only 
significant differences are reported. This revealed that average fixation 
durations were significantly less in Experiment 10 than in Experiments 7, 8 and 
9 (q = 6.64, p < .001; q = 4.15, p < .05; q = 6.05, p < .001 respectively).  The 
average fixation durations were significantly longer on the object and on the 
background for both Experiments 7 and 9 than Experiment 10 (Object: q = 
4.21, p < .05; q = 4.37, p < .05, Background: q = 5.18, p < .01; q = 4.18, p < 
.05 respectively). There was significantly longer average fixation durations on 
the background than object in Experiments 7 and 8 (q = 3.64, p < .05; q = 3.00, 
p < .05 respectively). 
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Figure 5.16. Experiments 7 Ð 10: Average fixation duration on different 
components of scene 
 
 
Section 5.3.2. Discussion 
 The analysis to compare eye movements across Experiments 7, 8, 9 and 
10 confirmed two findings from the analysis of the individual experiments 
already reported and revealed two additional new findings. 
 This meta-analysis confirmed that in Experiments 7, 8 and 10 
participants looked for longer and more often at the object than background 
components of a scene (as measured by total gaze duration and number of 
fixations), whereas in Experiment 9 participants looked for longer and more 
often at the background than object. However, unexpectedly there was no 
significant interaction between emotion, scene component and experiment for 
number of fixations or total gaze duration. This means that there is no evidence 
of a lack of attention narrowing onto the negative object in scenes in 
Experiment 9. Although, we can conclude that despite the radically different 
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visual search strategies used by participants viewing blocked stimuli in 
Experiment 9 there was no difference in the influence of emotion on the pattern 
of memory results. 
 This meta-analysis also confirmed that across all experiments together 
visual attention was narrowed onto the negative object in a scene with 
participants looking for longer and more often at a negative than a neutral or 
positive object. Correspondingly, participants looked for a shorter total gaze 
duration and less often at the backgrounds in scenes with a negative than 
neutral or positive object. This finding demonstrated the resilience of the 
central-peripheral trade-off in eye movements that was found in 3 experiments, 
and corresponded to  the central-peripheral trade-off in memory. 
 The two new key findings that were revealed by this meta-analysis 
relate to the average fixation duration. Firstly, there was a shorter average 
fixation duration in Experiment 10 than in Experiments 7, 8 and 9.  
One possibility is that the shorter average fixation duration in 
Experiment 10 reflects a more extensive search of the scene as participants 
move their eyes around more. The cue of the emotion may have increased the 
salience of the emotion of that scene and lead participants to a more extensive 
search of the scene to check the location of the source of the emotion. 
Alternatively, the cue of the emotion may have enhanced the perceived 
distinctiveness of each item and piqued the interest of participants to a greater 
degree than in the other experiments, therefore leading them to search the 
scene to a greater extent. 
Alternatively, average fixation duration has been reported to reflect 
level of visual processing complexity (e.g. Rayner & Pollatsek, 1989) and it 
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may be that the scenes were easier to process in Experiment 10 because 
participants were aware of the emotion of each scene before they saw it. In 
Experiment 9 participants were also aware of the emotion of each scene before 
they saw it, however, it may be that a reminder is needed before each item 
(rather than at the start of the block) for participants to retain this as salient 
information. If this were the case we would expect that reaction times for the 
encoding task in Experiment 10 would be shorter than for Experiment 9. 
Unfortunately reaction times were not recorded as part of the experimental 
procedure for the encoding task and therefore it is not possible to easily test 
this claim.  
 Another explanation, based on the claim that reduced average fixation 
duration reflects reduced visual processing complexity, may be that receiving a 
warning of the emotion in Experiment 10 makes the encoding task (an 
approach/avoidance task to measure perception of emotion conveyed by scene) 
easier and therefore the processing of the picture easier. In Experiment 9, 
although the warning of the emotion should have made the encoding task more 
easy it may be that blocking the pictures into groups of the same emotion may 
have made it more difficult for participants to rate each individual scene for 
emotion because further discrimination would have been required between 
items as participants may have implicitly made comparisons between items 
within each block. If this were the case we would expect a greater variance in 
the ratings from the approach / avoidance task for each emotion in Experiment 
9, where emotion groups were blocked, than in Experiment 10. We tested this 
by analysing the standard deviation in ratings for each participant for scenes of 
each emotional type.  We found a greater variance in ratings for each of the 
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emotional groups in Experiment 9 than in Experiment 10, although these 
differences were not statistically significant they do suggest that this may be a 
viable explanation for these results (see Appendix 5.2 for means and analysis). 
Secondly, there was a shorter average fixation duration on the object 
than background in Experiments 7 and 8, but this was not the case in 
Experiments 9 and 10. This may suggest that the object was more difficult to 
visually process in Experiments 7 and 8 because it was the source of emotion 
within the scene but this emotion was unexpected, compared to Experiments 9 
and 10 where the emotion was expected and therefore perhaps easier to 
visually process. 
 
Section 5.4. Discussion 
 In summary, in this meta-analysis of the memory and eye movement 
results from Experiments 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 we have found clear evidence in the 
memory results of an emotional enhancement of memory for negative and 
positive objects and an impairment in memory for the background of scenes 
with a negative object, with a clear pattern of results across all experiments. 
The results of the eye movements are not so straightforward. We have clear 
evidence that there is focusing of visual attention on to a negative object in a 
scene but not on to a positive object. There was a dramatically different pattern 
of eye movements in Experiment 9 when emotional and neutral stimuli were 
blocked but despite this the enhancement of memory for negative and positive 
objects remained. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis I will summarise my research findings, 
discuss ideas for continuing this research, and consider how the research in this 
thesis informs a number of issues: the choice of experimental stimuli in the 
study of emotion; the influence of task instructions on experimental paradigms 
and the influence of emotion on different memory processes.  
Section 6.1. Summary of findings 
 In this thesis I have examined the influence of emotion on memory. I 
began in chapter 2 by considering how factors at the time of retrieving a 
memory may be influenced by emotion and proposed that emotions of different 
valence may encourage the use of different strategies to retrieve memories. I 
found an emotional enhancement of memory for pictures which was restricted 
to positive emotion and only present with recognition tasks which encouraged 
the use of a nonanalytic processing strategy at retrieval, that is to say with a 
traditional / straightforward recognition task and a nonanalytic recognition task 
(see Figure 6.1). An additional and unexpected finding was that when 
recognition was followed by a Remember/Know/Guess judgement for each 
item there was no emotional enhancement of memory.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Summary of findings from Chapter 2 
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In chapter 3 I addressed two research questions. Firstly, I extended the 
research of chapter 2 by designing a within participants version of the between 
participants paradigm which had been used to examine retrieval strategies. 
Unfortunately the experimental paradigm did not successfully translate into a 
within participants design, however, the experiments did suggest that there may 
be interesting implications of using different methodologies to investigate the 
effects of emotion on memory. In the next phase of research in this chapter I 
continued the exploration of different paradigms. Specifically, I compared the 
pattern of results from the well-know Remember/Know/New paradigm 
(Tulving, 1985) with the more recently developed Same/Similar/New paradigm 
which has been used to demonstrate some interesting effects with emotion and 
memory (e.g. Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006). A memory 
advantage for negative emotional stimuli was found in both paradigms (see 
Figure 6.2). The results from the Same/Similar/New paradigm appeared more 
straightforward to interpret in the context of this type of experiment with the 
advantage of clear and well-defined criteria by which participants chose their 
responses. Therefore, I continued with this experimental paradigm in the 
investigation of cognitive processes underlying the influence of emotion on 
memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Summary of findings from Chapter 3 
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In chapter 4 I extended the experimental stimulus set I had used with 
the Same / Similar / New paradigm to also include positive emotional stimuli. 
Emotional enhancement of memory for specific visual details was found to be 
present for both negative and positive emotion. In the next experiments objects 
were presented as part of a contextual scene and memory was assessed 
separately for central and peripheral scene components. A central-peripheral 
trade-off in memory for specific visual details was found with negative 
emotion, but not with positive emotion. The remainder of this thesis used this 
stimulus set and experimental paradigm to explore the cognitive processes 
underlying these emotional enhancements of visual specificity of memory. At 
this stage of the thesis the focus of the thesis shifted to examining the role of 
factors at the time of encoding information into memory as the importance of 
these processes had been suggested by earlier research. Eye movements at the 
time of encoding the pictures into memory were recorded as a measure of 
attention and the spatial distribution of visual attention was found to be 
narrowed onto the negative object in scenes, but no attentional effects were 
found with scenes with a positive object.  
At this point the involvement of attentional effects in the negative 
emotional enhancement of memory appeared to have been confirmed and 
therefore further experiments aimed to explore other factors which lead to the 
enhancement of memory by positive emotion. As attention appeared to be 
important, the influence of these factors on visual attention was also examined. 
Relative distinctiveness and the unexpected nature of emotional stimuli were 
explored by blocking stimuli into groups by emotion and giving participants 
warning of the emotion of the next stimulus, but these were found not to be 
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responsible for the emotional effects. Memory for the association between 
central and peripheral elements of a scene and implicit memory were also 
examined as it was thought these might explain the positive emotional 
enhancement of memory without impairment for memory of peripheral 
elements. However, no emotional enhancement of these types of memories was 
found. From chapter 5 no firm conclusions could be made to explain positive 
emotional enhancement of memory, however, there were some unexpected 
findings regarding spatial visual attention. When stimuli were blocked into 
groups by emotion the attentional narrowing observed with mixed lists of 
emotional and neutral stimuli was removed but despite this the emotional 
enhancement for positive and negative emotion remained. This suggested that 
the narrowing of visual spatial attention is an associated, rather than causal, 
factor in the enhancement of memory by negative emotion. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 
summarise the experimental findings with negative emotion and positive 
emotion that were reported in chapters 4 and 5. With negative emotion an 
enhanced visual memory specificity was found with effects of attention 
narrowing and a central-peripheral trade-off in memory, but no effects of 
implicit memory or associative memory. Experimental manipulations of 
blocking groups of stimuli and warning of emotion still led to visual memory 
specificity but attentional narrowing effects were removed with blocked stimuli 
(see Figure 6.3). With positive emotion an enhanced visual memory specificity 
was found but there were no effects found of central/peripheral trade-off, 
attention narrowing, implicit memory or associate memory. Experimental 
manipulations of blocking groups of stimuli and providing a warning of 
emotion still led to enhanced visual memory specificity (See Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.3 Summary of findings from Chapters 4 and 5: Negative emotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Summary of findings from Chapters 4 and 5: Positive emotion 
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Section 6.2. Ideas for further research 
 The research conducted in this thesis has led to some interesting 
findings for which there are several worthwhile avenues of further 
investigation. However, the critical question in this thesis that remains 
unanswered is how the negative and positive emotional enhancement of visual 
specificity of memory can be explained. In the introduction to this thesis two 
theories were described of how emotion may influence the encoding process of 
memory and through this lead to the emotional enhancement of memory. In the 
first theory it was argued that emotion alters the allocation and distribution of 
attention to an event (e.g. Christianson, 1992). In the second theory it was 
argued that emotional events are relatively rare or unusual and this enhanced 
distinctiveness of emotional events may lead to the enhancement of memory 
(e.g. Schmidt, 2002). This first theory suggests that the experience of emotion 
alters cognitive processes whereas the second theory suggests that some 
associated characteristic of emotional events leads to the emotional 
enhancement of memory. In this thesis I have examined the influence of 
emotion that has been described in both of these theories but the findings do 
not provide clear support for either of these theoretical explanations of an 
emotional enhancement of memory. One thing that is clear is the complexity of 
the relationship between emotion and memory and the likelihood that some 
aspects of both of the theories above impact upon this relationship. Some 
additional experiments which could provide further evidence in support of 
either of these theoretical explanations are described below. 
 We found no firm evidence of a causal relationship between the 
narrowing of visual spatial attention and memory for specific details, however, 
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alternative measures of attention have been used to show a causal relationship 
with emotional enhancement of memory. Talmi et al (2007) found that a 
positive emotional enhancement of recognition memory was mediated by 
attention by asking participants to perform a concurrent auditory discrimination 
task at the time of encoding stimuli. With negative emotional stimuli there 
were no effects on subsequent recognition as a result of dividing attention at 
the time of encoding. This experiment did not examine memory for central or 
peripheral elements separately and did not examine memory for specific visual 
details so the effects of a divided attention task on recognition with the Same / 
Similar / New paradigm are not clear. By considering the impact of dividing 
attention at the time of encoding on the Same / Similar / New paradigm it 
might be possible to draw conclusions about a causal relationship between 
attention and the emotional enhancement of visual memory specificity.  
 One finding from this thesis that stands out is the different effects on 
memory and attention from positive emotion than negative emotion. This leads 
to the question of whether these differences are due to the emotion or some 
other aspect of the stimuli which is different? One possibility is that many of 
the positive stimuli become emotional as a result of a semantic and personal 
interpretations of the stimuli, for example a birthday cake may be positive 
emotionally because it brings to mind happy experiences of birthday parties. 
Whereas, in contrast many of the negative stimuli are generically negative, for 
example the threat of a weapon could be experienced in the same way by all 
participants. This concept of the self-relevance of information has been shown 
to influence memory (Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon & Schacter, 2007) and could 
be one of the ways in which positive emotional stimuli differ from negative 
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stimuli. One way to answer the question of whether the differences with 
positive emotion are due to the stimuli or the emotion could be to assess 
memory just for neutral stimuli using the Same / Similar / New paradigm but 
induce a positive, negative, or neutral mood in participants and compare 
memory performance whilst participants are in different moods. In this way the 
influence of emotion on memory for specific visual details could be examined 
whilst keeping the characteristics of the stimuli consistent.  
 In this thesis distinctiveness of stimuli was manipulated by presenting 
stimuli in mixed or blocked lists of emotion. However, emotional stimuli may 
also be distinctive in terms of the contrast in the memory representation 
between distinctive and common information (see Schmidt & Saari, 2007). The 
memory representations of emotional items may stand out against the 
background of memory representations for neutral items. In this case item 
distinctiveness would have an effect at retrieval and not at encoding. If this 
were the case we would expect any manipulation of item distinctiveness at 
encoding by blocking stimuli to have no effect on the emotional enhancement 
of memory. This could be examined directly by conducting a within-
participants manipulation of blocked or mixed lists of emotional stimuli. To 
allow for sufficient numbers of stimuli the experiment could be conducted on 
memory for objects presented in isolation, rather than on a contextual 
background. 
 Another avenue of further investigation would be to consider the 
independent influence of emotional arousal, rather than the emphasis on 
emotional valence that there has been in this thesis. Future research could 
consider whether the influence of negative and positive emotion on the spatial 
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distribution of visual attention remains the same when levels of lower and 
higher arousal are compared. This was not possible in the Same / Similar / New 
experimental paradigm used here due to the constraints placed on selection of 
stimuli by the necessity of creating congruent negative, neutral and positive 
versions of each scene. Future experiments could limit the stimuli to negative 
and positive only which would allow investigation of emotional arousal levels.  
 In the field of cognition and emotion a large amount of research has 
been devoted to investigating how individual differences mediate the influence 
of emotion on cognition. One particular example is the investigation of how 
people with different levels of anxiety demonstrate different attentional biases.  
In a meta-analytic review Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van Ijendoorn (2007) concluded that although a threat-related 
bias is a robust phenomenon in anxious individuals, it does not exist in 
nonanxious individuals. This indicates that individual differences could have 
important implications for the study of attentional biases in relation to 
emotional enhancement of memory, as it may be that only a sub-group of 
participants are experiencing the attentional biases for which we might find 
evidence. In addition the importance of individual differences suggests 
implications for the elicitation of emotions in participants by the emotional 
stimuli used in this research. In this thesis a range of items were used for 
negative and positive stimuli which should have meant that on average 
participants found the stimuli, as a group, elicited the intended emotions. 
However, by controlling for individual differences in participantsÕ emotional 
reactions to stimuli it may be possible to reveal further insights into the 
relationship between emotion and memory and reduce levels of noise in the 
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data. These ideas discussed above may also help in finding an explanation for 
the enhancement of memory by negative and positive emotion. 
 
Section 6.3. Emotion and experimental stimuli  
 In the introduction of this thesis different ways of defining emotion and 
the most appropriate criteria for defining emotion for the investigation of 
cognitive processes were discussed.  
Emotion has been defined in this thesis according to the opposing 
dimensions of negative and positive valence. This has proved a valuable 
approach with different effects on memory and attention from stimuli with 
different valences. Discrete emotions such as sadness, threat, anger have also 
been described as important to consider (e.g. Levine & Pizarro, 2006) and it 
may be that further insight into the influence of emotion on cognition could be 
gained by examining these discrete emotions. The categorisation of 
photographs from the International Affective Photograph System into discrete 
negative emotions of fear, disgust, sadness and anger has been conducted, 
although one of the difficulties can be that the majority of emotions are a blend 
of more than one of these basic emotions (Mikels et al., 2005). This blending 
of different emotions can cause difficulty in interpreting the findings but would 
be an avenue of research worth pursuing. 
 In the first two chapters of this thesis I used photographs from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang et al, 2001) as experimental 
stimuli. These IAPS photographs have been used extensively in emotion and 
cognition research. They are a very large source of easily accessible emotional 
and non-emotional photographical stimuli. However, through my experience of 
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designing and conducting experiments with the IAPS I have come across 
several difficulties in using these stimuli to investigate cognitive processes. 
There are perceptual differences in the characteristics of negative, neutral and 
positive emotionally arousing stimuli from this source. These differences 
include: the negative photographs tend to be darker, the positive photographs 
tend to be of bolder colours and the neutral photographs tend to be less 
complex as they often depict a single object on a relatively plain background. I 
attempted to select stimuli in a way that would minimise these differences and 
in chapter 3 adjusted the levels of colour saturation to obtain similarity across 
positive, negative and neutral groups of stimuli.  
Another difficulty in using the IAPS as a stimulus source is that by  
controlling for the perceptual characteristics described it is very likely that the 
final experimental set will be a mix of objects, animals, people and faces. 
Research indicates that there may be specialised cognitive processes for 
recognising human faces and interpreting emotions from facial expressions 
(Adolphs, 2002) and therefore ideally, this could be controlled by either 
exclusively using faces in emotional stimuli, excluding faces altogether or 
specifically including them as a factor. An additional difficulty with the IAPS 
is that some of the photographs are extracted from film stills or advertising 
shots and may be very well known to some participants in the experiment, 
introducing the problem that for some participants the study phase of the 
experiment does not involve encoding of novel stimuli. The elicitation of 
emotions by some of the pictures (for example American football games) may 
depend on cultural relevance and as many of the pictures appear to be North 
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American this can lead to difficulties in conducting experiments with groups of 
participants who may not be aware of these cultural references. 
 The differentiation of memory for central and peripheral elements of a 
stimulus can provide great insights into memory processes but these type of 
experiments are very difficult with the IAPS stimuli. Many negative 
photographs may contain several objects or people in the context of a complex 
scene, for example a scene of destruction and civil war, whereas positive and 
neutral photographs may be more likely to contain just one item e.g. a close up 
image of one personÕs face or a single object such as a rolling pin on the plain 
background of a table. These differences can have important implications for 
the objective definition of central and peripheral elements in a picture. 
 For many of the reasons described above I decided to explore the use of 
a different type of stimuli to elicit emotions. In creating my own set of stimuli 
similar to those described by Kensinger et al. (2006) it was possible to 
minimise many of the problems described above. Namely, the stimuli excluded 
any people or faces and each stimulus contained a background and single 
object. By creating negative, neutral and positive versions of each scene with 
the same neutral background the difficulties with IAPS pictures of different 
backgrounds in photographs of different emotional valence were avoided. 
There were some difficulties in creating the stimulus set of 72 scenes with a 
negative, neutral and positive version of each. One of these difficulties was in 
finding 72 plain backgrounds which could be uniquely described and provided 
semantically congruent backgrounds for the negative, neutral and positive 
objects pairs which had been used in the previous experiment. The constraints 
in selection of objects, with the exclusion of faces and people unfortunately 
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contributed to the difficulty in creating a set of negative arousing and positive 
arousing stimuli, and the level of emotional arousal was rated as much lower 
for the positive objects than negative objects. In the IAPS the majority of the 
positive arousing stimuli set include faces, people winning or playing 
exhilarating sports or erotic images, none of which were included in the 
stimulus set that I created. The overall distribution of emotional valence and 
arousal of stimuli used in Experiment 5 is shown below to indicate this point 
(See Figure 6.5). This shows the overlap in ratings of arousal for the neutral 
and positive stimuli. This distribution of emotional arousal in the stimuli used 
has prevented me from being able to make any strong conclusions about the 
specific contribution of emotional valence or arousal to the different findings 
with positive emotion. 
 
Figure 6.5. Average ratings of emotional arousal and valence (scale -5 to +5) 
given for negative, neutral and positive objects used in Experiment 5 
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 The nature of individual differences in the elicitation of emotions 
through the use of photographic stimuli, in particular, became apparent when 
considering the ratings given by individuals. For example, the mean average 
rating of high negative arousal and valence of some pictures may have been 
due to ratings from only a subset of the participants who rated the pictures. As 
discussed further below one possible way of overcoming this would be to use 
personalised stimuli to elicit emotions in different participants. The average 
ratings for emotional valence and arousal given to photographs presented in a 
mixed list of negative and neutral stimuli (for Experiment 4) were often 
different than those given to photographs presented in a mixed list of positive, 
negative and neutral stimuli (for Experiment 5). This may indicate that the 
ratings given for stimuli in this way reflect feelings of emotion relative to other 
stimuli rated, rather than experiences of emotion in the real world or it may 
indicate individual differences between participants rating photographs. It is 
not clear whether feelings of emotion experienced in real life would be 
tempered by other experiences close in time or whether the emotions 
experienced are independent of other surrounding events. 
 One difficulty in using photographic stimuli to induce emotions was 
apparent in the use of both the IAPS and the stimulus set that I created for the 
Same/Similar/New paradigm. Pictorial stimuli to evoke negative emotion are 
often over-reliant on weapons, positive emotions over-reliant on foods and cute 
animals and neutral stimuli on obscure or everyday household or office objects. 
This leaves unresolved the question of whether the differences found between 
positive and negative stimuli are due to the emotions evoked by these stimuli, 
the perceptual or semantic characteristics of items shown in the stimuli or 
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whether these perceptual differences are genuinely reflective of real-world 
differences in emotional events. 
 The implications of all of the issues discussed above with regards to the 
study of emotion depend on how emotion is defined. In the introduction I 
described some different frameworks that have been used to study emotion; 
emotions are biologically given, emotions are socially constructed, emotions 
are the result of perception of bodily changes, emotions are the result of 
cognitive appraisals. In this thesis I think that the use of photographic stimuli to 
elicit emotions assumes that emotions are both social constructs and the result 
of cognitive appraisals. Although I have not examined any neural or 
physiological reactions to emotion in this thesis I would also argue that 
biological reactions to emotional stimuli have an important role to play in the 
manner in which emotion affects cognitive processes. 
 
Section 6.4. Task instructions and experimental paradigm 
In the field of cognition and emotion there are many inconsistencies in 
research findings as described in the introduction. Some of these 
inconsistencies may be due to the experimental paradigms used. Different 
paradigms may reveal different relationships between memory and emotion 
and it is not always clear if these are important general differences or specific 
to one particular experimental paradigm. Some of the inconsistencies of 
findings between different paradigms may be due to performance in different 
tasks being based on different types of memory or memory for different parts 
of an experimental stimulus or emotional event. It is also possible that some 
tasks may lead to more consistent performance across participants than other 
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tasks, one reason for this may be the level of clarity in task instructions given 
to participants. 
In the first experimental chapter of this thesis I examined the level of 
recognition memory for emotional and non-emotional stimuli when different 
retrieval strategies were induced through different task instructions. These 
series of experiments were adapted from an existing paradigm (Whittlesea & 
Price, 2001), however, after conducting research using this paradigm the 
ambiguity and lack of clarity in some of the task instructions became apparent. 
Specifically, the instructions for the analytic retrieval condition relied on 
attempted deception of participants in that they were instructed to identify in a 
two-alternative forced choice recognition test the stimulus which had been 
changed from the earlier presentation. In reality, none of the photographs had 
been changed and it is possible that participants were confused by the 
instructions. Indeed this may be part of the reason that their performance on 
this task was at chance. As a result of these concerns I was very keen to move 
to an experimental paradigm with very clear task instructions for participants 
which should ensure that all participants completed the task as intended.  
In using the Same / Similar / New paradigm (Kensinger et al., 2006) in this 
thesis we have consistently found the same pattern of emotional enhancement 
and impairment in memory across a series of experiments.  This suggests the 
use of such a well-controlled paradigm is effective in reducing inconsistencies 
when assessing memory for central and peripheral elements of stimuli. The 
lack of ambiguity in instructions to participants in the Same / Similar / New 
paradigm is also apparent when comparing this to the Remember / Know / 
New paradigm. The standard instructions for this paradigm (e.g. Gardiner & 
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Richardson-Klavehn, 2005) with the distinction between Remembering and 
Knowing may make sense to participants if TulvingÕs (1985) memory model is 
assumed to be true and there are two different forms of memory. However, 
many researchers now argue for a single-process model of memory (e.g. 
Donaldson, 1996) and in that case RKN responses may relate to participants 
confidence in memory. The ambiguity and individual differences in 
participantsÕ interpretation of task instructions is reduced with the Same / 
Similar / New paradigm and the remarkably consistent results that I have found 
with this paradigm across a series of experiments with small changes in the 
methodology highlights the robustness of findings with this paradigm. 
One potential concern in the conclusions that can be drawn from the Same / 
Similar / New paradigm is what aspect of specificity of memory for emotional 
and neutral items the paradigm is really measuring. I have assumed, as did 
Kensinger et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b) that this is based on memory for visual 
details of the stimuli, however, it is possible that participants might be basing 
their decision to classify an item as Same / Similar / new on alternative 
information. One way to clarify this could be to conduct an experiment 
explicitly examining memory for visual details and see if the same pattern of 
results is found. For example, a change detection paradigm could be used 
where participants need to identify a small change in detail is made to the 
object or background of a scene.  
 A possible limitation of the Same / Similar / New paradigm is that 
following Kensinger et al. (2006) the analysis is restricted to items that were 
the same at the time of study and test. This means that although participants are 
presented with a reasonably large number of stimuli during the study and test 
  278 
phase, only a small proportion of this data is used. It may be interesting to 
consider what insights might be gained by examining memory for the similar 
items. One of the reasons, and that given by Kensinger, for the difficulty in 
interpreting responses to the similar items is that it is not known whether 
participants give a similar response to indicate that they remember the specific 
visual details of the related item from the study phase and therefore they can 
say this is not that item, or to indicate they have a vague memory of an item of 
that type but no memory for the visual details and therefore cannot be sure 
whether this item or a related item was presented. In addition to this, a 
difficulty with the similar items is that the extent to which they differ from the 
ÔsameÕ item varies. For example, one similar item may be different in 
orientation and colour to the same item, but otherwise it is identical. 
Alternatively, one similar item may differ because it is actually a different 
object although it is of the same type (e.g. another type of skull). This could 
have lead to inconsistencies in how participants selected a ÔsimilarÕ response 
and means it is not clear which is the correct response when presented with a 
similar item. 
 One other possible limitation of the Same / Similar / New paradigm is 
the difficulty of examining false alarm rates. I have chosen to limit analysis of 
false alarms to keep it similar to that conducted by Kensinger et al. (2006, 
2007a, 2007b). Therefore, I examined the responses given to New items to 
examine any potential response bias to emotional items (particularly positive 
items which have been shown to be susceptible to response bias) and found no 
evidence for response bias. False alarm rates could be considered by using a 
mathematical model such as variants on Signal Detection Theory or Single 
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High Threshold Theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). However, it is not 
immediately obvious which mathematical model should be applied to the SSN 
task and the choice of model would affect the results obtained. 
 
Section 6.5. Encoding or Retrieval effects  
In this thesis I have examined the effects of emotion on processes 
occurring at the time of encoding or retrieving a memory. From this research it 
is not possible to definitively conclude whether encoding or retrieval effects 
are critical to the emotional enhancement of memory. Nevertheless, findings 
that emotional enhancement of visual specificity of memory cannot solely be 
accounted for by effects of visual attention at encoding suggest that is it likely 
that emotion has influences on additional processes. In speculating what these 
might be I would suggest emotion may exert an influence on processes of 
encoding and retrieval, even though perhaps stronger effects on memory may 
be seen with encoding than retrieval effects.  
Despite the intended focus of experiments in this thesis on encoding 
and retrieval effects it is also possible that emotions may exert an effect during 
the process of consolidating a memory (e.g. Soetens et al., 1995). In the 
experimental findings of this thesis it is difficult to distinguish between 
whether these effects are due to encoding, consolidation or retrieval effects. 
For example, the central-peripheral trade-off effects in memory for negative 
emotional stimuli may be due to encoding, consolidation or retrieval. After 
Experiment 7 I seemed to have found concrete evidence for attentional effects 
at the time of encoding negative emotional stimuli that were associated with 
the central-peripheral trade-offs in memory for these stimuli, even though 
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causation could not be implied. However, the findings of Experiment 9 where 
the blocking of stimuli into emotional groups removed evidence of attentional 
narrowing at the time of encoding whilst the central-peripheral trade-off in 
memory remained, opens up the possibility of these memory effects being due 
to the influence of emotion on processes at either encoding, consolidation or 
retrieval. It is possible that blocking stimuli by emotion could lead to mood 
effects as the block progresses which may affect the consolidation of memories 
for the stimuli that are presented later in a block. Another possibility is that 
memory for the association between the object and background could provide a 
cue at the time of retrieval, which may be interpreted differently depending on 
whether the object is negative, neutral or positive. It is also possible that 
emotional experiences may be induced at the time of encoding and retrieving 
memories as participants are exposed to emotional stimuli at both of these 
times.  
 
 Section 6.6. Relating these findings to the real world 
 In this thesis different experimental paradigms have been used to 
investigate memory but the method of inducing emotional experiences has 
been constant throughout. This has been through the presentation of 
photographs of complex scenes which have been rated as inducing negative, 
neutral or positive emotions. This is an effective method to use for 
investigating memory as it allows for precise control over the visual 
information presented to participants which is then used for the memory test. 
One of the limitations of this method of emotional induction is that not all the 
emotional stimuli may produce the same level of emotional reaction in each 
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participant and the artificial production of emotions may make them 
qualitatively different to emotions experienced in real life events. One way to 
overcome this limitation could be to induce emotions by asking participants to 
recall emotional events from their own life (e.g. Berntsen, 2002). This would 
ensure that the emotions are ecologically valid, however, with this type of 
emotion induction it can be difficult to quantify the emotions experienced by 
different participants and ensure participants experience similar emotions. 
One other limitation of research in this thesis could be from the study of 
experimentally produced memories. It is possible that memories of 
autobiographical life events are affected in a different way by emotion than the 
artificial stimuli used in this thesis, although, this artificiality was limited by 
the use of photographs of complex everyday visual scenes, in comparison to 
the abstract stimuli used in some research. Similar to the limitations of using 
individual experiences to elicit emotion, with autobiographical memories it can 
be difficult to differentiate between differences in the actual life events 
experienced as opposed to participantsÕ memories of these events. 
Nevertheless, the examination of autobiographical memories of negative and 
positive life events has led to a pattern of findings of reduced memory for 
peripheral aspects of a negative life event (e.g. Talarico et al, 2009) that is 
similar to the findings of a central-peripheral trade-off with negative 
experimental stimuli. 
The paradigms used in this thesis have been artificial experimental 
representations of how emotion may effect memory for actual life events, 
nevertheless, the findings may still apply to real world experiences. For 
example, the finding of negative and positive emotional enhancement of 
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memory for specific visual details when stimuli are blocked into groups could 
suggest that either a negative or a positive mood may lead to a more fine-
grained memory for events. Therefore, if a person wants to ensure they 
remember the details of an event it may be important to be experiencing some 
type of emotional mood that differs from neutral, regardless of the particular 
direction of this mood.  
 
Section 6.7. Final Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the main findings of this thesis are of an enhancement of 
memory for specific visual details by both negative and positive emotion with 
an accompanying impairment to memory for peripheral details only with 
negative emotion. I found that at the time of encoding a stimulus into memory 
the narrowing of spatial visual attention onto the source of emotion in a scene 
with a negative object is often associated with, but not necessarily causal of, 
negative emotional trade-offs in memory. I have also found that the emotional 
enhancement of memory by both positive and negative emotion can be found 
even without obvious visual biases in attention at the time of encoding. This  
suggests that other cognitive processes at the time of encoding, consolidating 
or retrieving memories may be affected by emotion and contribute to the 
emotional enhancement of memory.  
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Appendix 2.1. IAPS numbers for the picture stimuli 
 
Positive pictures list A: 1419, 1440, 1590, 1601, 1720, 1722, 1750, 1811, 2050, 
2080, 2092, 2352, 2510, 5270, 5450, 5626, 5890, 7230, 7250, 7390, 7502, 
8116, 8161, 8162, 8190, 8220, 8380, 8490, 8496, 8503 
Positive pictures list B: 1460, 1500, 1540, 1620, 1650, 1710, 1740, 1810, 1920, 
2209, 2655, 5300, 5460, 5480, 5600, 5623, 5629, 5849, 5994, 7195, 7325, 
7580, 8021, 8041, 8090, 8180, 8200, 8210, 8260, 8531 
Neutral pictures list A: 1112, 1121, 1321, 1726, 1931, 1945, 1947, 2220, 2372, 
2441, 2487, 2690, 2702, 3550, 4274, 5395, 5532, 5535, 5661, 6000, 6900, 
7037, 7496, 7503, 7550, 7590, 7640, 8211, 9472, 9913 
Neutral pictures list B: 1230, 1303, 1310, 1313, 1616, 1935, 2272, 2410, 2575, 
2595, 2635, 2695, 2749, 2780, 5920, 7095, 7096, 7402, 7504, 7600, 7620, 
7830, 7920, 8160, 8232, 8475, 9080, 9171, 9401, 9411 
Negative pictures list A:  1220, 2120, 2141, 2205, 2312, 2455, 2590, 2800, 
3220, 3280, 6010, 6200, 6211, 6312, 6571, 6940, 7360, 9001, 9101, 9120, 
9290, 9320, 9390, 9415, 9480, 9561, 9592, 9621, 9830, 9910 
Negative pictures list B: 1090, 1274, 2490, 2692, 2700, 2710, 2715, 3022, 
6213, 6838, 8230, 8480, 9000, 9010, 9042, 9090, 9190, 9280, 9331, 9373, 
9400, 9404, 9430, 9470, 9471, 9520, 9530, 9560, 9600, 9611 
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Appendix 2.2. ANOVA Analyses for Experiment 1E: RKG responses 
 
Table 2.2.1. Experiment 1E: Results of separate ANOVA analysis on 
Remember/Know/Guess responses 
 Remember Know Guess 
Emotion block F(2,22) = 0.44, 
MSe = 0.79, p = 
.65 
F(2,22) = 3.81, 
MSe = 4.51, p 
< .05 
F(2,22) = 1.49, 
MSe = 2.95, p 
= .25 
Repetitions F(2,22) = 7.82, 
MSe = 1.85, p < 
.01 
F(2,22) = 0.19, 
MSe = 0.06, p 
= .83  
F(2,22) = 5.34, 
MSe = 2.56, p 
<0.05 
Accuracy F(1,11) = 2.96, 
MSe = 3.13, p = 
.11 
F(1,11) = 0.85, 
MSe = 0.78, p 
= .38 
F(1,11) = 0.28, 
MSe = 1.34, p 
= .61  
Emotion block*Repetitions F(4,44) = 0.55, 
MSe = 0.35, p = 
.70 
F(4,44) = 1.19, 
MSe = 0.80, p 
= .33 
F(4,44) = 1.75, 
MSe = 1.99, p 
= .16 
Emotion block*Accuracy F(2,22) = 0.52, 
MSe = 0.17, p = 
.60 
F(2,22) = 0.64, 
MSe = 0.78, p 
= .54 
F(2,22) = 0.46, 
MSe = 1.67, p 
= .64 
Repetitions*Accuracy F(2,22) = 2.60, 
MSe = 2.51, p = 
.10 
F(2,22) = 0.39, 
MSe = 0.48, p 
= .68 
F(2,22) = 0.08, 
MSe = 0.23, p 
= .92 
Emotion*Repetitions*Accuracy F(4,44) = 1.31, 
MSe = 0.46, p = 
.28 
F(4,44) = 1.58, 
MSe = 1.60, p 
= .20 
F(4,44) = 0.59, 
MSe = 1.77, p 
= .67 
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Table 2.2.2. Experiment 1: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a 
Remember / Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a two 
alternative forced-choice test (by number of training presentations) 
Number of  Remember Know Guess Rec FdÕ 
Repetitions   Hits FAs Hits FAs Hits FAs   
One .06 .05 .15 .15 .32 .31 .01 -.11 
Three .06 .07 .17 .13 .30 .29 -.01 -.30 
Five .12 .05 .16 .15 .29 .26 .06 -.52 
 
NB: Rec = Recollection; FdÕ = Familiarity Ð both calculated according to 
Yonelinas et al (1998) 
 
Table 2.2.3. Experiment 1: Probabilities of Hits or False Alarms to a 
Remember / Know / Guess judgement, Recollection and Familiarity in a two 
alternative forced-choice test (by emotion block) 
Emotion  Remember Know Guess Rec FdÕ 
Block    Hits FAs Hits FAs Hits FAs   
Positive .07 .04 .20 .16 .30 .26 .03 -.24 
Neutral .08 .07 .15 .15 .30 .30 .01 -.40 
Negative .08 .06 .13 .12 .31 .33 .02 -.26 
 
NB: Rec = Recollection; FdÕ = Familiarity Ð both calculated according to 
Yonelinas et al (1998) 
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Table 2.2.4. Experiment 1: Separate ANOVA analysis on Recollection and 
Familiarity 
 Recollection Familiarity 
Emotion block F(1.2,12.8) = 0.63, MSe = 
0.01, p = .54 
F(2,22) = 0.11, MSe = 
0.13, p = .90 
Repetitions F(2,22) = 1.95, MSe = 
0.06, p = .17 
F(2,22) = 0.42, MSe = 
0.54, p = .66 
Emotion block*Repetitions F(4,44) = 1.48, MSe = 
0.01, p = .23 
F(4,44) = 1.97, MSe = 
1.47, p = .12 
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Appendix 3.1 
 
Table 3.1. Low-level visual properties of photos presented as Study List A or 
Study List B: Positive Emotion block photos 
 
 Negative Neutral Positive 
Study list A B A B A B 
  
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
M 
(SD) 
Valence 
2.99 
(0.58) 
3.09 
(0.52) 
4.99 
(0.61) 
5.03 
(0.60) 
7.19 
(0.57) 
7.15 
(0.50) 
Arousal 
5.15 
(0.73) 
5.14 
(0.74) 
4.72 
(0.87) 
4.68 
(0.84) 
5.12 
(0.78) 
5.09 
(0.84) 
Luminosity 
95.73 
(33.89) 
95.67 
(38.91) 
96.22 
(34.52) 
92.44 
(28.67) 
90.70 
(36.74) 
85.30 
(29.34) 
Complexity 
38.27 
(9.36) 
41.07 
(12.23) 
42.37 
(10.40) 
44.73 
(15.01) 
36.80 
(8.89) 
41.63 
(11.75) 
RMS Contrast 
1.46 
(0.56) 
1.43 
(0.60) 
2.03 
(2.75) 
1.44 
(0.55) 
1.49 
(0.91) 
1.44 
(0.49) 
Red channel 
saturation 
107.96 
(39.76) 
106.89 
(41.08) 
105.20 
(40.03) 
105.32 
(38.13) 
105.53 
(37.36) 
94.57 
(30.80) 
Green channel 
saturation 
91.80 
(33.30) 
97.91 
(37.55) 
93.61 
(36.69) 
89.10 
(27.36) 
86.49 
(39.64) 
82.54 
(31.01) 
Blue channel 
saturation 
83.67 
(33.28) 
85.83 
(34.70) 
85.78 
(46.64) 
75.29 
(33.00) 
72.87 
(43.46) 
74.93 
(39.00) 
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Appendix 3.2. Contamination of Retrieval Style between Tasks 
 
 Possible contamination of retrieval style between tasks was examined 
by comparing recognition performance across only for the task which was 
performed first so performance could not be contaminated by a different 
retrieval style from preceding tasks (See Figure 3.2.1).  
 
Figure 3.2.1. Recognition performance across task and emotion only in first 
task (between groups comparison; N=12 for each task) 
 
 
The influence of emotion on recognition performance as part of the 
three different retrieval conditions was analysed by conducting an ANOVA 
which included data only for those participants who completed the task as the 
first task block in the experiment. A 3 x 3 ANOVA was conducted with the 
repeated measures factor of emotion and between participants factor of task. 
There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(2,66) = 3.19, MSE = 11.79, p 
< .05, partial eta
2
 = .09). The main effect of task was not significant  [F(2,33) = 
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1.66, MSE = 1.32, p < .21, partial eta
2
 = .09] and neither was the interaction 
between emotion and task type [F(4,66) = 0.76, MSE = 2.82, p < .55, partial eta
2
 
= .04]. Planned contrasts of the main effect of emotion revealed no significant 
difference in the recognition of neutral and emotional items [F(1,33) = 2.87, p = 
.10]. There was greater recognition of positive than negative items which was 
approaching significance [F(1,33) = 3.50, p = .07].  
Planned contrasts were also conducted on each of the recognition tasks 
separately. This revealed that for the task of straightforward recognition there 
was no significant difference between for recognition of emotional and neutral 
items [F(1,11) = 0.76, p = .40] nor between positive and negative items [F(1,11) = 
0.07, p = .80]. For recognition followed by a confidence judgement there was 
significantly greater recognition for emotional than neutral items (F(1,11) = 7.05, 
p < .05) and significantly greater recognition of positive than negative items 
(F(1,11) = 7.05, p < .05). For recognition followed by a RKN judgement there 
was no significant difference between for recognition of emotional and neutral 
items [F(1,11) = 0.01, p = .95] nor between positive and negative items [F(1,11) = 
1.08, p = .32]. 
 
The pattern of results found when analyzing the first block only is 
different from that when analyzing performance across all three blocks. 
However, the null effects of the ANOVA analysis must be interpreted with 
caution as the variances are greater due to the small number of participants in 
each between participants group (12).  
 
  
  309 
Appendix 4.1 
Analysis of Same, Similar and New responses to Same, Similar, 
New items 
Section 4.1.1 Analysis for Experiment 6 
The influence of emotion and scene component on the responses given 
to same, similar and new items was analysed by conducting separate ANOVAs 
on each of the different types of items for each experiment. The results from 
the three 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 3 (response type) repeated 
measures ANOVAs are reported below in Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Significant 
results are indicated  in bold type. The same analysis is reported for 
Experiments 7, 8, 9 & 10 in Appendices 4.1 and 5.1. 
In summary, the emotional influence on memory for specific details is 
shown by the greater number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items for emotional 
than neutral objects. The central-peripheral trade-off in memory is shown by 
the reduced number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items for backgrounds which 
were initially presented with negative than positive objects. There is some 
indication of an emotional influence on responses to similar items but 
responses to these items are difficult to interpret because correct responses may 
indicate either visual specificity of memory when participants recognise that 
they saw an item of that type before know that it was not that exact stimulus, or 
they may recognise that they saw an item of that type before but remember 
whether or not it was that exact stimulus. The lack of emotional influence on 
the responses to new items provides evidence that the results of emotional 
enhancement of visual specificity of memory are due to accuracy of memory, 
rather than a bias to give a recognition response to emotional stimuli.  
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Table 4.1.1. Results of ANOVAs on Same, Similar and New items 
Same items 
Effect ANOVA result 
Response type F(1.29,21.89) = 52.13, MSe = 5.97, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
.75 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: Same > Similar, Same > New 
(q = 12.97, 11.98, p <.001 all cases, respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.35,22.99) = 49.76, MSe = 3.74, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
.75 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: For objects Same > Similar, 
Same > New (q = 15.23, 16.14, p <.001 all cases, 
respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 0.68, MSe = 0.02, p = .61, !p
2 
= .04 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 4.28, MSe = 0.14, p < .01, !p
2 
= .20 
 See Planned contrasts for further analysis 
Similar items 
Response type F(1.50,25.53) = 3.21, MSe = 0.56, p = .05, !p
2 
= .16 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.81,30.70) = 20.05, MSe = 1.77, p < .001, !p
2 
= 
.54 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: For objects Similar > New, for 
backgrounds New > Same (q = 4.53, 5.21, p <.01 
all cases, respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 0.72, MSe = 0.02, p = .58, !p
2
 = .04 
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Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 1.92, MSe = 0.09, p = .12, !p
2
= .10 
New items 
Response type F(2,34) = 147.56, MSe = 13.10, p < .001, !p
2
 = .90 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: New > Same, New > Similar 
(q = 22.51, 19.10, p <.001 all cases, respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.33,22.54) = 10.59, MSe = 0.53, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
.38 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: For objects and backgrounds 
New > Same, New > Similar (Objects: q = 18.96, 
16.48, backgrounds: q = 12.88, 10.53, p < .001 
all cases, respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 0.09, MSe < 0.01, p = .99, !p
2
 = .01 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 0.40, MSe = 0.01, p = .81, !p
2
 = .02 
 
Table 4.1.2. Experiment 6 Ð Planned Contrasts 
 Background Object 
 Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive  
Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive 
SAME items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 4.19, 
p = .06 
Neg < Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.86, 
p < .05 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 9.70, 
p < .01 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.30, 
p = .59 
Similar Emo ! Neu Neg ! Pos Emo > Neu Neg ! Pos 
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response F(1,17) = 0.62, 
p = .44 
F(1,17) = 0.36, 
p = .56 
F(1,17) = 6.44, 
p < .05 
F(1,17) = 0.28, 
p = .60 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.62, 
p = .44 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 3.40, 
p = .08 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.94, 
p = .35 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.86, 
p = .19 
SIMILAR items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.62, 
p = .44 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.02, 
p = .88 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.99, 
p = .33 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) < 0.01, 
p = 1.00 
Similar 
response 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 5.58, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.86, 
p = .37 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.88, 
p = .36 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.72, 
p = .21 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.99, 
p = .18 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.17, 
p = .68 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 4.33, 
p = .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.52, 
p = .24 
New items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.01, 
p = .93 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.23, 
p = .64 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.04, 
p = .85 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.09, 
p = .77 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.38, 
p = .55 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.81, 
p = .38 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.01, 
p = .92 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.22, 
p = .64 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.22, 
p = .65 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.21, 
p = .65 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) < 0.01, 
p = 1.00 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.09, 
p = .77 
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Section 4.1.2 Analysis for Experiment 7 
  The influence of emotion and scene component on the responses given 
to same, similar and new items was analysed by conducting separate ANOVAs 
on each of the different types of items for each experiment. The results from 
the three 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 3 (response type) repeated 
measures ANOVAs are reported below in Tables 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. 
 In summary, the emotional influence on recognition of specific visual 
details was shown by a greater number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items for 
emotional than neutral objects. The central-peripheral trade-off was indicated 
by less ÔsameÕ responses to backgrounds that had initially been presented with 
negative than positive objects, although this finding was only approaching 
statistical significance. There was no overall emotional influence on responses 
to new items, although planned contrasts revealed that participants were more 
likely to give a correct ÔnewÕ response to new positive than negative items, and 
correspondingly more likely to give a ÔsimilarÕ response to new negative than 
positive items. This was the only experiment in which any influence of 
emotion was found on the responses given to new items and therefore it seems 
likely that this is an anomaly in the data as we have no explanation for why 
there would be a difference in responding to new items in this experiment only.  
 
Table 4.1.3.  Results of ANOVAs on Same, Similar and New items 
Same items 
Effect ANOVA result 
Response type F(1.35,22.99) = 37.37, MSe = 5.06, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
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.69 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: Same > Similar, Same > New 
(q = 10.49, 10.69, p < .001 all cases, 
respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 17.89, MSe = 1.87, p < .001, !p
2
 = .51 
 TukeyÕs post hoc: For object Same > Similar, 
Same >New, for background Same > Similar 
(Object: q = 11.28, 12.57, p < .001 all cases, 
background: q = 3.56, p < .05, respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 1.68, MSe = 0.06, p = .17, !p
2 
= .09 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 2.66, MSe = 0.07, p < .05, !p
2 
= .14 
 See Planned contrasts for further analysis 
Similar items 
Response type F(1.51,25.70) = 7.23, MSe = 1.09, p < .01, !p
2 
= .30 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Similar > Same (q = 5.32, p < 
.01) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 10.38, MSe = 0.81, p < .001, !p
2 
= .38 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Similar > Same, 
Similar > New, for backgrounds Similar > Same, 
New > Same (Objects: q = 3.94, p < .05; q = 
5.25, p < .01, Backgrounds: q = 3.59, 4.16, p < 
.05). 
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Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 0.93, MSe = 0.03, p = .45, !p
2
 = .05 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 1.74, MSe = 0.07, p = .15, !p
2
= .09 
New items 
Response type F(1.14,19.35) = 160.58, MSe = 15.07, p < .001, !p
2
 
= .90 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: New > Same, New > Similar, 
Similar > Same (q = 23.95, 19.16, 4.79, p < .001, 
.001,  .01) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.35,22.98) = 5.97, MSe = 0.11, p < .01, !p
2
 = .26 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects New > Similar, 
New > Same, Similar > Same and for 
backgrounds New > Same, New > Similar 
(Objects: q = 18.32, 14.82, 3.50, p < .001, .001, 
.05; Backgrounds: q = 15.55, 12.27, p < .001) 
Emotion* Response type F(2.43,41.23) = 3.10, MSe = 0.06, p < .05, !p
2
 = .15 
 See planned contrasts for further analysis. 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(2.18,39.97) = 0.11, MSe < 0.01, p = .98, !p
2
 = .01 
 
Table 4.1.4. Planned Contrasts 
 Background Object 
 Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive  
Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive 
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SAME items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.30, 
p = .59 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 3.37, 
p = .08 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 4.50, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.25, 
p = .63 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.24, 
p = .28 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.07, 
p = .79 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.12, 
p = .31 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.41, 
p = .53 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.34, 
p = .57 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.11, 
p = .06 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.92, 
p = .11 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.11, 
p = .75 
SIMILAR items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.10, 
p = .76 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.36, 
p = .26 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.64, 
p = .44 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.22, 
p = 65 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.57, 
p = .46 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.41, 
p = .53 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 3.20, 
p = .09 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.93, 
p = .35 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.18, 
p = .68 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.34, 
p = .57 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 9.26, 
p < .01 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.00, 
p = .33 
New items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.02, 
p = .90 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.06, 
p = .82 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.06, 
p = .81 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.14, 
p = .72 
Similar Emo ! Neu Neg ! Pos Emo ! Neu Neg > Pos 
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response F(1,17) = 0.25, 
p = .63 
F(1,17) = 2.74, 
p = .12 
F(1,17) = 0.01, 
p = .94 
F(1,17) = 4.48, 
p < .05 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.20, 
p = .66 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.84, 
p = .19 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.03, 
p = .87 
Neg < Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.73, 
p < .05 
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Appendix 5.1. Analysis of Same, Similar, New Responses to Same, Similar, 
New items 
 
 Section 5.1 Analysis for Experiment 8 
The influence of emotion and scene component on the responses given 
to same, similar and new items was analysed by conducting separate ANOVAs 
on each of the different types of items for each experiment. The results from 
the three 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 3 (response type) repeated 
measures ANOVAs are reported below in Tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. Significant 
results are indicated  in bold type. The analysis reported here is the same as that 
conducted for Experiments 6 & 7 and reported in Appendix 4.1. 
In summary, the emotional influence on memory for specific visual 
details was shown by the greater number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items for 
emotional than neutral objects. The central-peripheral trade-off was indicated 
by few ÔsameÕ responses to same items for backgrounds that were initially 
presented with negative than positive objects, although this difference was only 
approaching statistical significance. As described above in Appendix 4.1, the 
responses to similar items are difficult to interpret. The responses to new items 
indicated no emotional influence on a bias to respond to emotional items as if 
there was recognition even when there was no recognition present for that item. 
 
Table 5.1.1.  Results of ANOVAs on Same, Similar and New items 
Same items 
Effect ANOVA result 
Response type F(2,34) = 40.45, MSe = 5.46, p < .001, !p
2
 = .70 
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 TukeyÕs post hocs: Same > New, Same > Similar 
(q = 10.28, 11.63, p < .001 all cases, 
respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.23,20.89) = 37.05, MSe = 3.07, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
.69 
 TukeyÕs post hocs:  For objects Same > Similar, 
Same > new, for backgrounds Same > Similar 
(Objects: q = 12.83, 13.85, p < .001 all cases, 
backgrounds: q = 3.61, p < .05) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 2.07, MSe = 0.05, p = .10, !p
2 
= .11 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 3.40, MSe = 0.08, p < .05, !p
2 
= .17 
 For further analysis see planned contrasts. 
Similar items 
Response type F(2,34) = 9.55, MSe = 1.25, p < .001, !p
2 
= .36 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Similar > Same, Same > New 
(q = 6.01, 4.25, p < .001, .05 respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 15.12, MSe = 1.44, p < .001, !p
2 
= .47 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Similar > Same, 
New > Similar, for backgrounds New > Similar 
(Objects: q =5.17, 5.68, p < .01, .001, 
Backgrounds: q = 6.53, p < .001 respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 3.00, MSe = 0.09, p < .05, !p
2
 = .15 
 For further analysis see planned contrasts. 
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Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(2.70,45.95) = 2.66, MSe = 0.09, p < .05, !p
2
= .14 
 For further analysis see planned contrasts. 
New items 
Response type F(1.10,18.87) = 260.80, MSe = 19.89, p < .001, !p
2
 
= .94 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: New > Same, New > Similar, 
Similar > Same (q = 30.14, 25.13, 5.01, p < .001, 
.001, .01) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.23,20.82) = 4.54, MSe = 0.10, p < .05, !p
2
 = .21 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects New > Same, 
New > Similar, for backgrounds New > Same, 
New > Similar, Similar > Same (Objects: q = 
22.42, 19.34, p < .001; backgrounds: q = 20.20, 
16.20, 4.00, p < .001, .001, .05 respectively) 
Emotion* Response type F(2.32,39.36) = 1.64, MSe = 0.03, p = .17, !p
2
 = .09 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(1.95,33.13) = 0.59, MSe = 0.01, p = .67, !p
2
 = .03 
 
Table 5.1.2. Planned Contrasts 
 Background Object 
 Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive  
Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive 
SAME items 
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Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.32, 
p = .15 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.38, 
p = .05 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 6.47, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 3.77, 
p = .07 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.25, 
p = .15 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.29, 
p = .60 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.91, 
p = .11 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.25, 
p = .06 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.09, 
p = .93 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 5.13, 
p < .05 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 3.55, 
p  = .08 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.19, 
p = .67 
SIMILAR items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.40, 
p = .54 
Neg < Pos 
F(1,17) = 7.46, 
p < .05 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 
10.88, p < .01 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 5.39, 
p < .05 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.70, 
p = .42 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.55, 
p = .47 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.17, 
p = .69 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.54, 
p = .47 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.22,  
p = .15 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.15, 
p = .30 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 7.34, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.69, 
p = .12 
New items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.11, 
p = .75 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.52, 
p = .48 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.89, 
p = .19 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.19, 
p = .67 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.95, 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.37, 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.04, 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.25, 
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p = .34 p = .55 p = .84 p  = .06 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.83, 
p = .37 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.06, 
p = .81 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.27, 
p = .61 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.99, 
p = .10 
 
 
Section 5.1.2 Analysis for Experiment 9 
The influence of emotion and scene component on the responses given 
to same, similar and new items was analysed by conducting separate ANOVAs 
on each of the different types of items for each experiment. The results from 
the three 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 3 (response type) repeated 
measures ANOVAs are reported below in Tables 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.  
In summary, the influence of emotion on memory for specific visual 
details was shown by the greater number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items for 
emotional than neutral objects. The central-peripheral trade-off was not 
significant in this experiment but the results are in the same direction as for 
other experiments. Although there was a significant interaction for the new 
items between emotion, scene component and response type, no emotional 
influences were apparent on responses to new items when planned contrasts 
were conducted; therefore, it appears that consistent with responses in the other 
experiments, there was no emotional influence on responses to items that had 
not been seen before. 
 
Table 5.1.3.  Results of ANOVAs on Same, Similar and New items 
Same items 
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Effect ANOVA result 
Response type F(1.41,24.05) = 39.34, MSe = 6.84, p < .001, !p
2
 = 
.70 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Same > Similar, Same > New 
(q = 10.99, 10.73, p < .001 all cases, 
respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 27.83, MSe = 2.18, p < .001, !p
2
 = .62 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Same > Similar, 
Same > New, for backgrounds Same > Similar 
(Objects: q = 10.97, 12.52, p < .001; 
Backgrounds: q = 4.57, p < .01) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 1.23, MSe = 0.05, p = .31, !p
2 
= .07 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 3.93, MSe = 0.12, p < .01, !p
2 
= .19 
 For further analysis see Planned Contrasts.  
Similar items 
Response type F(2,34) = 7.52, MSe = 1.10, p < .01, !p
2 
= .31 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Similar > Same (q = 5.44, p < 
.01) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 21.34, MSe = 2.39, p < .001, !p
2 
= .56 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Similar > Same, 
Similar > New, for backgrounds New > Same 
(Objects: q = 6.23, 8.05, p < .001 all cases; 
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Backgrounds: q = 4.80, p < .01 respectively). 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 1.56, MSe = 0.04, p = .20, !p
2
 = .08 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 3.20, MSe = 0.13, p < .02, !p
2
= .16 
 See planned contrasts for further analysis 
New items 
Response type F(1.16,19.69) = 440.65, MSe = 20.83, p < .001, !p
2
 
= .96 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: New > Same, New > Similar, 
Similar > Same (q = 38.61, 33.58, 5.03, p < .001, 
.001, .01 respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(1.10,18.69) = 2.42, MSe = 0.06, p = .10, !p
2
 = .12 
Emotion* Response type F(1.81,30.72) = 0.28, MSe = 0.01, p = .89, !p
2
 = .02 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(2.52,42.85) = 3.36, MSe = 0.05, p < .05, !p
2
 = .17 
 See planned contrasts for further analysis 
 
Table 5.1.4. Planned Contrasts 
 Background Object 
 Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive  
Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive 
SAME items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.04, 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.87, 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 7.44, 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.91, 
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p = .84 p = .19 p < .05 p = .11 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.24, 
p = .28 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.79, 
p = .39 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.38, 
p = .14 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.04, 
p = .06 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.25, 
p = .15 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.84, 
p = .37 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 7.17, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.11, 
p = .75 
SIMILAR items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.41, 
p = .53 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.22, 
p = .28 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.17, 
p = .29 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.74, 
p = .21 
Similar 
response 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 6.11, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.05, 
p = .82 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 5.48, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.46, 
p = .14 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.82, 
p = .20 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.67, 
p = .21 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 
12.20, p < .01 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.56, 
p = .47 
New items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) < 0.00, 
p = 1.00 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.96, 
p = .10 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.63, 
p = .44 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.32, 
p = .58 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.72, 
p = .41 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.35, 
p = .26 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.75, 
p = .12 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.00, 
p  = .06 
New Emo ! Neu Neg ! Pos Emo ! Neu Neg !  Pos 
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response F(1,17) = 0.95, 
p = .34 
F(1,17) = 0.25, 
p = .63 
F(1,17) = 0.97, 
p = .34 
F(1,17) = 2.70, 
p = .12 
 
Section 5.1.3 Analysis for Experiment 10 
The influence of emotion and scene component on the responses given 
to same, similar and new items was analysed by conducting separate ANOVAs 
on each of the different types of items for each experiment. The results from 
the three 3 (emotion) x 2 (scene component) x 3 (response type) repeated 
measures ANOVAs are reported below in Tables 5.1.5 and 5.1.6. 
In summary, the emotional influence on memory for specific visual 
details was apparent in the greater number of ÔsameÕ responses to same items 
for emotional than neutral objects. The central-peripheral trade-off was not 
significant in this experiment but, as described above, the pattern of results was 
the same as for the other experiments. There was no indication of any 
emotional influence on responding to items in the absence of recognition, as 
evidenced by lack of any emotional effects on responses to new items.  
 
Table 5.1.5.  Results of ANOVAs on Same, Similar and New items 
Same items 
Effect ANOVA result 
Response type F(2,34) = 36.35, MSe = 4.56, p < .001, !p
2
 = .68 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Same > Similar, Same > New 
(q = 11.17, 9.51, p < .001 all cases, respectively) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 32.74, MSe = 2.16, p < .001, !p
2
 = .66 
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 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Same > Similar, 
Same > New, for backgrounds Same > Similar 
(Objects: q = 11.53, 12.54, p < .001; 
Backgrounds q = 4.28, p < .05) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 2.30, MSe = 0.08, p = .07, !p
2 
= .12 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 9.16, MSe = 0.24, p < .001, !p
2 
= .35 
 For further analysis see planned contrasts 
Similar items 
Response type F(2,34) = 3.84, MSe = 0.52, p < .05, !p
2 
= .18 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: Similar > Same (q = 3.91, p < 
.05) 
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 28.79, MSe = 1.55, p < .001, !p
2 
= .63 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: For objects Similar > Same, 
Similar > New, for backgrounds New > Same 
(Objects: q = 3.76, 6.13, p < .05, .001; 
backgrounds q = 4.78, p < .01) 
Emotion* Response type F(4,68) = 2.38, MSe = 0.10, p = .06, !p
2
 = .12 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(4,68) = 1.92, MSe = 0.09, p = .12, !p
2
= .10 
New items 
Response type F(1.34,22.75) = 332.39, MSe = 20.67, p < .001, !p
2
 
= .95 
 TukeyÕs post hocs: New > Same, New > Similar, 
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Similar > Same (q = 33.33, 29.47, 3.86, p < .001, 
.001, .05 respectively)  
Scene component* 
Response type 
F(2,34) = 0.57, MSe = 0.02, p = .57, !p
2
 = .03 
Emotion* Response type F(2.25,38.25) = 0.82, MSe = 0.02, p = .52, !p
2
 = .05 
Scene component* 
emotion* response type 
F(2.34,39.86) = 1.42, MSe = 0.02, p = .24, !p
2
 = .08 
 
Table 5.1.6. Planned Contrasts 
 Background Object 
 Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive  
Emotional vs. 
Neutral 
Negative vs. 
Positive 
SAME items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.37, 
p = .14 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.59, 
p = .13 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 
19.47, p < 
.001 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 2.74, 
p = .12 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.21, 
p = .65 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.46, 
p = .51 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 6.75, 
p < .05 
Neg < Pos 
F(1,17) = 4.62, 
p < .05 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 3.85, 
p = .07 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 5.82, 
p < .05 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 8.19, 
p < .05 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) < 0.01, 
p = 1.00 
SIMILAR items 
Same Emo ! Neu Neg ! Pos Emo ! Neu Neg ! Pos 
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response F(1,17) = 1.95, 
p = .18 
F(1,17) = 0.08, 
p = .78 
F(1,17) = 1.80, 
p = .20 
F(1,17) = 1.67, 
p = .21 
Similar 
response 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.26, 
p = .28 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) < 0.00, 
p = 1.00 
Emo > Neu 
F(1,17) = 8.70, 
p < .01 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.79, 
p = .39 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.02, 
p = .90 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.05, 
p = .83 
Emo < Neu 
F(1,17) = 
11.96, p < .01 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.03, 
p = .87 
New items 
Same 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.23, 
p = .64 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.36, 
p = .26 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 1.80, 
p = .20 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 3.40, 
p = .08 
Similar 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.14, 
p = .71 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 3.77, 
p = .07 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.53, 
p = .48 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.17, 
p  = .68 
New 
response 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 0.33, 
p = .57 
Neg ! Pos 
F(1,17) = 1.05, 
p = .32 
Emo ! Neu 
F(1,17) = 2.07, 
p = .17 
Neg > Pos 
F(1,17) = 0.04, 
p = .85 
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Appendix 5.2. Analysis of Variance in Ratings of Encoding Task 
for Experiments 9 and 10 
 The variance in ratings for the encoding task for Experiments 9 and 10 
was analysed by calculated the standard deviation in ratings given by each 
participant for scenes with a negative, neutral or positive object. This revealed 
a greater degree of variance in the ratings given in Experiment 9 where the 
scenes were blocked into those of the same emotion, compared to the ratings 
given in Experiment 10 when the scenes were presented in a 
pseudorandomised order (See Table 5.1.7). Participants were given a cue as to 
the emotion of the next scenes in each Experiment, although in Experiment 9 
this was only indicated at the start of each block, whereas in Experiment 10 
this was indicated before each item. Paired samples t-tests were used to 
statistically compare these values between Experiments. This revealed no 
statistically significant difference between the values for Experiment 9 and 10 
(Negative: t(34) = 1.07, p = .29; Neutral: t(34) = 1.37, p = .18; Positive t(34) = 
1.35, p = .19). 
 
Table 5.1.7. Average standard deviations for ratings of approach / avoidance in 
encoding task for Experiments 9 and 10 
 Experiment 9 Experiment 10 
Negative 1.31 1.16 
Neutral 1.12 0.95 
Positive 1.23 1.05 
 
